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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This research examines the proposition that ethics in business 
functions as part of legitimising narratives, rather than as a normative 
framework to guide or assess behaviour. 
Methodology: The applied ethics context of the acquisition of UK military 
capabilities is employed as a case study to test the proposition. Adopting a 
critical realist paradigm, Bourdieu’s theory of practice is applied in two stages. 
Quantitative (survey) and qualitative (narrative interview) data are collected, 
from which a Weberian ideal type is developed via narrative analysis. 
Findings: The results reveal that the public/private sector interface should be 
understood as a Bourdieusian practice, in which people use narratives involving 
normative ethical claims as a means of delegitimising options that threaten their 
field positions and capital accumulations. It is argued that akrasia – acting 
against one’s best interests – can be explained in these terms, and that even if 
a normative ethics of Defence acquisition is one day possible, any theory of 
ethics should – for completion – attempt to take account of how ethics serves to 
support or delegitimise specific narratives in the business of acquisition. 
Research limitations/implications: The research builds on the literature on 
akrasia, suggesting that the options available to people in business are 
behaviourally as well as cognitively limited. Moreover, potential codes of ethics 
are overruled by symbolic power within a practice and hence have no effect. 
The research is not longitudinal and is limited to a case study that necessarily 
involved unrepresentative populations, although the methodology facilitates 
generalisation. Further work on public/private sector interfaces is needed to 
explore how other populations narrate challenges to convention. 
Originality/value: The research represents a novel application of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice to the context of public/private sector integration and uniquely 
to Defence acquisition, disputing the viability and utility of codes of ethics as 
part of professionalising the acquisition function. It also offers a sociological 
explanation of akrasia. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of ethics has a long and storied history that, from the early twentieth 
century, has increasingly been applied to business (Abend, 2013). At its most 
general, ethics means a systematic conception of right and wrong behaviour 
(Fieser, 2003). However, the implications of ethics for the intersection of public 
and private sectors have been little considered and can be counterintuitive or 
even undermine codes of practice. 
Consider the context of UK Defence acquisition, or ‘[t]he activities of setting and 
managing requirements, negotiating and letting contracts, project and 
technology management, support and termination or disposal based on a 
through life approach to acquiring military capability’ (Ministry of Defence, 2009; 
the more commonly used term procurement refers only to the purchasing of 
equipment or a service). Suppose that two acquisition agents want a military 
capability programme they are involved with to succeed. One intends to 
deliberately ignore public sector processes and behave in whatever way 
necessary to achieve her aim, but she does not understand acquisition as well 
as she believes and the programme succeeds in spite of rather than because of 
her actions. Meanwhile, the other instead follows the mandated processes 
almost to the letter and delivers the programme, but accidentally commits a 
serious violation of procurement law. Judging the second agent harsher than 
the first is intuitive, perhaps because people are inclined to overlook unethical 
behaviour if it suits them to do so, but it is unclear how such a preference is 
justified. (This example is adapted from Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011.) 
Now imagine a change in the scenario: this time, both agents behave 
unethically yet succeed in delivering their programmes. However, a random 
audit selects the second instance and the agent’s behaviour is discovered. By 
construction, there is no difference between the two agents; one was just 
unfortunate enough to be caught (adapted from Michaelson, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this grants luck an important role in ethics, which can be 
extremely problematic (Nagel, 1993); after all, if organisations are – or become 
– too complex to be controlled in detail, it is difficult for acquisition agents to be 
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held to account if the success or failure of their work is in significant measure 
due to chance. 
Suppose instead that an acquisition agent deliberately distorts (reduces) the 
anticipated cost of a programme to help it secure funding, but the amount then 
doubles once reality takes over. However, the agent’s hidden aim was to better 
satisfy the end user, who is eventually provided with a capability that saves lives 
on operations. Those responsible for the funding may be inclined to describe 
this conspiracy as unethical, but for the user the ends justified the means. It is 
then problematic to call such actions unethical if agents ‘have a systematic 
incentive to underestimate the likely cost of equipment’ (Gray, 2009: 6). 
Finally, consider another story: this time, an acquisition agent is corrupted into 
giving – or deliberately chooses to give – preferential treatment to a ‘British’ 
company. Everyone then agrees that this action benefitted the UK economy 
overall, particularly the sustainment of engineering skills. Whether this should 
be called unethical depends on different ethical perspectives, but now the agent 
can argue that the question is also one of national strategy. The Government or 
the acquisition system could respond by insisting that the agent did not behave 
as the acquisition procedures require, but if the agent declares that she has 
chosen to prioritise securing British jobs over European procurement law 
because it is the right thing to do then pointing to the process will have little 
impact on her reasoning.  
These examples, although hypothetical, suggest that any answer to the 
question of what counts as unethical in Defence acquisition will not be 
straightforward. This is because the procurement and support of military 
capabilities is undertaken in at least two contexts: the large but limited context 
of business, which spans the public and private sectors, and the wider context 
of society, of which business generally and Defence more specifically are parts. 
Both have ethics associated with them: the ethics that should inform how 
people conduct themselves in business – hence business ethics – and the 
ethics that advises how everyone should behave in society. Defence acquisition 
could be guided by the ethics of the society it operates within, but typically its 
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activities span national borders. It could also be bound by theories of business 
ethics, but the acquisition context may be unique, such that it requires a new 
theory of acquisition ethics. 
1.1 Ethics in Defence acquisition 
This research explored the Defence acquisition context from an empirical, 
sociological perspective to better understand what can or cannot be said about 
a theory of business ethics in acquisition. Rather than directly apply traditional, 
normative theories of ethics that prescribe what is ethical and what is not 
(Dancy, 2013), this research argues that existing approaches do not account for 
people’s behaviour and that what is more important is how people use ethics 
when they talk about business decisions. For example, as the UK Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) increasingly outsources more of its traditionally core functions, 
and as senior figures are caught in political scandals in which they appear to 
have sold their influence, a narrative of an unethical ‘revolving door’ between 
the MOD and the Defence Industry has gained prominence (David-Barrett, 
2011). According to some versions of this narrative, which are replicated in the 
survey and interview data in this research, the Defence Industry is parasitic on 
the MOD, and the ‘poaching’ of public sector workers to positions in the private 
sector underpins an adversarial relationship. However, identifying a rule that 
defines this movement of people’s employment as unethical and including it in a 
code of ethics is problematic, as the literature review in Chapter 2 clarifies. 
Moreover, there is very little research on the impact of such codes and people 
may ignore or resist them even if they have agreed to them (Helin and 
Sandström, 2010) 
Although this issue of so-called ‘revolving doors’ has been studied in the 
contexts of political transparency and business ethics, there is little research on 
the impact of the ever-closer links between customer and supplier in Defence 
acquisition and how these may challenge the dominant, oppositional account. 
Those who argue that the relationship is more accurately characterised as 
interdependent have not directly considered the influence of narratives in 
precluding what might be better – in business terms – for the overall Defence 
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sector; for example, that the movement of people between sectors with blurred 
boundaries should be considered both natural and desirable (Zaring, 2013; Tan, 
2013; Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2011). In particular, the ethical objections 
associated with the closeness or otherwise of public and private sectors in UK 
Defence have not been considered from a sociological viewpoint that examines 
how narratives shape what is or is not permitted. Therefore, this research seeks 
to address this gap in present understanding by examining how narratives 
shape legitimacy in business. 
1.2 Research question 
The overall research question addressed in this research was thus: How does 
ethics function in narratives of Defence acquisition? The investigation explored 
what people in Defence say when they talk about the relationship between the 
MOD and the Defence Industry, and what this suggests about the role of ethics 
in narratives of Defence acquisition. The proposition offered, with empirical 
support, is that these narratives use ethics to legitimise the courses of action 
that could be taken, rather than to do the right thing according to a theory of 
ethics. As a basic example, when the employment of women in front line roles 
was being considered by the MOD, critics pointed to the supposedly negative 
influence on military ethos and, therefore, the risk to life on operations (‘every 
infantryman knows that the price for this social engineering experiment will be 
paid in blood’), attempting to delegitimise an option that was eventually taken 
(Kemp, 2016). How this form of narrative functions in Defence acquisition was 
the focus of the research. 
1.3 Structure of the research 
The research is set out across six subsequent chapters. Firstly, in Chapter 2 a 
detailed literature review explores business ethics, identifying several themes 
and the limitations of studies to date. It is argued that normative ethics is easily 
overwhelmed by the detail of specific contexts, a difficulty that is illustrated 
through thought experiments that initially appear easy to interpret but soon 
contradict people’s intuitions and conflict with the ordinary behaviours expected 
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in Defence acquisition or anywhere else. Normative ethics is then contrasted 
with descriptive approaches, which examine how people actually act when 
confronted with ethical problems. The implications of neuroscientific and 
behavioural science research are explored and renewed emphasis is placed on 
the conflict between current perspectives on Defence acquisition and the reality 
of people’s cognitive limitations, which are not addressed by existing codes of 
ethics. Finally, an alternative conception is set out, in which ethics is understood 
as forming part of how power is exercised within organisations. The literature 
review proposes that even if a normative ethics of Defence acquisition is one 
day possible, any theory of ethics should – for completion – attempt to take 
account of how ethics serves to support or delegitimise specific narratives in the 
business of acquisition.  
To limit the scope of the research, Chapter 3 explains the aims and objectives, 
together with the detail of a case study that was selected as a vehicle to 
conduct the empirical work. The chapter characterises the literature gap from 
the prior review and how the research addresses this, stating its rationale and 
explicit intent through the research question above. The case study is situated 
relative to the literature and its appropriateness is justified. 
Having examined the available literature and having considered the case study 
to be employed, Chapter 4 sets out the methodology used in researching the 
use of ethics in narratives. This is undertaken by describing the research 
paradigm, including a critical discussion of the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological commitments. In particular, it is argued that the use of a critical 
case study is necessary to construct, through narrative analysis, an ideal type to 
permit inferences about the whole – Defence acquisition, or business ethics 
across the public/private sector interface more generally – from the detail of a 
single, ‘paradigmatic case’ (Biernacki, 2012: 148). Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of 
practice as a theoretical framework for social inquiry is explained and its use in 
this research is justified as providing the best fit for an exploration of business 
ethics in the acquisition context. 
 6 
The results and findings in Chapter 5 display the quantitative and qualitative 
data obtained through the research. In addition to providing analysis of the 
results, it explores the use of narratives and how ethics forms a vital part of 
them. The penultimate discussion in Chapter 6 then brings together the 
literature and the findings to develop an ideal type to account for the results and 
suggest an answer to the overall research question. This is offered as a best 
explanation for why Defence acquisition has achieved limited success in 
integrating customer and supplier roles to deliver improvements (Gray, 2009). 
Finally, a conclusion in Chapter 7 summarises the research, including its 
implications and recommendations for further study. 
1.4 Scope 
An important qualification in this research is that it made a deliberate choice to 
focus on how people narrate their experiences using ethics, rather than ethics 
itself. Therefore, for the purposes of this work, it does not matter what should or 
should not happen in Defence acquisition: no ethical position is taken with 
regard to how people may behave or have behaved, and there is no advocacy 
of what ought or ought not to happen with regard to the case study or to 
acquisition in general, except insofar as critical realism as a research paradigm 
implies a search for better ways of undertaking acquisition. 
Secondly, the research focused on the relationship between the MOD and the 
Defence Industry, but recognised that what counts as the latter is contested and 
is increasingly complicated by the global role of companies involved in Defence 
acquisition (Dorman, Uttley and Wilkinson, 2015). To address this difficulty, the 
UK Defence Industry has been characterised as ‘all defence suppliers that 
create value, employment, technology or intellectual assets in the UK’, whether 
UK or foreign-owned (MOD, 2002: 4). This then implies characterising the UK 
Defence Industry ‘in terms of where the technology is created, where the skills 
and intellectual property reside, where jobs are created and sustained, and 
where the investment is made’ (MOD, 2002: 9). This was the definition of ‘the 
UK Defence Industry’ employed throughout this research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Business ethics has a significant academic pedigree and, after an overview of 
why business ethics is important, this literature review is focused on four key 
themes that emerge from an examination of the existing research: the centrality 
of normative ethics, imported from philosophy; the major theories of business 
ethics and their influence on the principal-agent problem; the challenge of 
empirical research that describes how people actually behave with respect to 
ethics; and the application to business ethics of sociological perspectives on 
both the role of social identity and the influence of social power. These themes 
are related throughout to the research context of Defence acquisition. The 
review concludes with options for further research, as well as a link to the 
theoretical framework to be employed, which is covered in detail in the 
methodology chapter. 
As set out in the introduction, this chapter situates the work within the larger 
business ethics research base. To explore what an ethics of Defence 
acquisition might consist in, the literature review was undertaken via keyword 
search against the search strings ‘business ethics’, ‘acquisition’, ‘procurement’, 
‘procurement ethics’, and combinations thereof. Citation searching was then 
used to expand the scope to related papers and – given the results, explained 
below – to take a sociological perspective, which added ‘identity’, ‘sociology’, 
‘Bourdieu’, ‘theory of practice’ to the keyword search. This captured the 
headings in this review and the associated literature. The primary database 
employed was EBSCO through Cranfield University’s Barrington Digital Library, 
supported by Google Scholar, ABI Inform and Emerald Insight. An important 
limitation, particularly in the later use of Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of practice, 
was that the literature was limited to publications in English and, therefore, 
excluded un-translated French discussion of Bourdieu’s work. 
2.1 Ethics and Business 
Any discussion of ethics begins with the difficulty of defining it. The term ethics 
is often conflated with morality or the separation of good and bad behaviour, but 
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ethics is instead a conception of moral judgments: where morality is concerned 
with choices, ethics is about the reasoning that justifies them (Razzaque and 
Hwee, 2002). For example, a personal belief that infidelity is always and 
everywhere wrong is a moral claim; an explanation shared with others to 
convince them to believe similarly constitutes an ethical statement. Historically, 
morality developed from the obedience owed to God and to religious authority 
into a conception of self-governance (Schneewind, 1998). The study of morality 
and its extension to collective self-governance is thus ethics (Singer, 2002), in 
which morality becomes social and functions as a form of collective conscience 
(Swartz, 2010). 
Ethics can be common to all situations or limited to a specific context, such as 
business, and is typically represented as a set of rules of behaviour that govern 
how individuals should behave, which sit over and above their own, personal 
sense of morality. If ‘the good’ designates what should be valued, then ‘the 
right’ codifies what should be done (Sullivan, 2006). These rules should be 
higher than the legal minimum (Backof and Martin, 1991). Indeed, without this 
distinction between law and ethics, it would not be possible to make sense of 
claims that what is (or was) legally permissible can nevertheless be judged 
unethical; for example, the owning of slaves or participation in genocide at times 
in history when these were allowed or even encouraged by the existing legal 
framework. In this respect, business ethics is considered vital in addressing 
corruption in procurement and other fields of business activity where actions 
that may be legal are nevertheless opposed as unethical (Sullivan, 2006). 
The most common experience of ethics for individuals is via ethical dilemmas, 
or situations in which people are faced with conflicting values; for example, 
whether a person should adhere to an ethical principle against stealing or 
instead to a duty to provide food for her family (Landeros and Plank, 1996). 
Ethics should aid in resolving this kind of predicament and, in both business and 
personal contexts, provide accountability by demonstrating that activities have 
been conducted properly, or at least not in violation of societal expectations 
(Webley, 2001). Indeed, one challenge is that behaving unethically can often be 
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profitable in the short-term, but in the longer-term it damages reputation 
because trust is lost (Keller, Lindberg, Vickers and Williams, 2006). 
Although business ethics is now described in the literature as an example of 
applied ethics, owing primarily to the complexity of the commercial environment 
(Withers and Maling, 2013), this is a recent conceptual separation and it had 
previously been assumed that everyday ethics would suffice, rendering any 
distinction artificial (Sinclair, 1993). Business ethicists now agree that 
commerce requires at least some form of consensus on obligations – such as 
trust and accuracy of information – to ensure that supply chains can function 
(Webley, 2001). Moreover, ethics forces its way into business because if there 
were no societal needs then there would be no place for business to serve 
them; so, in this sense, the opportunity for commerce to contribute to society 
depends on the existence of shortfalls or inefficiencies (Michaelson, 2008). By 
the same token, ethics must be part of national defence because people’s 
security needs have to be met, not to mention the larger context of the ethics of 
maintaining and employing military capabilities in the first place (Byrne, 2010). 
The study of business ethics as a specific discipline began in the early twentieth 
century as a consequence of public pressure on businesses to act in the wake 
of numerous scandals (Abend, 2013). However, in spite of the ancient 
philosophical history of ethics, discussed in more detail below, business ethics 
was not researched significantly prior to the 1990s (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). 
Instead, ethics was the domain of philosophers and, if it was taught at all on 
business courses, the education was prescriptive and normative, setting out 
what could be learned from philosophy and how people ought to behave, 
whether in business or in any other part of life. This approach also allowed 
decisions to be assessed in ethical terms, but only by appealing to philosophy. 
Even if answers could be found in philosophy, the extent to which they could be 
accessed was at issue. Based on work in cognitive development, originating 
with Piaget (1950), it was argued that ethics depends largely on how developed 
a person’s reasoning is. That is, given an assumption that philosophy already 
provides a guide to how to behave, the more ethically developed a person is, 
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the closer they should be able to get to the correct assessment. Kohlberg 
(1981) and Rest (1986) provided models that accommodated different levels of 
reasoning and suggested that people can be capable of ethical judgment yet 
still behave unethically if they fail to reason at the higher stages, in which 
intention is explicitly involved. 
Research into business ethics began to challenge this approach, based on the 
commonplace that even good people sometimes do bad things (Bazerman and 
Gino, 2012). Several infamous experiments showed that people can be 
overwhelmed by the circumstances they find themselves in, such as in 
Milgram’s (1963) investigations of obedience to authority or the Stanford Prison 
experiment (Zimbardo, 2007); both demonstrated that people could be made to 
behave in ways that they would otherwise recognise as unethical. Indeed, 
although public concern over ethics tends to focus on the actions of individuals, 
unethical behaviour has since been shown to be widespread in organisations 
and not attributable to specific individuals or groups (Misangyi, Weaver and 
Elms, 2008). Consequently, other explanations have been sought, which are 
identified in Section 2.5 below. 
2.1.1 Ethics and acquisition 
If business is an instance of applied ethics then the acquisition context is more 
specific still. At its most basic level, the Defence sector is indirectly responsible 
for the harm caused by weapons systems, whether to individuals or to the 
environment, through the provision of these systems (Byrne, 2007). 
Programmes may opt to invest more or less time in minimising undesired harm, 
such as collateral damage to non-military targets, and these are decisions for 
the Defence Industry as supplier and for the MOD as customer through 
requirements setting (Halpern and Snider, 2010). Whether the use of military 
weapons can be ethical at all is contested (Byrne, 2010), but – on the 
assumption that it can be, or given that such systems currently are acquired and 
used – this provision for the use of force creates a special regulatory context for 
the public and private sectors (Halpern and Snider, 2010), as well as tension 
where ethics is not also blended across the two (Roberts, 2010). 
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In general, unethical behaviour in acquisition takes two forms: deliberate action, 
which is typically also illegal; and indirect omission or negligence, usually driven 
by organisational pressures such as a desire for promotion (Latiff, 2015). 
Examples of deliberate action are when individuals involved in acquisition 
accept gifts or other inducements, provide unfair advantage to particular 
suppliers, or exploit information asymmetry (Saini, 2010). Historical examples of 
such behaviour in acquisition range from bribery and using political influence to 
deliberately selling faulty goods for profit at times of war (Latiff, 2015). 
Ethical problems arise throughout the acquisition process. At the requirements 
setting stage, since supplier companies have an interest in winning new 
business and will not survive if they do not, they may attempt to convince the 
customer that a new system is necessary when it is not; meanwhile, acquisition 
agents or sponsors seeking greater influence may support them in doing so 
(Latiff, 2015). Moreover, once an acquisition programme exists, the prospects of 
the people involved – both public and private sector – are bound up in its 
success, which influences their behaviour and creates incentives to over-
promise to seniors, to minimise cost predictions or plans, to refuse to accept 
and account for technological uncertainty, to reduce the time and effort 
allocated to testing, or to oversimplify requirements that will then have to be 
improved through greater investment; in short, ‘many participants in the 
procurement system have a vested interest in optimistically mis-estimating the 
outcome’ (Gray, 2009: 19). Even decisions about where to build or support 
capabilities can be subject to political intervention and governments, elected 
representatives, and large companies have been accused of exerting influence 
(Halpern and Snider, 2010). 
The need for ethics in acquisition was recognised in the UK’s Defence Values 
for Acquisition in the previous Defence Industrial Strategy (MOD, 2005), and 
more recently as acquisition has increasingly been professionalised and as 
behavioural incentives to underestimate costs have been identified (Gray, 
2009). To assure ethical behaviour, the public sector has insisted that 
contractors have deliberate codes of ethics, supported by training programmes 
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(GAO, 2005), utilising better governance to ensure that procurement functions 
fulfil an ethical obligation to reduce social harm (Alder and Gooch, 2013). 
However, unethical behaviour is most likely to be caused by acquisition agents 
working to unachievable aims or timelines (Keller et al., 2006) and, without 
incentives to behave differently, merely committing to ethical codes does not 
address the potential rewards of acting unethically in business (Kurland, 1993).  
Therefore, this presents a problem to anyone seeking to understand what 
counts as ethical in Defence acquisition or to improve performance (Gray, 
2009). To pursue the claim of a shortfall in codes of ethics and to add more 
detail to the overview of business ethics, the four key themes introduced above 
are now covered in turn, beginning with the historical focus on ethics as being 
exclusively the domain of philosophy. 
2.2 Normative ethics 
As has already been noted, normative approaches to ethics originate in 
philosophy, of which ethics is a significant element (Schneewind, 1998). They 
are prescriptive insofar as philosophical consideration of an ethical problem is 
intended to reveal the correct (ethical) course of action; that is, they seek to 
identify norms to govern conduct. Normative ethics can invoke principles that 
either absolutely determine an act to be unethical (for instance, ‘it is always and 
everywhere wrong to kill someone’) or else judge it in a contributory sense (that 
an act involves killing someone must count against it, but there may also be 
other principles involved) (Dancy, 2013). Nevertheless, given a normative 
theory of ethics, the right thing to do in the face of an ethical dilemma is 
whatever the theory prescribes. Although this need not imply that everyone is or 
should be a philosopher, people are at least supposed to consider ethical 
decisions rationally and judge as a philosopher presumably would (Palazzo, 
Krings and Hoffrage, 2011). Normative theories thus have two aims: the 
theoretical one of explaining why a particular course of action is or is not ethical, 
as well as the practical goal of applying this to guide behaviour (Väyrynen, 
2011). 
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2.2.1 Ethics and trolley problems 
To illustrate normative theories before defining them, it is useful to offer a 
famous philosophical thought experiment: the so-called ‘trolley problem’ (due 
originally to Foot, 1967). Suppose that a runaway trolley car (or tram) is hurtling 
out of control and that further along the track there are five innocent bystanders 
who happen to be walking on the line and who thus unknowingly face certain 
death. (In less benign versions of the problem, the five may be tied to the tracks 
to prevent escape.) An observer, conveniently standing near to a switch that 
controls a track interchange, could operate the lever and thereby divert the 
trolley onto another track, along which a single person is walking. Should she 
divert the train? Now consider an adjustment to the scenario: instead of the 
switch, the observer is located on a bridge overlooking the track and stands 
next to a large man. If she pushes the man off the bridge and into the path of 
the trolley, she can stop it killing the five bystanders, sacrificing him in doing so. 
Should she push him? 
The trolley problem has resulted in a wealth of literature because it illustrates a 
basic difference in ethical theories. When questioned, in the first scenario most 
people agree that the switch should be thrown and they base this decision on 
simple consequences: it is better to save five even though one will die, or – 
normatively – the needs of the many outweigh those of the few. On the other 
hand, people report feeling uncomfortable about pushing the man from the 
bridge, even though the calculation is exactly the same: sacrifice one so that 
five may live. In the second case, there seems to be a separate duty at work, 
which prevents the deliberate intent to kill the man. 
One way to understand the distinction is via Aquinas’s doctrine of double effect, 
according to which doing harm to promote good overall is always inferior to 
promoting good while doing harm only as an indirect side-effect (Lanteri, Chelini 
and Rizzello, 2008). This perspective allows the trolley problem to be 
characterised as it standardly has been: it is permissible to flip the switch but 
not to push the bystander because the former results in indirect harm whereas 
the latter is direct and deliberate, even though both achieve the same 
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consequences. Indeed, this preference for indirect harm may even be a 
psychological mechanism in people (Royzman and Baron, 2002). In summary, it 
seems that people weigh up the consequences but still have in mind some form 
of duty to not cause deliberate harm, a balance that a good person would then 
try to achieve. 
2.2.2 Normative theories of ethics 
Trolley cases are found throughout the ethics literature, which has been 
dominated by normative theories that help explain how people should make 
ethical decisions (Michaelson, 2008). A detailed analysis of ethical theories is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but they are traditionally divided into three 
classes of theory: consequentialist, deontological and virtue-theoretic. 
2.2.2.1 Consequentialism 
The claim that an action is right insofar as it has positive consequences is called 
consequentialism and is akin to an ethical cost-benefit analysis (Slote and 
Pettit, 1984). It is in consequentialism that ‘the ends justify the means’ or ‘the 
needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few’, hence sacrificing one to 
save five. Indeed, for the consequentialist, both trolley scenarios are the same 
and if a person is willing to pull the switch then she should also be ready to 
push. Consequentialism is most famously associated with Bentham and Mill, 
and what counts are the effects of actions as part of an overall ethical calculus 
(Gigerenzer, 2010). 
Standard objections to consequentialism focus on the practical difficulty of 
having enough information available to predict and then assess the 
consequences of potential actions, just as with the trolley scenarios. There is 
also a concern that consequentialism can be used to justify various horrors, 
such as imprisoning innocent people if the deterrent effect on overall criminal 
behaviour outweighs the not inconsiderable inconvenience to the new prisoners 
(Murphy, 1994). Consequentialists respond that theirs is a theory of justification 
rather than one of deciding which values should be chosen in the first place, or 
a focus on the right rather than the good (Pettit, 2002); therefore, it can be 
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noted what kind of world might follow from selecting between options while still 
choosing to do otherwise (Slote and Pettit, 1984). In the introductory scenario in 
Chapter 1, for example, the acquisition agent who engaged in inflating costs but 
ultimately delivered an important capability could account for her behaviour on 
consequentialist grounds: it was acceptable (to her) to lie because the value of 
the outcome outweighs the deception, but whether this kind of behaviour is 
permitted would be up to the employer. Needless to say, a political backdrop of 
austerity may disincline the acquisition agent to consider ethics and focus 
instead exclusively on programme results. 
2.2.2.2 Deontology 
The second approach, due to Kant, is deontology, which is concerned with 
duties rather than consequences (from the Greek deon, meaning duty). For the 
deontologist, people should focus on doing what is right because it is their duty 
to do so, instead of or even irrespective of the consequences. Kant set out both 
hypothetical imperatives – things people should do if they want to get something 
else, such as working hard to pass an exam – and categorical imperatives that 
are always and everywhere duties (Bowie, 2002). There are several 
formulations of these categorical imperatives: one is to act ‘only according to 
that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law without contradiction’, which implies that people cannot lie 
because if everyone did the same then social life would break down. Another 
derivation is to ‘treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as 
an end’ (Kant, 1993: 30). In business terms, this means that people must freely 
consent to a relationship such as employment and must be given the 
opportunity to develop their capacities as an unrestricted individual rather than 
being thought of and used as an economic tool (Bowie, 2002). 
For a deontologist, then, an acquisition agent is not permitted to lie because 
there is a categorical imperative not to, even if the capability that may be 
brought about through the lying is desperately needed. This disregard for 
consequences is a criticism of deontology: what if lying once to acquire a 
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capability would save ten lives on operations? Kant insisted that the duty not to 
lie holds even where life is at stake, famously arguing that if a killer asks for the 
whereabouts of his quarry then a person may not lie to prevent the murder and 
must answer the question honestly. However, while a Kantian perspective 
prevents some of the imagined horrors of consequentialism, it is easy to stretch 
it to incredulity: if it is wrong to sacrifice one person for the sake of five, what 
about one for two hundred or two million? Another difficulty is that ethical 
dilemmas are, by definition, conflicts between duties. 
2.2.2.3 Virtue ethics 
Rather than concerning itself with what people should do, virtue ethics is about 
what kind of person they should aspire to be (Pence, 2002). Virtue ethicists 
argue that duty and the greatest good have become outdated concepts and that 
in daily life people merge conflicting principles, such as by employing triage in 
treating the sick but prioritising individual autonomy in affirming the right to 
abortion (MacIntyre, 1981). Virtue ethics aims to provide, through archetypal 
virtues like wisdom, courage and temperance, a narrative tradition that helps 
develop ethical character (Pence, 2002). When confronted with an ethical 
dilemma, the virtue theorist asks what the different possibilities would say about 
her character (and vice versa) instead of seeking a rule or calculating 
consequences, although both can form part of her deliberations. 
In an acquisition context, virtue ethics is embodied in the notion of a military 
ethos and the development (through osmosis) of the appropriate values, usually 
via exemplar characters or stories (Robinson, 2008). The virtuous agent then 
relies on her ethos to judge how to behave, although critics argue that it is 
unclear whether this means that people positively accept the values they adopt 
or are inculcated with, or instead behave in response to social cues and scripts, 
particularly to help in reducing identity tensions when they join the military or 
any other new environment (Lind and van den Bos, 2013). Moreover, it is 
difficult for people to translate stories or examples of virtue (such as tales of 
saints) into tangible actions when faced with ethical dilemmas (Abend, 2012). 
Virtue approaches are also contradicted by the UK military’s consequentialist 
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‘Service Test’ that asks personnel to consider how an act will impact the 
reputation of operational effectiveness of their Service, even if military training in 
the UK is essentially ethos-based (Robinson, 2007). 
2.2.2.4 Theories of ethics and the trolley problem 
Returning to the trolley problem and its recent empirical treatments helps 
demonstrate why applying these normative theories is not so straightforward, 
particularly with experiments suggesting that how people react to the ethical 
dilemma can be manipulated in interesting ways. For example, when the 
sequencing of the problem is changed, such that people are exposed first to the 
question of pushing the bystander off the bridge, their emotional response can 
alter their reasoning about flipping the switch in the other (now second) 
scenario. However, their reasoning (that killing one to save five may be 
permissible) does not appear to change their emotional response to the 
deliberate pushing, even though the consequences of both scenarios remain 
the same (Lanteri, Chelini and Rizello, 2008). 
Providing an ‘explanation’ for responses to a hypothetical scenario is perhaps 
inappropriate, but one way to interpret the difference in this case is that if 
people are forced first to confront the possibility that someone will die as a 
direct result of their action, their emotional response overrules the later, 
reasoned decision. Normatively, at least, this conclusion is disturbing because 
in life people do not get to choose the order in which they experience ethical 
dilemmas: the utility of theories of ethics would be significantly limited if they 
only function when life plays out in a particular way. Another experiment 
adapted the trolley problem to test whether people would be more likely to push 
the bystander to save five lives than to pull the switch to save three, but this 
proved not to be the case. However, when the experiment was changed to 
involve two separate tracks on which three could be saved by switching or five 
by pushing (in addition to doing nothing), people preferred to push, presumably 
moving towards a consideration of consequences (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). 
Further differences have been identified in cultural attitudes, particularly the role 
of a belief in fatalism, from which perspective an action may be ethically 
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permissible but is nevertheless resisted because of non-ethical factors, such as 
a conviction that events should not be steered from their given course (Gold, 
Colman and Pulford, 2014). Another, less culturally-bound way to interpret this 
is via limited knowledge: although the trolley experiment is set up as a 
simplification to begin with, people realise that they cannot be certain what will 
happen if they act in an attempt to save others and may therefore prefer to not 
become involved at all – a kind of ‘keep out of it’ heuristic, invoked even when 
there is an opportunity to do good by intervening. This is returned to later in the 
literature review. 
2.2.2.5 Methodological issues with trolley problems 
It is also unclear whether, in considering trolley problems, people are making 
comparative assessments between the cases or instead evaluating each 
individually; however, given the implications of the order in which the cases are 
presented, there are difficulties associated with making any normative 
conclusions at all (Liao, Wiegmann, Alexander and Vong, 2011). Indeed, trolley 
problem research has been based on small samples that are straightforwardly 
unrepresentative, consisting largely of higher education students who are paid 
to participate and who come from limited demographics (Hauser, Cushman, 
Young, Kang-Xing Jin and Mikhail, 2007). Moreover, using standard scenarios 
implicitly assumes that there are no organisational structures or dynamics that 
influence how people make decisions (Baïada-Hirèche, Pasquero and Chanlat, 
2011). The analysis of trolley problems in terms of the major philosophical 
approaches is also begging the question, assuming that no other options exist 
or that the experiments can only be explained in terms of the standard 
normative theories available. The experiment thus tests how well philosophy 
can be applied (reproducing the cognitive development work discussed above), 
not how people actually behave when confronted with ethical choices. In short, 
trolley problems are reliant on a methodological assumption that the closest 
match between the intuitive response and normative ethical theories ‘wins’ 
(Turner, 2013). 
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The general issue is that both ethical decisions and their interpretations are 
underdetermined because of equivocality and uncertainty: there are many 
possible options available to people, who lack complete information to decide 
between them, and this is precisely the position of others who then seek to 
explain why people decided as they did or judge them for it (Sonenshein, 2007). 
Indeed, it can be argued that an ethical dilemma is just a problem like any other, 
in which a person has to decide which factors are important and which are less 
so. Although an ethical principle may be appealed to, there is no way to know 
whether a general principle will apply to a particular situation without first setting 
out the reasons that arise from the particular circumstances; but then the 
general principle is no longer necessary (Dancy, 2004).  
The serious methodological issue with the trolley problem (and other 
philosophical thought experiments) is thus that, to reduce bias, the cases 
intentionally present subjects with less complexity and uncertainty than would 
otherwise be the case (Hauser et al., 2007), which potentially primes them for 
acceptable or supportable responses and encourages post hoc explanations in 
terms of norms (Sonenshein, 2007). For example, note that the consequences 
in the basic trolley scenarios are not actually identical: the innocent victim who 
dies to save the five other innocents is different in each case (that is, the person 
on the tracks is not the person on the bridge, unless this is specifically 
emphasised). 
Even if the story is adjusted to make the two situations the same, there may still 
be a difference between the five and the one. For example, what if the person 
switching or pushing is related in some way to the sacrificial bystander on the 
bridge or else to any of the five? This changes the story from one privileging 
rational explanation to a more emotional response: the lack of supporting 
information – simplistically, what if the one potential victim is a cancer 
researcher and the five are convicted murderers? – means that the most honest 
answer might be ‘it depends’ (Abend, 2012). In consequentialist terms, based 
on the overall outcome alone, pushing one’s spouse off a bridge to save five 
people might well be the ethical thing to do, but of course this adjustment to the 
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scenario alters everything. Similarly, if the spouse now lies on the track with four 
other unfortunates, any resistance to pushing may be far easier to override. 
Nevertheless, trolley problems are not entirely hypothetical and are increasingly 
relevant as work develops on autonomous vehicles, for which ethical decision 
making exactly like whether to switch or push has to be embedded in control 
systems. For example, an autonomous vehicle may need to choose between 
killing five people or deliberately crashing to instead result in only the death of 
its single passenger. Even though the owner may agree with this reasoning via 
trolley cases, some research suggests that people will be less likely to buy 
vehicles that are able to make a decision to sacrifice the owner for the 
consequentialist benefit of others (Bonnefon, Shariff and Rahwan, 2015). Here 
the tension between an imagined duty that a person may believe her car owes 
to her as its purchaser is in conflict with a similarly imaginary ethical obligation 
for the car to balance the life of the owner against those of others. 
2.2.2.6 The insufficiency of normative ethics 
In summary, although this introduction to normative theories is necessarily 
limited and a voluminous literature exists, normative ethics remains contested 
with little or no agreement on which ethical theories are correct or even which 
values should be held (Duska, 2013). This means that there are no 
philosophical conclusions to recommend to business or to society at large 
(Leiter, 2014). Even where consensus exists, the background philosophical 
assumptions can differ significantly (Abend, 2014). More importantly, if 
philosophers are unable to agree on normative ethics, the prospects for 
application by non-philosophers in business contexts are limited. Indeed, if 
there is no accord on how to decide what counts as ethical, what is the use of 
codes of ethics? It is possible to point instead to agreement on common values, 
but this is no more than is already provided by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and similar statements of basic rights. 
Even if there was a hypothetical set of norms that could be applied by ordinary 
people, it is the constantly changing nature of the actual context that frustrates 
attempts to implement a normative approach, just as with the literature on the 
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trolley problem. This is not to argue that ethics is relative, but only that ‘it 
depends’ is indeed a legitimate response in practice to ethical dilemmas when 
the specific context is important. Philosophically, it is difficult to argue that 
because an ethical principle makes sense in some hypothetical context, or even 
in some real life historical scenario, it must follow that it has general applicability 
in all contexts (Dancy, 2013). It then becomes easy to tell hypothetical stories 
about acquisition that would be analogous: what should an Army agent do if 
cost-benefit analysis shows that it is better to sacrifice several land programmes 
for the sake of an aircraft carrier? Perhaps more challengingly, what if an 
agent’s friend has recently been killed on operations for want of a capability 
that, to acquire it, will imply pushing someone off the metaphorical bridge? On 
this view, acquisition becomes a zero-sum game in which the funding of a 
programme means another losing support. 
2.3 Theories of Business Ethics 
In spite of the difficulties with normative theories, in practice business ethics is a 
form of applied ethics that mediates between philosophical theories and the 
everyday business environment. Even though the reliance on philosophy is 
typically based on a superficial reading of the associated literature (Abend, 
2011), the field has been dominated by three approaches, which are influenced 
by and associated with the main normative theories.  
2.3.1 Shareholder theory 
Firstly, shareholder theory argues that it is the responsibility of business 
managers to maximise shareholder profit because companies are the private 
property of their owners; therefore, businesses can have no social 
responsibilities and it makes no sense to speak of ethics in business beyond 
this focus on what the shareholder wants. This does not mean that businesses 
can do as they please because they must still follow legal rules and 
shareholders may choose to impose specific requirements on managers; for 
example, to not operate in countries with poor human rights records (Friedman, 
1970). However, on this view, the sole responsibility of an acquisition agent 
 22 
would be to her ‘shareholder’; that is, to a capability sponsor as the overall 
customer. 
Criticism of shareholder theory focuses on its short-termism, as well as its 
association with consequentialist economic logic and the idea that the hidden 
hand of markets best advances the common good, which has been subjected to 
empirical critique (Stout, 2013). However, there is also a deontological version 
of shareholder theory that avoids this objection, which contends that it is 
impermissible to use the resources of shareholders in ways they do not desire, 
even if this would advance the common good. This is because it is always 
unethical to use people – in this case, the shareholders – as means rather than 
ends, with business managers having agreed, implicitly or explicitly, to use the 
shareholders’ money as the shareholder intended (Hasnas, 1998). The 
deontological acquisition agent must then deliver exactly what her sponsor has 
asked for, even if she believes herself able to provide something superior. 
Nevertheless, shareholder views on business ethics may have the effect of 
encouraging ‘unethical’ behaviour: if business decisions are taken via 
cost/benefit analysis and the ultimate aim is to increase shareholder value, then 
ethical values may be subordinated to profit. However, businesses – both at the 
organisational and individual level – also undertake philanthropic activities, so it 
may be more accurate to say that a plurality of values exists and that people 
can be ambivalent about which predominates at any given time (Segal and 
Lehrer, 2013). The more general issue is that separating business from ethics is 
untenable because a sole focus on shareholder value is not ethically neutral 
and implies valuing possible courses of action above others (Harris and 
Freeman, 2008). 
2.3.2 Stakeholder theory 
The second key theory of business ethics is stakeholder theory, which asserts 
that anyone with a stake in a business’s activities is due ethical consideration, 
regardless of their legal position relative to the company (Freeman, 1980). This 
was also intended as a critique of shareholder theory and succeeded in bringing 
stakeholder perspectives to prominence (Webley, 2001), particularly once it 
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became apparent that greater shareholder profit could be delivered by 
achieving stakeholder value (Freeman, 2008). Indeed, if customers want to see 
ethical practices then it should be profitable for businesses to behave ethically 
(Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007). 
Stakeholder theory is often linked to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or 
any actions of businesses ‘that address social and ethical values beyond legal 
requirements’, such as philanthropy (Van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013: 351). 
CSR is then that aspect of business ethics that focuses on how companies 
should interact with wider society, rather than solely with individuals as 
customers; for example, taking into account any corporate (deontological) 
duties to the environment rather than to shareholders, such as where a 
profitable activity is in conflict with environmental protection. However, CSR is 
not just about ethics but can also help to increase future profits by enhancing 
the reputation of a business or aligning with stakeholder expectations; this is the 
link to stakeholder theory (Windsor, 2006). 
Common to many such views is the claim that pro-social behaviour is of benefit 
both to society and to the profitability of a business (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
This enhancing of business success was, explicitly, the original aim of business 
ethics education in universities and business schools (Abend, 2013). However, 
critics object that the accommodation of stakeholders and shareholders ignores 
situations in which there is a tension between their aims (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003). Furthermore, this is an empirical (actually consequentialist) version of 
stakeholder theory: the claim is that considering the views of all stakeholders is 
best for the success of a business, rather than this approach being 
recommended even if it is not profitable at all (Hasnas, 1980). 
In fact, there are well-documented instances of companies behaving in a pro-
social manner without any economic motivation (Matten and Crane, 2005). The 
associated normative version of stakeholder theory holds that, notwithstanding 
the empirical assertion that business success follows from stakeholder 
consideration, businesses should give equal weight to the differing needs of 
stakeholders regardless, achieving a balance between these claims rather than 
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maximising profit to the shareholders. For stakeholder theorists, this normative 
principle is deontological insofar as businesses then have a duty to treat all 
stakeholders as ends rather than means (Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007), even if 
this violates the same duty owed to shareholders (Hasnas, 1980). The practical 
difficulty for stakeholder theory is thus how to represent all stakeholders while 
also respecting the rights of shareholders, as well as attempting to account for 
the value of intangible assets such as trust or knowledge (Sveiby, 1997). In 
acquisition terms, this is the complexity of involving everyone with an interest in 
a capability while still delivering what the sponsor requires, which means 
balancing a commitment to front line operations with the assertion that all 
stakeholders have an equal claim, all complicated by the public sector having to 
consider factors beyond profit. 
2.3.3 Integrative Social Contracts Theory 
A third form of normative business ethics is the social contract tradition, best 
exemplified in recent times by Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT; see 
Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Recognising that ethics needs to take account of 
organisational reality and cannot be imposed from above, ISCT attempts to 
achieve an accommodation between ‘thin’ norms that everyone in society could 
endorse and ‘thick’, context-dependent ones that are actually applied in daily life 
– a now-common distinction in ethics (Walzer, 1983). ISCT thus separates two 
forms of social contract: a hypothetical macro contract that sets the overarching, 
global ethical terms, and a second micro or local contract that applies within 
communities, businesses or other organisations (Donaldson and Dunfee, 2000). 
This twin conception of norms then means that communities may define their 
own local norms that are binding for their members, but only if the resulting 
micro contracts are compatible with the higher-level norms that everyone (by 
construction) accepts.  
A simple example of ISCT is seen in many sports: rules set the boundaries of 
what can be done, but within their limits the teams are free to experiment with 
tactics. Another example is the restriction that ‘churches cannot persecute 
heretics but they can choose bishops in the manner they see fit’ (Lindblom, 
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2011: 578); that is, the persecution of heretics is (now) incompatible with 
societal hypernorms, but other religious matters are the business of the church 
alone, so long as its actions remain within the limits of these hypernorms. 
Norms are then described as authentic if they are both contracted and 
recognised by a community, and further as legitimate if they are within the 
boundaries of hypernorms. ISCT thus means giving communities as much 
freedom as possible to decide on their own ethics, but not so much that 
anything is permitted (Dempsey, 2011). The integration of the two types of norm 
stops communities from adopting rules that are considered illegitimate but also 
provides for ‘moral free space’ in which people are at liberty to contract with one 
another. 
ISCT is useful in conceptualising acquisition because, on this view, if a decision 
has no effect outside of a community then it has no ethical implications unless it 
violates hypernorms (McGraw, 2004). For example, an acquisition agent might 
ignore process restrictions, thereby violating the equivalent of micronorms 
within acquisition, while not violating any societal macronorms: perhaps she 
ignores the views of a particular stakeholder while delivering a capability that 
still meets the requirements of the sponsor. The converse is also interesting: in 
a ‘conspiracy of optimism’, in which an acquisition agent accepts an 
unrealistically low tender from a contractor, the agent’s behaviour may be 
unethical from a wider societal perspective while remaining ethical inside a 
subset community, such as a Single Service intent to safeguard capabilities 
even if the Government and/or electorate has other priorities. Another important 
instance is the conviction that so-called revolving door transitions between 
Defence and the defence industry are unethical: there are no macronorms 
preventing this movement of people and micronorm prohibitions are usually 
temporary if they exist at all. 
Criticism of ISCT centres on the problem of actually identifying hypernorms. 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999: 54) explicitly avoid providing a catalogue 
because ‘the claim to have found a list, expressible in a particular natural 
language and definitive for all moral situations, constitutes a form of moral 
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absolutism’. Instead, on their view, ethics is no different from science in being a 
fallible and inevitably incomplete venture. Moreover, the ‘thickness’ of people’s 
actual experience of ethics implies that hypernorms are already known for them; 
the difficulty is coming to an agreement with others, such as through a wide 
consensus, the acceptance of a bill of rights, or an overlap between laws and 
normative philosophical claims. 
Just what constitutes sufficient consensus is the empirical question at issue, 
though (Wempe, 2008). If ISCT fails to provide hypernorms then it cannot be 
applied in practice in complex situations, especially in business (Calton, 2006). 
The general response to this objection has been to undertake surveys to 
determine hypernorms (Dunfee, 2006), which, for example, is how the United 
Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights was derived (Glendon, 2001). However, 
appealing to a vote hardly constitutes a normative approach and many historical 
norms that achieved consensus at one time – such as slavery or the inferiority 
of women – would now be rejected, at least in some regions (Van Buren, 2001). 
In short, a consensus has to be just before it can be accepted (Rawls, 1996), so 
ISCT must return to normative ethics. 
This concern with articulating hypernorms is key when confronting moral free 
space: those circumstances in which the available hypernorms (such as a bill of 
rights) and micronorms fail to provide enough guidance to address some ethical 
dilemma; for example, the use of new technology such as Unmanned 
Autonomous Vehicles in combat (Singer, 2013). The implication is that moral 
free space will exist whenever new circumstances arise and while norms are 
adapting or evolving to meet them (Dunfee, 2006); but these are precisely the 
conditions in which ethics is needed most. Hypernorms are thus 
underdetermined and cannot function as intended (Phillips, Freeman and 
Wicks, 2003). 
Nevertheless, a potential response – returned to below – is that the latitude 
provided by moral free space is exactly what ethics should involve (Kant, 1991): 
there is always a separation between ethical principles and actions because 
being ethical is about determining how best to apply the principles, rather than 
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following them as instructions (Derrida, 1988). On this view, then, people are 
actually empowered by deliberately not articulating ISCT in some hypothetically 
full format (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). 
2.3.4 Principal-Agent problems 
All these normative theories of business ethics, whether applied or otherwise, 
face the same difficulty, known as the principal-agent problem: while the 
shareholders and/or stakeholders may provide resources for and direction on 
what a business should do, agents must carry out this intent and may choose to 
deviate from it to suit their own needs. This divergence between the two always 
favours the agent because the latter has an advantage in information terms 
(Soudry, 2007). Transactional costs are then added to business because the 
principal must constrain the agent through policy and processes to minimise the 
risk of a separation of interests; meanwhile, the agent is less inclined to work to 
achieve the principal’s ends because there is a lower chance of personal 
(additional) benefit (Yukins, 2010). 
The principal-agent dichotomy is based on an agent being monitored by a 
principal, but in acquisition there are multiple principals and agents (Soudry, 
2007) and merely being aware of the potential for conflicts of interest is 
insufficient to reduce their actual impact (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). To 
return to an earlier example, an acquisition agent may actually believe that 
people on front-line operations are her real principals, or there may be other 
people she seeks to satisfy by leveraging information asymmetry. This then 
generates moral hazard in the public sector because there is little or no threat of 
sanction in the event that an agent misunderstands – deliberately or otherwise – 
the principal-agent relationship in this way. 
Indeed, for an economically rational actor, any benefits from efficient acquisition 
will accrue largely to the principal, while the costs of inefficiency will be borne by 
the agents, which means that agents are not actually motivated to achieve 
financial savings unless otherwise incentivised (Yukins, 2010). The implication 
is that the agent can focus on the front-line colleague rather than the principal 
and will escape sanction even if caught; after all, although the principal may 
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understand ‘value’ to mean the best capability possible while minimising costs 
to the taxpayer, the agent may interpret it differently as the greatest capability 
regardless of cost, an assessment that will be hard to challenge on ethical 
grounds. (As discussed later, exactly this point was raised in the interviews.) 
Without an economic measure of agent performance, it is difficult for principals 
to understand how well agents are discharging their responsibilities or the 
extent of any divergence in interests. In the unlikely event of being challenged, 
an acquisition agent can either point to delivering results to the end user (a 
consequentialist justification) or insist that she has a duty to not compromise on 
the threat to end users regardless of cost (a deontological rationalisation). 
Moreover, any control measures, whether in the form of rules or oversight, will 
restrict the innovation that an agent can say is necessary to identify and act 
upon opportunities (Soudry, 2007). The point is that, from an ethical 
perspective, the agent may prioritise innovation on behalf of colleagues rather 
than acquisition rules; that is, she prioritises stakeholders over principals 
(Yukins, 2010). From the agent’s point of view, she is not doing anything wrong; 
and for the principal, there is no normative consensus to fall back on to say 
otherwise. 
2.3.4.1 Principals, agents and ethos 
One way for public sector organisations like Defence to attempt to address the 
principal-agent problem is via the development of a public service ethos, which 
is a virtue ethics approach that then motivates agents to serve the public 
interest rather than their own. However, achieving this in practice is not 
straightforward and people do not merely drop or minimise their own values and 
replace them with others (Gailmard, 2010). The difficulty is that these ‘public 
values’ are themselves contested and potentially in conflict with others; for 
example, the clash of existing Single Service values with the pan-Defence 
behaviours sought by Defence Reform (Levene, Allen, Conway, Day, 
Grimstone, Houghton, Iacobescu, McKeeve and Noakes, 2011). Indeed, a 
perverse behaviour can be induced if a principal declines to offer an agent any 
incentive to achieve a socially optimal result because an inefficient alternative 
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would actually leave the principal with a greater share (Miller and Whitford, 
2006). For example, a military principal may decline to pay agents to deliver 
capability coherence across Defence because the existing incoherence 
provides for more resources to the principal’s own Service, which is then an 
instance of ‘good’ behaviour violating an existing ethos (Cording, Harrison, 
Hoskisson and Karsten, 2014). 
Therefore, even where the principal appeals to ethics via the notion of public 
service to reduce the likelihood that the agent will serve her own interests, those 
priorities may be replaced by group interests and still defeat the principal’s 
intent (Atkinson and Fulton, 2013). Where what counts as the public interest is 
contested, as indeed it must be in a democracy, this problem will persist 
(Gailmard, 2010). Furthermore, if – as the sociological literature suggests – 
people in the public sector use ‘public interest’ as a rhetorical device to hide 
their own, more partisan interests, it is necessary to understand how this takes 
place and is sustained (Colley, 2012). Indeed, the notion of a ‘public interest’ is 
itself an explicitly ethical claim with normative implications – people should do 
such-and-such in the name of the public interest. Studying how narratives about 
it either support or delegitimise specific ways of organisational behaviour and 
how people make sense of them can thus illuminate the actual role of ethics in 
acquisition, a possibility considered again below (Sonenshein, 2007). 
2.3.4.2 Codes of ethics 
In spite of all these difficulties, the primary approach to avoiding the principal-
agent problem and securing ethical behaviour in organisations is to provide 
people with a code of ethics, a method that has increased in popularity since 
the 1990s (Linden, 2013). In practice, businesses tend to treat ethics in an 
absolutist manner: using codes of ethics, organisations specify the values, 
policies and behaviours that are to be followed and typically do not admit of any 
doubt (Michaelson, 2008). Moreover, these codes also presuppose that people 
are rational and that the requirements of the code can be followed regardless of 
the role of organisational context (Colley, 2012).  
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Although ethics ostensibly benefits everyone, codes of ethics may actually 
function to restrict entry to professions and thus provide economic benefit to 
existing participants, serving to inflate the prestige associated with membership 
(McGraw, 2004). Indeed, the original motivation for business ethics education 
was explicitly linked with a drive to make business a profession like medicine by 
associating it with a code of ethics (Abend, 2013). Insisting on a code also 
places a limit on the right of exit because ordinarily a person can move between 
companies, but not if prohibited or restricted by a professional code. 
More importantly, there is very little research on what happens to codes once 
they have been issued, and even when people actively sign up to a code of 
ethics they may still ignore or resist it (Helin and Sandström, 2010). Insisting 
upon a code is then likely to be of limited utility (McGraw, 2004). Studies also 
suggest that codes of ethics are insufficient in combatting unethical behaviour 
because people need to feel that something is wrong before they act on a code 
prohibiting it (Zhong, 2011). Codes can actually be counter-productive because 
they absolve people of ethical concern by transferring all ethical questions to 
the rules set out in the code (Helin and Sandström, 2010). In effect, they reduce 
ethical attention within a community because members defer to a code rather 
than, in the absence of any direction, being forced to make ethical decisions for 
themselves (Gordon, Clegg and Kornberger, 2009). This problem is returned to 
below. 
2.4 Descriptive ethics 
Given these difficulties with applying normative ethics to business, whether 
generally or to the acquisition context specifically, it should be little surprise that 
the literature on ethical decision-making questions whether people use norms at 
all, except in justifications after the fact (Lanteri, Chelini and Rizello, 2008). 
Descriptive ethics instead depicts how people actually act, and behavioural 
approaches study how ethical decisions are made and how people in turn judge 
the ethical choices of others. 
Descriptive perspectives can also inform normative ethics, such as where 
following a norm results in unpalatable real world consequences and the norm 
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is therefore discarded (Gorski, 2013a). However, it is the difference between 
‘ethical decision making in a morally ideal world and ethical decision making in 
a world characterized by bounded rationality, weakness of will, character flaws, 
and the limitations of human cognition’ that drives descriptive ethics (Bowie, 
2009: 635). In short, it focuses on thick concepts that are contingent on the 
contexts in which they arise, rather than the thin, ostensibly universal standards 
of normative ethics (Abend, 2011). (Note that the potential objection here that 
descriptive ethics cannot be generalised – because it deals with specifics rather 
than universals – is addressed in Chapter 4.) 
Another motivation for a shift to descriptive approaches is that questions of 
business ethics have tended to focus on individual action rather than the 
influence of collectives, minimising the role of organisations and thereby 
discounting the extent to which different business contexts might change ethical 
behaviours. This risks ignoring the impact of power, whether political or 
organisational, and invariably recommends minor changes to ethics training 
programmes rather than examining why ethical violations arise in organisations 
in the first place (Parker, 2003). In particular, the attitudes and expectations of 
individuals within organisations can be important in shaping how they behave 
and can induce unethical behaviour even when the values of the individuals and 
the organisation preclude it (Ntayi, Ahiauzu and Eyaa, 2011). Similarly, when 
ethical behaviour is not rewarded in organisations, ethical frameworks or the 
values espoused have little impact (Kurland, 1991). In general, the implied 
psychological contract between a company and its employees, or between a 
buyer and a supplier, can set reciprocal expectations of behaviour or 
obligations, violations of which can break down trust and lead to unethical 
actions (Hill, Eckerd, Wilson and Greer, 2008). 
The underlying focus of descriptive ethics is thus on the complexity of actual 
ethical decision-making: the question of how things happen rather than how 
they ought to. Therefore, this section of the literature review is split into two: the 
implications of neuroscientific research for and on ethics, and empirical 
investigation of how people respond to ethical dilemmas. 
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2.4.1 Neuroscience and ethics 
Normative accounts of ethics are significantly challenged by neuroethics, or the 
application of cognitive neuroscience to ethics (Salvador and Folger, 2009). 
Although no single area of the brain has been identified as responsible for 
ethical deliberation, research suggests that people categorise and make 
assumptions about their environment in ways that may be automatic or out of 
their control (Hauser et al., 2007). In particular, there is a separation of this 
reflexive cognitive system from the reflective approach that is associated with 
normative ethics (Haidt, 2001). Neuroethics then provides an account of ethical 
decision making in terms of distinct neurological processes: first, a reflexive, 
pattern-matching process compares an experience to prototypical ethical cases 
to seek a match; then, if no match is found, this is followed by a reflective, 
conscious attempt to consider the experience, which is more akin to the 
normative approach (Salvador and Folger, 2009). People can learn heuristics, 
but typically by adaptation to their environment, including power relations 
(Gigerenzer, 2010). 
On this view, people make ethical judgments almost instantaneously by 
comparing situations to already available heuristics and only draw upon ethical 
reasoning if these heuristics are unavailable, such as if the situation is novel 
(Hulsey and Hampson, 2014). This in turn accords with research into the trolley 
problem and other scenarios in which people declare actions to be unethical but 
are unable to explain why they decided as they did, a phenomenon that has 
been described as moral dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001). The likelihood that 
people do not necessarily follow ethical rules and instead rely on a kind of 
ethical intuition is important because it may mean that forcing people to use the 
former will lead not just to worse choices, but also to people not knowing why 
they are supposed to be following ethical rules at all (Woodward and Allman, 
2007). 
This neuroethics perspective, with the empirical work underpinning it, 
challenges the traditional assumption that ethical failures are intentional (Kish-
Gephart, Harrison and Treviño, 2010). Instead, the research suggests that 
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providing codes of ethics or insisting that agents undergo ethical training is 
unlikely to succeed if most decisions are taken intuitively (Bowie, 2009). Indeed, 
a rules-based approach may be actively resisted if it fails to accord with agents’ 
own subjective experiences of ethics being a matter of instinct and emotions 
(Salvador and Folger, 2009). Worse still, training courses that focus on 
normative approaches may encourage calculated, deliberative decision-making 
that reduces the role of intuition and ethical rules-of-thumb, thereby indirectly 
promoting consequentialist choices as a default (Zhong, 2011). Ultimately, 
‘active judgment may actually be quite uncommon’ (Reynolds, 2006: 741).  
According to the neuroethics literature, this is because people are simply not as 
rational when it comes to ethics as they believe themselves to be; instead, they 
can act in ways that they would consider unethical if they were made aware of 
the normative reasoning available or if they were in possession of all the 
information (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). An example of this phenomenon, 
known as bounded ethicality, is seen in the assessment of business options: 
suppose that in one case a decision is made solely with a focus on profits but 
that the choice leads to societal benefit, while in another the same decision 
results in societal harm. When questioned, a low proportion of people judges 
that the benefit in the first decision was intentional, but a high proportion asserts 
the harm to have been deliberate in the second (Knobe, 2003). 
This example also highlights the problem of luck in ethics, or the clash between 
the desire to assign ethical blame or praise to business decisions and the reality 
that chance plays a significant role in whether decisions prove to be correct 
(Michaelson, 2008). While this asymmetry in the attribution of intent may be 
reclaimed as normative in the sense that the second decision ignored the 
normative consideration of societal benefit or harm (Hindricks, 2014), there 
remains a divergence between how people reason about ethics and how they 
judge behaviour (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). Indeed, people are risk averse in 
general and may prefer to avoid losing rather than actively seeking to gain 
something, which then influences how they respond to ethical dilemmas (Kern 
and Chugh, 2009).  
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In general, it is persistent over-estimation by individuals of how ethical they are 
that contributes to ethical failure (Chugh, Bazerman and Banaji, 2005). 
Bounded ethicality is an extension of the concept of bounded rationality, or ‘how 
people actually make decisions in an uncertain world with limited time and 
information’ (Gigerenzer, 2010: 529). It means accepting that people neither 
have access to all possible options and knowledge of their consequences, nor 
the time to assess them, to determine the maximal course of action. Even if it 
were possible to provide a normative ethical theory that always and everywhere 
provided norms to cope with any situation, in practice people would be unable 
to cope with all the information they would need to really apply it. Given these 
limitations, training people in ethical theories does not provide them with what 
they actually require: the time to reflect and/or experience of other situations to 
help shape their responses (Sonenshein, 2007). 
People are thus less likely to regard their behaviour as unethical in 
circumstances where the appropriate ethics are vague or unclear and where, 
because of bounded ethicality, they are not able to address this normatively 
(Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). Conflicts of interest may then go unrecognised 
because people’s conception of their own ethical rationality exceeds their actual 
abilities, so they fail to notice problems (Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005). 
Another consequence is that systematic, process- and/or governance-driven 
responses to principal-agent problems are insufficiently complex to cope with 
the neurological reality of ethical decision-making; they merely add delays and 
costs rather than getting at ethics (Atkinson and Fulton, 2013). 
More importantly, faced with these cognitive constraints, people may use ethics 
to justify their behaviours rather than to shape them (Reynolds, 2006). This is 
akin to operating as a lawyer rather than as a judge, allowing people to improve 
confidence in their own decisions by making them appear rational and 
unavoidable after the fact (Sonenshein, 2007). As with neuroethics, this 
reverses the traditional understanding of ethics: people make decisions first and 
use normative theories afterwards to explain themselves (Olson, 2002). Facing 
an ethical problem, people may then seek to construct a narrative that explains 
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their choices rather than reasoning them through before acting (Atkinson and 
Fulton, 2013). 
Although an ethics that fails to take account of this body of literature has been 
described as ‘like a ship without a sail’ (Gigerenzer, 2010), the influence of 
empirical studies is a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, in spite of the 
availability of research, neuroethics is still significantly shaped by normative 
ethics: typically, neuroethicists experiment to determine to what extent 
normative ethical principles are employed when people reason about ethics, so 
it remains difficult to shake off the methodological assumption that people are 
ultimately still normative ethicists. 
Indeed, and to reiterate, experiments based on the theory of cognitive moral 
development (Kohlberg, 1969) and ethical decision-making models (Rest, 1986) 
assume that ethical decisions result from conscious reasoning (Hauser et al., 
2007). This reasoning is supposed to happen at different levels, from avoiding 
punishment (the lowest), through self-interest and concern at the expectations 
of others, to rules and complex ethical principles (the highest level). On this 
view, improving organisational ethics is about raising the level of individuals’ 
ethical reasoning, hence the focus on ethics training programmes. However, the 
actual influence of education on these levels is inconsistent (Kish-Gephart, 
Harrison and Treviño, 2010) and, while the level of education might, on Rest’s 
(1986) model, suggest greater sophistication in ethical reasoning, in fact 
education may merely permit better justifications. That is, the more ethical 
training a person has, the better she will be at explaining her behaviour as 
ethical, as opposed to her actually being more ethical. Moreover, when it is 
unclear what counts as ethical and what does not, people are less likely to 
describe their own conduct as unethical anyway (Welsh and Ordóñez, 2014). 
The weakness of neuroethics is thus that it has largely focused on how ethical 
behaviour in the thin sense can be related to brain activity, not the thick, and it 
is difficult to say how the latter can be achieved without pointing to the 
dependence of descriptive ethics on social factors; in short, neuroethics still 
focuses on the individual rather than the social (Abend, 2011). Nevertheless, it 
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places importance emphasis on the influence of complexity and the necessary 
reductions in information load and options that people must actually employ in 
ethical decision-making.  
2.4.2 Ethics and heuristics 
If neuroethics is correct that reflexive decisions come before reflective 
justifications, then the ways in which people actually make their decisions 
become very important. The use of heuristics or rules-of-thumb involves 
ignoring some information rather than seeking the ‘correct’ decision in an ethical 
dilemma (Gigerenzer, 2010).  This means acknowledging bounded ethicality 
and opting instead for satisficing, or achieving an answer that is good enough 
rather than perfect (Slote and Pettit, 1984). It is not that this employment of 
heuristics involves a meta-ethical claim that people ought to use ethical 
shortcuts rather than normative theories, but instead that fully reasoning things 
through is rarely (if ever) possible (Bruni, Mameli and Rini, 2013). 
Indeed, satisficing via heuristics need not imply that a ‘good enough’ decision is 
always inferior to an optimum one; this is because the parameters of optimum 
models typically have to be estimated from limited data samples and the ‘best’ 
decisions become impossible in practice (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes, 
2007). For example, in economics the mean-variance portfolio model of asset 
allocation is optimal, for which its author Markowitz was awarded the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, but it underperforms the heuristic that 
Markowitz actually used in his own investing (specifically, allocating his money 
equally across however many investments he chose). This is because the data 
demands to identify the mean-variance portfolio for a large number of assets 
are just too great (DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal, 2009). Another example of 
satisficing in acquisition is calling for 80% (or ‘good enough’) solutions to 
capability requirements (Gray, 2009). On this view, that people lack all the 
available information is not a problem to be overcome but instead becomes 
definitive of ethics: to behave ethically in a situation is to identify the best 
heuristic (Gigerenzer, 2010). (Note that what ‘best’ means in this context does 
have a meta-ethical character, which is a problem associated with normatively 
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grounding the results of neuroethics that is not pursued in this chapter; see 
Bruni, Mameli and Rini, 2014.) 
Examples of heuristics used in ethics are ‘don’t get involved’, ‘do as others do’ 
(where the others are members of a person’s own community), ‘divide things 
equally’, and ‘tit-for-tat’ (Gigerenzer, 2010). Given heuristics like these, people’s 
behaviour can be understood not from a process perspective but in terms of the 
heuristics they follow. To illustrate, they may be acting in a manner determined 
by following an organisational culture (‘do as others do’), although society is 
complex and hence it is unclear which culture is meant (Sinclair, 1993); they 
may minimise their involvement in contentious decisions (‘don’t get involved’) 
rather than actively avoid ethical responsibility; in an acquisition context, they 
may assume competition for contracts as a default when it is not suitable 
(‘divide things equally’); or they may sustain adversarial behaviours rather than 
more appropriate ones (‘tit-for-tat’). A corollary is that the heuristics that people 
actually rely upon for ethical decision-making may differ from the processes and 
roles they have been assigned to work within, potentially leading to deliberate 
disobedience or else to principled objection (Colley, 2012). 
Heuristics thus do not somehow represent a failure of ethical reasoning; 
instead, they seem to be inevitable, given the computational limitations of the 
brain. However, by the same token, they may also result in an ethical blindness, 
or ‘the temporary inability of a decision maker to see the ethical dimensions of 
the decision at stake’ (Palazzo, Krings and Hoffrage, 2011: 325). Bounded 
ethicality means that this ethical blindness is not deliberate and that people are 
not even aware of it, but it presents a significant challenge to normative 
approaches because these assume that people know the difference between an 
ethical and an unethical decision. Instead, cognitive limitations impose 
frameworks on how people interpret the world, which then allow them to reduce 
the overwhelming complexity they are faced with, often by following what is 
effectively a script that helps to disallow particular issues (Alvesson and Spicer, 
2012). 
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The problem is that this necessary simplification can also restrict how widely 
people consider their context, resulting in ethical decisions that are correct from 
within the framework but unethical to those outside it (a cognitive violation of 
ISCT, so to speak). Social and organisational pressures can increase the risk of 
this happening and, insofar as people are organisationally dislocated from their 
larger social context (typically owing to specialisation, individualisation and 
globalisation in the workplace), they are then less able to take empowered 
decisions about limiting their behaviour (Gonin, Palazzo and Hoffrage, 2012). 
In circumstances where a consensus on how to behave exists, generally 
through socialisation, individuals can then effectively lose their ability to act 
independently even if they recognise the group behaviour to be unethical. That 
is, notwithstanding that socialisation may originally aim at inculcating ethical 
behaviour throughout an organisation, successful establishment of an 
organisational perspective may also enable deviant actions to become the norm 
if they are part of this viewpoint (Ntayi, Byabashaija, Eyaa, Ngoma and Muliira, 
2010). This can lead to a ‘motivated blindness’, or individuals being disposed to 
ignore their values and ethics in making decisions that benefit them. For 
example, a supplier may ignore unethical practices by a buyer (and vice versa) 
if the result appears beneficial to both parties; an ethical concern only occurs 
when one party feels that it has been taken advantage of (Hill, et al., 2008). In 
effect, a person’s ethical reasoning can behave like a lawyer trying to argue for 
an advantageous outcome rather than like an attempt to get at ethical truth 
(Bhattacharjee, Berman and Reed, 2012). 
The role of heuristics points again to the weakness of codes of ethics: they 
provide a framework for people to make ethical decisions when the codes align 
with agents’ heuristics, but this agreement also provides the potential for rigidity 
in decision-making. The conditions are then set for ethics to be perceived as an 
add-on rather than central to business, which exacerbates the problem of 
ethical blindness (Helin and Sandström, 2010). As people become socialised 
into the ethical frameworks of organisations, their unawareness of other 
possibilities may increase (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer and Hunyady, 2003). As a 
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potentially worst case, the existing practices become embedded in 
organisations as norms, rather than contingent and open to question (Peacock, 
2010). 
This may also help to explain why people are incrementally capable of moving 
from ethical to unethical behaviour (for example, the infamous Milgram (1963) 
experiment on obedience to authority): having been gradually socialised, they 
make their evaluative judgments not from a hypothetical philosopher’s position 
of atemporal, normative objectivity, but instead relative to the organisational 
context and the decisions they have made previously (Palazzo, Krings and 
Hoffrage, 2011). These are effectively a form of ethical ‘sunk cost’: having 
chosen to invest time and effort in a course of action, people may prefer to stick 
with it, even if it becomes increasingly unethical, rather than give up. Even when 
attempting to make consequentialist, cost-benefit decisions, people do not have 
all the information they need and are constrained by bounded rationality. 
Moreover, given imperfect information, any process or governance employed 
will be insufficient to decide between competing options (Sonenshein, 2007). 
2.4.3 Akrasia 
A specific problem in ethics related to cognitive limitations is the ancient 
challenge of Socrates that akrasia – acting against one’s better judgment – is 
impossible: people always do what they think is right, even if their reasoning is 
faulty (Rorty, 1980). (For Socrates, ‘no one who either knows or believes that 
there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, 
will ever continue on his present course’ (Plato, 1961: 358b-c).) An akratic 
action is voluntary and yet contravenes an actor’s assessment of what she 
ought to do in a given set of circumstances – she acts against her better 
(actually, her best) judgment (Rorty, 1998). Akrasia is an ethical problem 
because those who act against their better judgment may then find that their 
conduct in doing so is judged to be unethical (Sommers, 2011). 
Although akrasia is contested in the literature and many have, with Socrates, 
denied that is possible (Gilead, 1999), the problem has lacked a normative 
solution and hence empirical approaches have been pursued (Ainslie, 2005). In 
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general terms, an action is assumed to consist in a reason for the action (its 
cognitive grounding); an emotion that makes the action wanted and could act as 
its cause; and a preference for acting (choosing to want to act); whereas an 
akratic action may have a reason that is hidden because the person is unaware 
of it (Gilead, 1999). This might be because of ‘unarticulated moral beliefs and 
habitual dispositions’ (Sanghera, 2011: 2), and the occlusion is also sustained 
by the social context, including the way people talk about and categorise 
phenomena (Rorty, 1998). As a result, people may feel shame for behaving in 
an akratic way (Gilead, 1999); for example, when wealthy people agree that 
they should donate significantly to charity but ‘have become accustom[ed] to 
their affluent lifestyle and privileges [and] find the prospects of losing their 
power and status too painful’ (Sanghera, 2011: 6). 
Recent empirical investigation in behavioural science has demonstrated 
conclusively ‘that both people and nonhuman animals spontaneously value 
future events in inverse proportion to their expected delays’, and this hyperbolic 
discounting (rather than the expected, more ‘rational’ exponential curves) has 
been used to explains akrasia: it means that people prefer smaller rewards that 
occur sooner, rather than larger ones that they have to wait for (Ainslie, 2005: 
636). The discounting then creates an incentive to not notice contradictions or 
lapses in motivation. Since akratic actions that originate in dispositions are 
widespread in society, people can thus easily act against their better judgment 
when to do so is habitual (Rorty, 1998). This means that people may act in an 
apparently akratic way, yet nevertheless remain consistent with their beliefs and 
habits, even if they are unable or unwilling (ashamed) to articulate this (Rorty, 
1997) – such as when a person prefers to do x but believes that those in 
positions of power favour y (Sommers, 2011). 
In summary, descriptive approaches to ethics pose significant challenges to the 
default normative interpretations of how people make ethical decisions, drawing 
particular attention to cognitive limitations that drive the need for coping 
strategies like heuristics or to behavioural phenomenon like hyperbolic 
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discounting and akrasia. However, while descriptive ethics often points to the 
role of social factors, it remains focused on the individual (Abend, 2011). 
2.5 Sociological perspectives 
To summarise the argument so far, the majority of treatments of ethics are 
either explicitly normative or presuppose a normative approach, yet research on 
how people actually behave suggests that these are untenable. Furthermore, 
the separation of normative and descriptive ethics has been underpinned by an 
assumption that ethical reasoning is different from other decision-making, which 
then minimises the importance of the social (Elm and Radin, 2012). Therefore, 
seeking a foundation for a theory of business ethics offers (at least) two options: 
to develop a normative theory that is adjusted or somehow accounts for the 
results of descriptive ethics research, perhaps by demonstrating how heuristics 
are influenced by normative theories, or to investigate whether ethics has a 
different role. 
There has been limited overlap in academia between ethics and sociology 
(Turner, 2013). However, sociological examinations of ethical problems argue 
that they occur not as isolated questions with defined answers, but as aspects 
of stories in which the meaning of the decisions cannot be divorced from the 
unity of the narrative (Abend, 2012). On one interpretation of this, there can 
never exist single ethical decisions akin to the experiments of normative or 
descriptive ethics because these circumstances do not occur in real life 
(MacIntyre, 1981); instead, people try to make sense of their lives and the 
ethical decisions they make as part of a continuous story that is told and retold 
(Abend, 2012). It is how they do and do not achieve this narration that this 
section deals with, focusing on two key concepts: identity and power. The 
literature review could also have considered the role of culture, but that concept 
has less explanatory power because organisational cultures are either too 
abstract or too diverse (Sinclair, 1993). This preference for a Bourdieusian view 
over a Foucauldian one is further justified in Chapter 4. 
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2.5.1 Ethics and identity 
That people want to identify themselves as ethical and preserve this self-
conception has been shown to motivate behaviour (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 
2008). Specifically, the extent to which people are prepared to be unethical is 
limited by their desire to maintain a positive self-image (Welsh and Ordóñez, 
2014). Even though they might be able to benefit economically from some 
unethical behaviour and there may be little risk of being caught, they will only 
engage in it to the extent that they do not then have to reconsider their self-
image as an ethical person (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). For example, it may be 
easier to steal something from a friend than to steal money from the same 
friend to pay for the item because the former presents less of a challenge to a 
person’s sense of ethical self (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). Being ethical is 
then a matter of sitting on a spectrum rather than taking a single position, such 
that self-image is positively reinforced when a person feels closer to the fully 
ethical pole; while conversely, a disjunction between actions and identity can 
lead to a person experiencing shame (Stets and Carter, 2011). 
It is this sense of self-image that is meant by the concept of identity, which 
refers to the meanings that people attribute to themselves, whether as 
individuals or as members of groups. Identities are always plural, varying over 
time as people shift between roles like employee, spouse, friend, student or 
customer that they can hold simultaneously (Bardon, Clegg and Josserand, 
2012). This fluidity of identity has increased in importance as the roles of 
traditional sources of self-identification, such as religion and other social 
structures like family and community, have reduced as a result of globalisation 
(Giddens, 1991). Being perceived as ethical is an important part of people’s 
narratives and they will emphasise stories that demonstrate this (Bazerman and 
Gino, 2012). 
On this view, it is then not the rules and governance of acquisition that constrain 
the agent, but her own sense of identity as an ethical person, which may be 
affected by the ends to which she is working. Rather than taking any opportunity 
for unethical behaviour if the benefits outweigh the costs, as those in favour of 
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ex ante control measures may assume, an acquisition agent might instead take 
as much ethical risk as possible to achieve an aim but remain constrained by 
her own sense of self, giving process restrictions little or no attention. It is thus 
being true to (ethical) self that matters to people, not adherence to ethical 
principles (Blasi, 1984). If unethical actions go unchallenged by an agent, this 
may in turn be because recognising them is an identification that presents a 
threat to her ethical self-image rather than acquiescence in bad behaviour. 
People may thus not even realise or – if confronted – agree that they have done 
anything wrong (Atkinson and Fulton, 2013), relying on an ethical calculus that 
balances lapses against good behaviour (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). 
2.5.1.1 Pro-social identity 
An example of people acting unethically but preserving a sense of ethical self is 
lying, which most people consider to be wrong but engage in all the same. 
Explaining this may be relatively straightforward: lying can result in the 
dishonest person being perceived as more rather than less ethical, especially if 
the deception is undertaken to help others (Levine and Schweitzer, 2014). This 
pro-social lying begins with ‘white lies’ but extends to altruistic lies being 
considered more ethical than selfish truths. Consequently, even if – from a 
hypothetically objective ethical standpoint such as Kant’s – it is possible to state 
that it is always better to tell the truth than to lie, in practice people appear (at 
least sometimes) to value compassion above honesty: they separate what a 
behaviour like lying is from how it functions (Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor 
and Wo, 2013). 
People are thus more interested in pro-social actions than in maximising self-
interest (Lind and van den Bos, 2013); in short, ‘from the group’s point of view, 
there cannot be a more dutiful act than so-called “white lies”’ because they 
recognise the existence of the rules that are bent or broken (Bourdieu, 1998: 
139). Paradoxically, then, it is being deliberately unethical for pro-social motives 
that demonstrates to the group that there are ethical rules that define the group 
in the first place – this is why people conceptualise actions along an ethical 
continuum instead of viewing them as right or wrong (Perryer and Scott-Ladd, 
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2014). In ethical terms, the implication is that when lies have consequences, 
people prioritise these above deontological limits on dishonesty; in short, it is 
wrong to lie as a general principle but not necessarily if it is for the sake of 
someone else. The problem in the Defence context is that acquisition agents 
may always or predominantly have in mind the consequences to operational 
capability rather than honesty and transparency in processes. There is then little 
to be gained from advocating these values if people rate them less than pro-
social lying that supports operational effect. More importantly, once people are 
incentivised to look favourably upon someone, they will try very hard to maintain 
a pro-social narrative and will excuse unethical behaviour rather than give up on 
that person (Linstead, Maréchal and Griffin, 2014). 
2.5.1.2 Changing identities 
Given the plurality of identities available, people will attempt to move between 
identities as a way of controlling and reducing uncertainty, and – to the extent 
that identities can be asserted – people may experience authenticity, ambiguity 
or anxiety (O’Mahoney, 2011). When a person can maintain the integrity and 
consistency of their sense of self, their identity is described as authentic; the 
aim is for people to be able to control their stories of self to achieve this 
(Miyahara, 2010). Therefore, the way in which the past is interpreted has a key 
role in making sense of current identities through achieving a form of 
biographical continuity (Ibarra and Barbulescu, 2010). A common way of 
achieving this is to insist on a separation between the groups to which an 
individual belongs and ‘them’, typically demarcating or ‘othering’ a superior 
group that the individual is a member of from an inferior group (Ybema, 
Vroemisse and van Marrewijk, 2012). By construction, this includes a sense of 
wanting to be considered more ethical than the comparison group, which then 
functions to underline the dominance of the identity and the position of power 
that it reinforces (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). 
On the face of it, this suggests that identity is something that people have. From 
a narrative perspective, though, identity is not something that is possessed but 
rather is employed when people attempt to explain their current positions and 
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perspectives in life, as well as where they want to get to in future (Miyahara, 
2010). By narrating identity as a story or series of stories, told in a way that 
selects from past history to create a potential future, the narrator hopes that 
others will endorse her identity and thereby help it achieve authenticity, 
especially when the narrator is using identity to negotiate her position relative to 
others (Ibarra and Barbulescu, 2010). The narrative thus ties events together to 
become episodes in a continuous tale (Somers, 1994), which may be an ethical 
one that implies normative demands: ‘because you are an x, you ought to do y’ 
(Donahoe, Eidson, Feyissa, Fuest, Nieswand, Schlee and Zenker, 2009). These 
appeals may be explicit or (more likely) implicit and embedded in habits or 
narratives (Bourdieu, 1990). This is then the link between identity and ethics: 
being able to act at all seems to depend on some form of normative framework 
against which to assess possibilities (Taylor, 1989). (This claim is returned to 
below.) 
Identities are non-trivial and in particular the negotiation of identity can be 
especially important in an organisational context as identity moves from being 
an individual narrative to a collective one. For example, businesses will typically 
seek to develop their own identity, which employees may be compelled – 
explicitly or otherwise – to adopt or resist (Gagnon, 2008). Notwithstanding the 
importance of self-image to individuals, they may opt to accept the 
organisational identity imposed on them because they value job security and 
assess that refusal represents risk. However, once this organisational identity is 
acceded to, the individual’s self-worth can increasingly become associated with 
the organisation and its values, both inside and outside the workplace, including 
as part of a professional identity (Ramarajan and Reid, 2013). It is this bonding 
with the organisation, together with the narrative continuity of identity as an 
ideal to help make sense of life, that make it difficult for people to leave an 
organisation or to challenge the dominant narratives (Conroy and O’Leary-Kelly, 
2014). 
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2.5.1.3 Social identity 
Although identity can be empowering when narratives are developed to create 
biographical continuity and a sense of a positive future, in fact people do not 
have full control over their narratives because identity is a social phenomenon 
(Horton, 2006). Given the focus on demarcating one group from others, identity 
can only be constructed cooperatively and it is the inevitably performative 
aspect of identity that reinforces the desire for narrative continuity (LaPointe, 
2010). In particular, since a loss of status is socially undesirable, it is easier to 
remain within the dominant narrative or to only adjust it slightly than to 
challenge it (Ibarra and Barbulescu, 2010). This is achieved in two ways: either 
through assimilation, incorporating a new identity within a person’s existing self-
conception, thereby making the practice of the new identity fit with the existing 
narrative; or through accommodation, which involves adjusting the narrative to 
make space for the new identity, minimising the change required so that 
narrative continuity is preserved. It is the social context that determines the 
salience of a particular identity (Tacon, 2016). 
In general, change is easier to cope with if the overall narrative remains 
unadjusted because then the future identity is contained within the existing 
concept of self (Just, 2011), reducing stress and normalising the modifications 
to identity practice (Manzi, Vignoles and Regalia, 2010). It is when people are 
unable or unwilling to adjust their narratives to accommodate change that they 
feel a lack of integration (Niessen, Binnewies and Rank, 2010). Powerful 
organisational narratives can thus delimit identity creation and the opportunity to 
develop alternatives because people will tend to position themselves relative to 
what they perceive to be the standard narrative (Ybema, Vroemisse and van 
Marrewijk, 2012), especially because attempting to hold conflicting identities 
simultaneously can lead to cognitive dissonance (Vest, 2013). Consequently, in 
practice people tend to maintain narrative continuity by limiting identity changes, 
particularly when moving employment; for example, military personnel 
disproportionately seek to remain in uniformed service (Higate, 2001). They 
also avoid anxiety by aligning themselves with organisational narratives 
(Alvesson and Spicer, 2012). 
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2.5.1.4 Criticisms 
It has been objected that the majority of identity research has been conducted 
in Western contexts (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002). However, the 
primary objection to identity as a concept in social science is that it is used in a 
folk sense to purportedly explain how people behave rather than analytically in 
a way that demonstrates the actual existence of identities (Brubaker and 
Cooper, 2000). On this view, identities are reified and, as an essentialist 
concept, actually contribute to reducing individual agency (Somers, 1994). On 
the other hand, the more people can choose to change their identity, the less 
causal power the concept has (Todd, 2004). This criticism holds that identity is 
shorthand for a plurality of different things that should be distinct; for example, 
identity binds people together but, at the same time, is supposed to separate 
them. Rather than being a conceptual error, then, identity is wrongly taken to 
actually exist and to have ontological meaning in the social world (Brubaker, 
2002). 
Against this criticism, conceptions of narrative identity have changed in recent 
years, from an assumption that narratives are an attempt to overlay a form of 
order on social experience to arguing ‘that social life is itself storied and that 
narrative is an ontological condition of social life’ (Somers, 1994: 613-614). In 
this way, the experience of social life just is the arraying and combining of 
narratives: people are continuously in a process of becoming social beings, so 
their identities are indeed fixed by the narratives they use but constantly 
changing also. (This is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.) Therefore, the 
essentialist objection to identity is misplaced because it does not account for the 
use of identity as a relational concept, the implications of which are to be 
understood empirically (Wellman, 1988). Moreover, the narrative approach 
means that people act as they do because of the stories they tell about 
themselves (Calhoun, 1991); to not do so would go against their self-conception 
and result in ontological conflict (Somers, 1994). In short: identity is not an a 
priori concept at all and is contingent-yet-constitutive of social being. 
Nevertheless, its operation presupposes non-identity, or the demarcation of self 
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from other: by affirming their identities, people disaffirm those of others (Olson, 
2002). 
2.5.2 Ethics and power 
If identity is key in understanding ethics but is necessarily social, the way in 
which ethical narratives are mediated by social structures and practices needs 
to be understood (Calhoun, 1991). Consider an example: if a person is 
perceived by others to be an ethical exemplar, a ‘good person’, then this can 
imply that a form of ethical ‘credit’ has been accrued, which in turn allows for 
later unethical behaviour (Bazerman and Gino, 2012). In short, a person can get 
away with being unethical sometimes because she is ethical most of the time 
and is known as ethical by others. 
2.5.2.1 Ethics and capital 
This presents a difficulty from a normative perspective because if a person has 
a large amount of ‘ethical capital’ then she is less likely to be judged unethical 
by those who recognise and value this credit, or else will be judged differently 
insofar as she is on good terms with those assessing her behaviour. Indeed, 
research suggests that people are more inclined to accept ethically 
questionable decisions by those who are similar to them or with whom they 
have positive relationships (De Bock, Vermeir and Kenhove, 2012). Therefore, 
those who might otherwise be expected to regulate or identify unethical conduct 
might perceive the behaviour as comparable to their own and choose to accept 
it rather than challenge it, or else be lenient towards people with significant 
ethical capital. 
The accumulation of capital is a social phenomenon that influences how people 
act. Specifically, ethical capital is accrued by behaving in an ethical way and – 
crucially – being recognised as so doing by a community (Zug, 2014). Just as 
with economic capital, acting in a manner that accords with social expectations 
thus becomes an investment in ethical capital because a person then builds up 
a stock of it, which can in turn be converted into opportunities; in short, it 
becomes profitable to behave as others expect (Swartz, 2010). For example, a 
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person perceived as ethical – holding a significant amount of ethical capital – 
might be preferred for an opportunity within a community or be afforded more 
respect by it, leading to a position of power: 
[Ethical] capital consists of accruing a record of [ethical] stance, 
enactment, and reputation. It can be possessed, enlarged, increased, 
invested in, lost, gained, and transferred. It is recognised by others, 
creating advantages, and comprises a combination of personal, social, 
relational, institutional, and structural features that ultimately convey 
(economic) benefit to those who possess it. (Swartz, 2009: 148) 
This ethical capital is then a form of symbolic capital that has value insofar as it 
functions as a form of prestige that demands recognition and hence affords the 
bearer power (Bourdieu, 1998). Groups can use ethical capital to create and 
sustain cohesion, which can be regarded as positive (Kluver, Frazier and Haidt, 
2014). However, by the same token, this ethical capital will help subdue any 
actions within the group that are contrary to its sustainment and limit interaction 
with other groups (Gu, Konana, Raghunathan and Chen, 2010); hence, it may 
function to delegitimise alternatives as people find themselves unable to 
conceive of options that lie outside the limits imposed on them by their lack of 
capital, or possibilities to which no ethical capital is attached (Strand and 
Lizardo, 2015). Alternatively, ethical capital may encourage people to regard 
themselves as justified in behaving unethically insofar as their actions promote 
the collective identity (Kluver, Frazier and Haidt, 2014). The accumulation of 
ethical capital is then a function not of behaving in accordance with normative 
ethics, but instead with the dominant narratives in a community or field, since 
this activity is what generates opportunity and advantage relative to the power 
structures that exist (Swartz, 2010). 
2.5.2.2 Ethics and structures 
More can be said about the operation of social power and a literary example of 
its potential influence is Hamlet’s claim in discussion with Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern: ‘for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.’ 
Regardless of the philosophical merits of Hamlet’s perspective (Wittgenstein, 
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1993), it poses a challenge: if there is no agreed normative theory of ethics that 
can be called upon, or if people do not actually behave in accordance with 
normative theories, does this imply that what counts as ethical in an 
organisation is a result of how dominant discourses shape what counts as 
legitimate (Kornberger and Brown, 2007)? Furthermore, all structures are non-
neutral insofar as they imply an ordering of possible options through the 
recognition and reward of some actions over others (Olson, 2002). On this view, 
to describe how ethics functions in organisations it is necessary to understand 
not which norms are appropriate but how other systems such as social 
structures operate, such that ethics can then either reinforce or question 
existing structures and behaviours (Besio and Pronzini, 2014). This is to say 
that if ‘thinking makes it so’ then research can explore how it achieves this and 
what different thinking could otherwise make so. 
One perspective is via institutional theory, in which the aim of organisations is to 
enhance their own legitimacy rather than their efficiency. They achieve this by 
adjusting internally as necessary to anticipate and reflect their stakeholders’ 
needs, which then delimits options for change as these expectations become 
embedded (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This results in organisations being 
characterised as fields, or areas of institutional life in which a specific logic 
dominates and provides rules and patterns of behaviour that are taken for 
granted (Scott, 2001). This is a macro-level alternative approach to business 
ethics, in which companies have to behave ethically to the extent that 
stakeholders support their activities and the business can survive (Van Aaken, 
Splitter and Seidl, 2013). From the institutional perspective, dominant social 
actors will call on organisational resources to force others to observe the 
behavioural norms that those with authority wish to maintain, based on a 
particular view of the institution and the kind of identity it should have (Donahoe 
et al., 2009). 
Considered from a perspective centered on social power, the earlier objection 
that identity creates fixed categories then fails for another reason: what is 
shared when a social identity is pointed to is not a reified concept that, 
 51 
somehow, exists across a shared, collective mind, but is instead the use of 
‘structurally similar sets of practical schemes of classification and perception’ 
(Lizardo, 2004: 392). Moreover, and to also return to the claim that being able to 
act at all depends on a normative framework against which to assess 
possibilities (Taylor, 1989), the alternative is thus that these norms are provided 
not by ethics but by accepted organisational practice (Bourdieu, 1990). 
However, the influence of power goes beyond the institutional level because 
individuals acting within a collective context are exposed to different levels of 
impact on their ethics: the macro system of ideologies and social attitudes; the 
institutions and other practices that govern how people can behave even if they 
play no explicit part in them; the micro system of lived experience and 
interpersonal relationships; and the inter-relationships in turn between different 
micro systems that people inhabit at different times or simultaneously, 
according to the identities they move across (Swartz, 2010). By setting out 
these levels, researchers are better able to explain why people may be aware of 
and able to reason ethically in terms of social norms, yet still behave unethically 
(Evans and English, 2002). 
2.5.2.3 Power and narratives 
At the limit of this sociological view, ethics is thus the power of convention and 
people are subjugated by dominant classes (Marx, 1988) or constrained by 
narratives that set social norms (Foucault, 2000). For Durkheim, the way that 
people speak about their organisation and about others is part of the ritual that 
sustains their view of the social world, and it is this narrative that demands 
obedience (Lincoln and Guillot, 2004). This is then the normative requirement: 
ethical facts become rules of social behaviour with defined sanctions in the 
event of a violation; the only difference between ethics and law is that sanctions 
are, respectively, organised diffusely by society or formally by the state 
(Karsenti, 2012). A sanction is imposed for ethical violations not because it 
follows from an act, but because of the relationship between social expectation 
and that act. This relationship is important because society then functions as an 
ideal to which the intentions of individuals are drawn (Durkheim, 1953). 
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The challenge for business ethics is that the organisational narratives that 
provide a normative influence are not necessarily disinterested and may instead 
mask the operation of power (Gordon, Kornberger and Clegg, 2009): what is 
purportedly for the benefit of all, or at least for the benefit of the organisation, 
may instead reinforce a contingent order that could otherwise be challenged 
and only claims neutrality through its success (Olson, 2002). At minimum, the 
complexity of ethical choices is such that single factors cannot be isolated from 
the larger context or overlapping influences (Kish-Gephart, Harrison and 
Treviño, 2010). Moreover, if – as the descriptive ethics research suggests – the 
normative understanding of ethics is precisely the wrong way around, such that 
people make decisions first and, if asked, use normative explanations to justify 
them (Sonenshein, 2007), then power may have a role both in the decision-
making and the subsequent justification. It can also provide a disincentive for 
people to question how things are done and take organisational routines as 
natural and not in need of explanation (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012).  
Ethics thus cannot be separated from business because values are ‘embedded 
in social contexts from which they cannot be removed’ (Sandberg, 2008: 230) 
and it becomes difficult to point to unethical activity as anything other than ‘a 
collection of transgressions united only in the context in which they occur’ 
(Ficcarrotta, 1998: 11). In particular, if ethics is formalised into following a code 
of conduct then the role of actual ethical decision-making is reduced or even 
entirely absent (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes, 2007). To develop an 
argument originally from Wittgenstein (1993), suppose that acquisition had an 
operating process defined in all-encompassing detail, along with a code of 
ethics and a training programme that ensured that all agents were able to make 
fully rational decisions to deliver their programmes. On the one hand, there is 
no place in such a schema for ethics at all because there is no sense in which 
the agents do not know how to act; but this implies that ethical blame cannot be 
assigned to mistakes because the agents are not responsible for any of their 
decisions: by construction, there were no grey areas in which they had to go 
beyond what the process, code and training told them to do. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the unpalatable absence of ethical responsibility, such a 
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schema has another consequence: it allows people in positions of power to 
frame the decisions made in acquisition as resulting from the structure of the 
system, rather than representing a choice by one or more individuals that could 
have been made otherwise, an alternative in which the challenges provided by 
ethical dilemmas would help to shape the development of ethics (Baïada-
Hirèche, Pasquero and Chanlat, 2011).  
On this view, the structures in Defence acquisition, or in any organisation, can 
reduce ethics to process, thereby implicitly supporting or delegitimising 
particular courses of action (Helin and Sandström, 2010). Moreover, ethical 
procedures presuppose that ethical issues are in principle decidable, which 
ensures that people are given technical rather than ethical accountability, so the 
routine of working against a decidable process numbs ethical sense (Clegg, 
Kornberger and Rhodes, 2007). 
The alternative is to argue that the very undecidability of social reality, born of a 
backdrop of bounded ethicality and the satisficing role of heuristics, provides a 
place for ethics at the heart of decision-making (Derrida, 1988). This 
undecidability offers people the chance to become involved in debating what 
counts as satisficing and to explore pro-social behaviour as a priority (Lind and 
van den Bos, 2013). Without this prospect, ‘[a]n ethics of undecidability 
suggests that those accounts of business that seek to ease moral anxiety or 
resolve moral indeterminacy through the institution of the rule or the norm 
should be exposed for what they are: an unjustifiable and amoral fig leaf to 
cover a lack of human decency’ (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes, 2007: 407). 
This, then, is the philosophical problem of applying general ethical principles to 
specific contexts as though a code could take the place of ethics (Dancy, 2013). 
This line of argument can be objected to on the grounds that ethics is always 
about finding an accommodation between principles and a complex reality 
(O’Neill, 2002). That is, ethical principles are ‘indeterminate, yet generalizable 
commitments’ that provide reasons for acting (or for not acting) (Smith and 
Dubbink, 2011: 223). In effect, principles contain an implicit ceteris paribus 
clause; for example, ‘other things being equal, you should not steal’. On one 
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interpretation, this was Kant’s (1991) original intent for deontology: ethical 
principles count as reasons that should not be ignored when determining a 
course of action, but can be overcome by circumstances and other reasons if 
necessary, such as when a duty not to steal is outweighed by a duty to support 
a family (Smith and Dubbink, 2011). 
However, these other reasons include the ‘thick’ combination of description and 
evaluation that people use when describing the context of their ethical decisions 
(Linden, 2013). Therefore, as descriptive ethicists contend, ethical principles 
actually function not as guides but as heuristics (Stangl, 2006). The ethical 
danger is again that these ‘rules of thumb’ can become ossified as ‘thin’ 
concepts that, by virtue of their abstraction, are used to either overrule 
organisational reality or shape it in ways that legitimise some decisions over 
others, discouraging people from challenging what becomes perceived as 
normal (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012). This move from thick to thin makes ethics 
falsely simplified (Linden, 2013). 
2.5.2.4 Ethics as disposition 
This concern is compounded because the ability to behave ethically results from 
integrating perceptions of ethical situations with actions, turning these into 
habits that then make up ethical identity (Hulsey and Hampson, 2014). 
Borrowing Bourdieu’s (1990) term, responses to ethical problems are thus a 
form of habitus: people become inclined to react in particular ways and these 
become the heuristic through which people interpret their experiences (Hulsey 
and Hampson, 2104). Once these responses have formed and are rewarded, 
ethics is whatever members of a community define it as (Lukes, 2005). 
Although these dispositions have developed over time and are contingent, they 
become automatic and are then assumed as the default (Todd, 2004), providing 
social power to those who are favoured by the organisational narratives that 
shape the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In this way, specific forms of 
behaviour become normalised and misrecognised as a natural part of 
membership in an organization (Lincoln and Guillot, 2004): 
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Once belief is conceptualized as a species of habit, […] it is easy to see 
that by the time a person is assenting to abstract propositions, they 
already believe in a way that is more fundamental than assent to the 
abstract statement. Because belief is always rooted in concrete 
situations, assent to propositional statements is always derivative and 
only connected to action after the fact.’ (Strand and Lizardo, 2015: 63-64) 
Unethical behaviour can then become part of organisational narratives and 
habitual, routine and unquestioned (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms, 2008), 
especially when people’s identities are threatened (Swann, Seyle, Gómez, 
Morales and Huici, 2009). When this occurs, codes of ethics and compliance 
checks fail because the ordinary undertaking of business is itself unethical 
(Weaver, 2006). From a Bourdieusian perspective, pro-social behaviour is that 
which individual agents use to increase their power, depending on their relative 
positions, the capital they have available and their dispositions (Van Aaken, 
Splitter and Seidl, 2013). 
Indeed, pro-social actions in favour of a group then imply an antisocial activity 
towards competitors (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002). It is thus the 
embodiment of the organisational narratives in habit that perpetuates the 
behaviour (Bourdieu, 1990), so only the development of new habits can address 
this (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms, 2008). Changes in organisational ethics 
require ‘the creation of alternative identities that cognitively and morally frame 
action differently’ (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms, 2008: 751). Without these, 
people who belong to dominant groups will reaffirm their existing identity, while 
the dominated either convert to the dominant identity or do so publicly while 
retreating to private, core identities such as religion or family (Todd, 2004). 
Where such alternatives are absent, those who are dominant within an 
organisation have the power to define what counts as legitimate, achieving this 
indirectly by rewarding behaviour that sustains an organisational narrative and 
thereby creating dispositions and habits in others (van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 
2013). Moreover, when a dominant identity is challenged, both the dominated 
and the dominating may experience this as a threat to the ethical order on 
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which their habitus is founded (Todd, 2004). Ethics then becomes ‘a discursive 
resource bound up in relations power’ and ‘dominant discursive practices can 
work to legitimate certain decisions and actions rather than others’ (Kornberger 
and Brown, 2007: 514). In this context, people behave in ways that serve to 
increase or retain the power associated with their positions and reduce 
organisational and individual uncertainty (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012), which 
then provides a sociological understanding of the operation of ethics that allows 
people to have individual agency while still accounting for the macro-influence 
of structures like institutions (van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013). The research 
implication is that ethical behaviour in business is not the free exercise of 
individual agency of normative ethics, but it is also not fully determined by 
structures (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). 
2.6 Summary 
Having sought to identify a potential ethics of acquisition, the examination of this 
context from an ethical perspective – both normative and descriptive – 
suggested a gap in the literature. It was argued, firstly, that normative 
approaches fail, particularly when confronted with the specific contexts faced by 
acquisition agents. Although a formal philosophical account might be able to 
address this in time, it was also shown, through a descriptive ethics examination 
of how people really behave and reason when confronted with ethical issues, 
that the normative view is at fault as a presupposition for ethics in organisations, 
specifically when people’s cognitive limitations are challenged by the complexity 
of actual ethical problems. Finally, it was proposed that any theory of business 
ethics in acquisition should look instead to the function of ethics within 
organisations such as Defence, notably in the power of ethical narratives to act 
as a means of controlling behaviours and limiting possibilities. 
The literature review thus framed the research that was undertaken because it 
justified a focus on the influence of power structures, especially given the 
hierarchical nature of the MOD and Defence acquisition. The scope is set out in 
Chapter 3, while the methodological implications are explored in Chapter 4.  
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3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Having set out the wider context through the literature review, this chapter 
explains the aim of the research and provides background on the case study 
selected. 
3.1 Literature gaps and research intent 
The literature review indicated that there is a gap in how business ethics is 
conceptualised, which prevents the acquisition community understanding the 
extent to which Defence acquisition seeks to reduce ethics to procedures, how 
this reduction operates, and the potential or actual consequences. There has 
been little study of how such process rules affect the ethics of people in 
organisations (Nielsen and Massa, 2013), let alone how ethical discourses are 
framed by – or themselves frame – what is possible or thinkable, such as what 
counts as open to ethical consideration and what does not (Rhodes, Pullen and 
Clegg, 2010). For example, a disallowed discourse might be one that compares 
military redundancies – characterised as an inevitable consequence of fiscal 
austerity and, therefore, not a matter for ethics – with mistakes in acquisition 
programmes that result in costs equal to or higher than the anticipated 
manpower savings. Excluding some forms of thought then becomes an 
important use (or abuse) of power. 
On this view, ethical problems in organisations could be the result of macro-
level, structural factors that impose ‘rules of the game’ instead of exclusively the 
province of individual acts or actors; but if this is the case then, by implication, 
the solutions are to be found and/or implemented in changing organisational 
narratives, not in providing staff with more training (Nielsen and Massa, 2013). 
Rather than behaviour being caused by failures in ethical reasoning about what 
decisions to take, it may be that ethics functions as a narrative to explain and 
legitimise decisions instead of normatively underpinning them (Gordon, 
Kornberger and Clegg, 2009). The standard approach in business ethics is 
then, mistakenly, focusing on the consequences rather than how the 
possibilities came about in the first place; or – crudely, and with reference to the 
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trolley problem referred to in the literature review – ethics means asking ‘how 
many should suffer death-by-trolley?’ instead of questioning how and why 
people came to be on the tracks at all. Indeed, the post hoc use of ethics to 
justify actions then becomes yet another means of preserving organisational 
power, reducing the agency of the people involved and delimiting scrutiny 
through narratives of inevitability (Rhodes, Pullen and Clegg, 2010). 
To repeat the scope limitation set out in the introduction, though, it should be 
noted that this perspective says nothing about whether a specific organisational 
activity is ethical in the traditional, normative sense; instead, it is concerned with 
how ethics is implemented within organisational practice and how ethics serves 
to persuade others (Duska, 2013). Given that organisations function in 
conditions of bounded rationality just as individuals do, narratives that, in 
principle, restrict ethical scrutiny of decisions or else use ethics to circumscribe 
discussion are to be expected. Therefore, they are to be critically examined; 
otherwise, ‘[a]n ethics innocent of power is an ethics of ignorance: power is 
always implicated with ethical discourse and practices’ (Gordon, Clegg and 
Kornberger, 2009: 94). Failing to undertake this scrutiny leaves those in 
positions of power able to rationalise their own versions of what counts as 
legitimate (Gordon, Kornberger and Clegg, 2009), even though they may not 
even realise that they are doing so and may instead view their behaviour as 
entirely natural (Bourdieu, 1990). 
3.2 Research aim 
The aim of this research was, therefore, to examine the extent to which ethics in 
Defence acquisition functions as part of narratives to legitimise or delegitimise 
options, rather than as a normative framework to guide or assess behaviour. 
The research focused on the applied ethics context of the acquisition of military 
capabilities and a presumed adversarial relationship between the Ministry of 
Defence as customer and the Defence Industry as supplier. Through a 
sociological, mixed methods investigation of military acquisition, which is 
detailed in Chapter 4 below, the research attempted to explore how the 
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relationship operates with a view to understanding whether an ethics of 
acquisition is possible. 
3.2.1 Rationale 
The justification for choosing to research ethics as narratives is both applied 
and academic. In addition to revealing the role of ethical narratives in shaping 
practice, the literature review also showed that there is widespread public 
concern about the ethical implications of the so-called ‘revolving door’, or the 
movement of public sector workers to positions in the private sector that results 
– or gives the impression of resulting – in conflicts of interest (Demmke and 
Bossaert, 2004; David-Barrett, 2011). (Note that, in the UK Defence context at 
least, the ‘revolving door’ is actually more accurately characterised as a one-
way valve, since there is very little movement back into the MOD from Industry.) 
Although this revolving door problem has been studied in the context of political 
transparency, there is little research on the impact of the ever-closer links 
between customer and supplier in military acquisition, and the impact of 
narratives on the effectiveness of the new working relationships that result. 
Additionally, the relationship between defence sector customers and suppliers 
has been the subject of proposals for more accurately characterising it as an 
interdependent ecosystem, implying that the straightforward division of public 
and private sectors should be reconsidered as people move along a continuum 
between these poles rather than through a door (Tan, 2013; Heidenkamp, Louth 
and Taylor, 2011). Moreover, a limited amount of other research argues that the 
revolving door problem is overstated and that in fact both sectors benefit from 
such transitions (Zaring, 2013). However, this claim has not been investigated 
in the context of military acquisition, and the normative objections associated 
with the closeness or otherwise of public and private sectors in UK Defence 
have not been considered sociologically. 
The potential practical implications are that moving between sectors should be 
supported, and that the business ethics associated with Defence acquisition will 
have to be reconsidered as applying across the intersection of public and 
private sectors rather than to the public and private sectors separately. This 
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may have significant implications for the ongoing reform of Defence acquisition 
(beginning with Gray, 2009), particularly given more recent demand for such 
ecosystem approaches in the Defence sector (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, 2013). It could also influence the development and 
adoption of a code of ethics, which is standardly a requirement for defining a 
profession (McGraw, 2004) and is important as acquisition becomes a specific 
career field in UK Defence (HM Government, 2016). 
3.2.2 Research question 
The overall research question addressed in this study was: How does ethics 
function in narratives of Defence acquisition? 
This was examined via two sub-questions: 
 How do people involved in Defence acquisition talk about the relationship 
between the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
 What does this reveal about the role of ethics in narratives of Defence 
acquisition?  
The proposition was that people in Defence employ ethics not in the traditional, 
normative sense, but instead as part of their narratives to legitimise or 
delegitimise potential courses of action or those already undertaken. The 
investigation of this was achieved via the case study detailed below and using 
the methodology set out in the next chapter. 
3.3 Case Study 
Since late 2014, the MOD has taken steps to address critical skills shortages by 
considering a whole-of-sector approach, according to which ‘Defence will in 
future be drawing more heavily on people and skills from the private sector’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2015: 18). In particular, the UK Government committed in 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015 to ‘mak[ing] it easier for 
people to move between the different elements of the “Whole Force” over their 
career, [working] collaboratively with industry to make skills available across 
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organisational boundaries when and where needed’ (HM Government, 2015: 
32). 
Responding to this strategic intent as part of the Armed Forces People 
Programme, the Enterprise Approach was a project that aimed to improve the 
maintenance of critical skills by challenging the definition of retention, arguing 
that keeping skills within a wider Defence Enterprise is actually the issue; in 
effect, that skills are not ‘lost’ if a person exits the Armed Forces or Civil Service 
for a job in the Defence Industry if she is still supporting Defence outputs, 
especially if it were possible for her to move back again having developed her 
skills in Industry. The Enterprise Approach thus intended to support sector-wide 
retention by offering so-called portfolio career pathways within the Defence 
sector. To achieve this, the formal definition and integration of a Defence 
Enterprise was assumed to be necessary, which could then enable a 
collaborative alignment of the demand for skills between the MOD and the 
Defence Industry, securing the supply of skills to deliver Defence outputs while 
also contributing to securing the industrial base. 
In keeping with the strategic direction, the Enterprise Approach efforts focused 
initially on options for accessing the private sector to address the specific 
shortage categories of maritime engineers, particularly those with nuclear skills. 
The work employed a joint team involving the MOD and maritime prime 
contractors, with the participants agreeing that behavioural change would be 
vital to success, but was likely to be long-term. Although the Defence lexicon 
had shifted, with UK Defence literature increasingly speaking of ‘the Defence 
Enterprise’, many people in both the MOD and Industry remained sceptical that 
closer collaboration between the two is possible. For example, prior to this 
research, but subsequently confirmed by it, a common sentiment expressed in 
the MOD in response to skills shortages was that “Industry poaches our 
people”. The Enterprise Approach project thus presented an opportunity to 
research how people responded to the initiative, especially given that – in 
keeping with the conclusions of the literature review – ‘poaching’ (a legal term) 
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is suggestive of delegitimising the Enterprise Approach through the use of 
normative ethical language. This example is returned to in Chapter 5 below. 
3.3.1 The case study relative to the literature 
Some research suggests that the UK Government’s strategic intent, notably the 
aspiration to support UK prosperity, is indeed conditional on an industrial base 
and the security of the supply chain (Louth and Taylor, 2015).  However, while 
there is limited evidence that quantifies the benefits of Defence spending to the 
wider UK, including output multipliers of 2.3 for investment and 2.8 for skilled 
job creation (Oxford Economics, 2011), together with an estimated 36% return 
to the Treasury for onshore tax obligations (Taylor and Louth, 2012), there is a 
lack of data to quantify the Defence sector’s impact on UK prosperity. This is 
largely due to a focus on ‘value for money’ in terms of individual programmes 
rather than for the UK as a whole (Dorman, Uttley and Wilkinson, 2015). 
Nevertheless, a significant and increasing body of literature, including case 
studies from other sectors, demonstrates that greater value is generated when 
customer, key suppliers and their supply chains are integrated and work 
collaboratively (Kastalli and Neely, 2015). One implication of this research is 
that any strategy for prosperity must include the co-creation of value and joint 
innovation because success is ultimately based on how effectively the overall 
system directs its combined capabilities and talents to transform and achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes (HM Treasury, 2015). 
As already noted, distinctions between the public and private sectors are 
contested (Clarke, 2004), particularly in the Defence context of a monopsony 
buyer typically purchasing from monopoly providers (COM, 2007). 
Consequently, research data suggests that partnering relationships are 
increasing (Farrant and Mommeja, 2009) and are challenging the assumption of 
an adversarial relationship between customer and supplier that is driven by 
competition (Louth, 2012b). Moreover, in Defence the customer is typically also 
the sponsor through funding research and development activity, but – in the UK 
context – also through a commitment to supporting Defence exports; and it is 
also the regulator through Governmental and Departmental policy 
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(Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2013a). Consequently, the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry are essentially bound to one another by default, even if this 
then results in unresolved tensions (Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2013c). 
This blurring or convergence of roles, both of the public sector as buyer and of 
an overall Defence system, is particularly well established in Singapore, where 
the defence sector is described as a single ecosystem (Karniol, 2006). Through 
personnel exchanges across the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the 
Science and Technology Laboratories, the intent was to develop the onshore 
defence industry while also building up critical skills and national research 
capabilities (Tan, 2013). The viability of the Singaporean ecosystem was a 
result of this strategic choice to integrate through a deliberate overspill of both 
technology and skills into non-Defence applications (for example, aviation) 
(Eliasson, 2011). This helps sustain a Singaporean defence sector that would 
otherwise be unviable due to its relative size and competition from other nations 
(Karniol, 2006). The experience of Singapore illustrates research conclusions 
that the success or otherwise of an ecosystem perspective depends on the 
extent to which the customer and supplier(s) are willing to collaborate rather 
than attempt to control the new entity (Farrant and Mommeja, 2009), or else to 
exploit a pre-existing position of dominance (DeVere, 2011). 
The Singaporean ecosystem can be characterised as an enterprise, or ‘a 
complex system of interconnected and interdependent activities undertaken by 
a diverse network of stakeholders for the achievement of a common significant 
purpose’; engineering services contracted through availability are the best 
current UK examples (Purchase, Parry, Valerdi, Nightingale and Mills, 2004: 7). 
In addition to leveraging the lessons of the Singaporean experience, the 
Enterprise Approach project had adapted this definition to describe a Defence 
Enterprise that encompasses anyone involved in developing, generating, 
sustaining and delivering military outcomes, which implied accepting that the 
notional enterprise is less concerned with where skills are based and instead 
with how they can be accessed to deliver operational capability. More generally, 
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it meant recognising that the MOD and Defence Industry are interconnected 
and interdependent, working to a shared purpose with a shared risk of failure. 
This Enterprise Approach was justified on the basis of the UK Government’s 
determination that, in addition to protecting its people and projecting global 
influence, the UK would seek to achieve prosperity by supporting UK Industry 
(HM Government, 2015). However, the aspiration to define and manage 
Defence as an enterprise conflicted with existing Industrial Policy in the White 
Paper National Security through Technology (MOD, 2012), which prioritises 
open competition except for relatively few capabilities, such as submarines, in 
which the preservation of onshore industrial capacity can be justified. The White 
Paper’s perspective has been subject to significant criticism, especially with 
regard to critical skills, because buying off-the-shelf implies that the skills, 
manufacturing, and research and development bases move to wherever the 
shelves are (Louth, 2012a), thereby undermining the ability to generate exports 
(Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2013c). This challenge is being addressed in 
Australia through detailed attention to the use of both domestic and international 
industry in supporting exports and the potential for disparity between them, but 
not in a similar way in the UK (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). 
Consequently, there was the possibility for discord within UK Defence, born of 
an apparent mismatch between existing Industrial Policy and the new 
Governmental strategic direction. The fact that public sector support to Industry 
had become explicit also meant that the revolving door problem could return to 
prominence. Furthermore, at the societal level, this aid or assistance, along with 
an enterprise approach or ecosystem perspective that sought to develop it, was 
likely to lead to wider public criticism of the role of the Defence Industry and the 
extent to which the Government incentivises arms sales as a vehicle for 
prosperity (Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2011). Indeed, the integration of a 
Defence system could itself become strategic intent – an end in itself – and then 
imply that the resulting Defence Enterprise is to be taken as given, discouraging 
criticism (Tan, 2013) while also inviting moral hazard if individual programmes, 
companies or even the Enterprise itself becomes ‘too big to fail’ (Vucetic, 2013). 
 65 
3.3.2 Justification of the case study 
This case study thus presented an opportunity to explore the tension in 
Industrial Policy intent through the challenge associated with critical skills in 
Defence. The Strategic Defence and Security Review direction to explore 
sharing skills between the public and private sectors was likely to maintain or 
increase the number of people moving across organisational boundaries, which 
has already been shown to create adversarial narratives (Newall, 2014). Given 
that behaviours have been identified as crucial to any collaboration between – 
and integration of – organisations (HM Treasury, 2015), coupled with the results 
of the literature review, it could be anticipated that the Enterprise Approach 
project would be challenged in behavioural terms. Moreover, if the research 
proposition proved to be correct, this contesting would involve ethics being used 
to delegitimise the project. 
Therefore, as a joint MOD/Industry initiative, the Enterprise Approach project 
provided for a specific case in which narratives about Defence acquisition might 
explicitly be used, primarily with respect to the relationship between the MOD 
and the Defence Industry. Given the Government’s commitment to this work, 
the research could leverage this strategic direction to achieve both quantitative 
and qualitative data within a bounded time period (the Concept Phase of the 
Enterprise Approach project lasting from May 2016 to April 2018 in total). 
Finally, the restriction of the project to a maritime test case meant that it was 
realistic to expect sufficient but not overwhelming data for analysis. 
Consequently, the Enterprise Approach met the conditions necessary to be 
employed as a case study (that is, that it should be Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), subject to the methodological 
arguments in the next chapter. The limitations of using a single case study are 
covered in Chapter 4 below. 
3.4 Summary 
Given the gap in the research on business ethics identified in the literature 
review, coupled with the research aim set out in this chapter, an appropriate 
theoretical framework was required that could be applied in attempting to 
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understand how ethics actually operates within narratives. The context of the 
public/private sector relationship in acquisition, particularly the so-called 
revolving door transitions involved, suggested a focus on how business ethics 
functions in Defence acquisition. A case study was justified as providing an 
opportunity to explore how people talk about public/private sector interactions 
because if – as hypothesised – ethics is used to delegitimise options, then the 
case study would be likely to exhibit instances of this behaviour as people 
resisted the proposed greater integration between the MOD and the Defence 
Industry. 
Methodologically, only a form of research that observes and analyses how 
people use ethics as part of constructing and employing narratives could study 
the possibility that ethics – regardless of its normative, positive intent – is just 
another organisational power dynamic (Baïada-Hirèche, Pasquero and Chanlat, 
2011). That Bourdieu’s theory of practice could achieve this is justified in 
Chapter 4, together with an explanation of how the theory was employed. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
Having explored the relevant literature and set the objectives of this research, 
this chapter explains the methodological decisions taken, including its 
ontological and epistemological assumptions; provides a discussion and 
justification of Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the appropriate theoretical 
framework, including why it could be used to investigate organisational ethics; 
and presents the methods used to gather data for subsequent analysis. 
4.1 Research goal 
To restate and build upon the aim of the research that was given in the last 
chapter, previous work had investigated the relationship between the MOD as 
customer and the UK Defence Industry as supplier on the basis of a persistence 
of individual identities across organisational boundaries (Higate, 2001; Newall, 
2014). This study’s exploration of identities in transition suggested that the MOD 
benefits from the persistence of military identities: people who have moved from 
the MOD to the Defence Industry retain a desire to support their former 
colleagues – going beyond their contractual obligations – because they 
perceive themselves to have a wider defence ecosystem identity. According to 
this, some individuals must move across the public/private sector border but 
remain part of the same overall system. However, this analysis was limited to a 
small sample size and revealed only that this motivation operated at an 
individual level; whether or not a collective ecosystem identity exists or how it 
might function were beyond the scope. Nevertheless, the implication was that 
the existence of such collective identities would be a better explanation of 
individual behaviour within the Defence system and that the default assumption 
of an adversarial relationship between customer and supplier should be 
critiqued (Heidenkamp, Louth and Taylor, 2013b). 
The current research sought to develop this previous work, moving beyond the 
focus on individual identities to examine if and how a collective identity (or 
identities) exists in UK Defence and the role of ethics in shaping it. If, for 
example, an adversarial tension contributes to a separation of MOD and UK 
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Defence Industry identities, then it would be of interest to determine whether 
this is based on any normative ethical claims about the behaviours of one or 
both sides, or if it is generated and/or sustained in another way. Since a prior 
study observed that ‘a sense of shame’ was associated with cross-boundary 
employment transition (Newall, 2014: 51), the research explored the extent to 
which this embarrassment is grounded in the symbolic power of ethics, 
including the possibility that individuals can be driven to adopt or internalise a 
dominant adversarial discourse without realising (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002) 
and then – through their actions – reinforce it (Samuels, 2013). 
4.2 Rationale 
On the assumption that an antagonistic relationship between the MOD and the 
Defence Industry is the dominant discourse, there were (at least) two possible 
propositions as to why this state of affairs exists. From a normative perspective, 
there may be unethical behaviour on the part of one or both sides, which results 
in distrust and the reinforcing of identity boundaries. However, from another 
perspective, ‘claims about identity are rarely evaluated and accepted on their 
own merit, but are instead mediated by the operation of symbolic power’ 
(Samuel, 2013: 401). This authority then disposes people to act in particular 
ways that reproduce existing ways of life, such that those who move against 
expectations can feel ashamed without really understanding why: 
The practical recognition through which the dominated, often unwittingly, 
contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting, in advance, the 
limits imposed on them, often takes the form of bodily emotion (shame, 
timidity, anxiety, guilt) … (Bourdieu, 1995: 169) 
Since this sense of shame was noted in the previous research (Newall, 2014), 
the question was then – in business ethics terms – whether Defence acquisition 
is constrained by genuine ethical violations or by ethically arbitrary limits that 
are placed on people via collective identities, which then come to be regarded 
over time as natural and hence form the basis of interactions within the 
ecosystem (Bourdieu, 1990). 
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The issue for Defence acquisition is that an ostensibly rational justification for 
separation on the basis of ethical norms could actually be obscuring (and doing 
the rhetorical work of) a discourse that imposes and preserves the power of 
dominant actors, which is a problem that confronts any development of 
collective identities (McConkey, 2004). This is especially the case if 
circumstances become taken for granted by individuals because this implies a 
denial of other options, social possibilities or distributions of power (Swartz, 
2013; McConkey, 2004). Rather than an adversarial relationship being natural, 
then, it may be the result of narratives about Defence acquisition being shaped 
by symbolic power, thereby creating collective identities that could be otherwise 
(Bourdieu, 1991). 
As theoretical framework to explore this, Bourdieu’s theory of practice is set out 
in greater detail below. Prior to this explication, the research paradigm is 
discussed; that is, the ontological, epistemological, methodological and other 
assumptions made by the researcher in approaching the social world in this 
investigation (Kuhn, 1962). Once this research paradigm has been paired with 
the Bourdieusian theoretical framework, which sets practice (as revealed in 
narratives) as the unit of analysis (Bourdieu, 1990), the methods used to collect 
and analyse data are then described (Blakie, 2010). 
4.3 Research methodology 
4.3.1 Research paradigm 
Historically, there are two main paradigms of social science research: positivism 
and interpretivism (Bryman and Bell, 2003). At a philosophical level, they are 
demarcated by the question of whether social reality exists independently of the 
knowing subject (Nightingale and Cromby, 2002). Positivists pursue causes for 
social action that do not depend on the existence of people or their opinions 
(Roth and Mehta, 2002), while interpretivists seek an understanding of how 
social reality is experienced (Heracleous, 2004); that is, interpretivism trades 
positivism’s generalisation-via-causes for understanding-in-depth, based on an 
assumption that the two are incompatible (Crane, 1999). 
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Positivism advanced in the early 20th Century, particularly with the 
philosophical development of logical positivism in the 1930s. For positivists, 
what exists is what can be measured (Cruickshank, 2010); therefore, there is no 
need for any metaphysical assumptions in science. The social sciences should 
thus follow their natural science predecessors and proceed empirically, 
advancing what positivists would say are theory-neutral hypotheses that, from 
their consequences, could be subjected to experiment. Where regularities 
between variables could be determined, explanation in social science could 
take the form of covering laws and social facts: given a particular fact about 
society, a general law should be able to subsume or ‘cover’ it, such that the 
combination of the law and the circumstances result in the fact to be explained 
(Bunge, 2004). As a result, positivism is overwhelmingly but not exclusively 
associated with quantitative methods such as surveying (Glennan, 2006). 
However, both observations and hypotheses cannot be neutral; they are 
unavoidably theory-laden (Hanson, 1958). Moreover, covering law explanations 
were rejected as logically flawed (specifically, they assumed that only one 
cause exists for a given social behaviour; see Law, 2007) and because they do 
not involve mechanisms (Bunge, 2004), or ‘the process (or processes) through 
which the cause influences its effect’ (Steel, 2005: 950). In general, being able 
to deduce the behaviour of the system from some first or fundamental principles 
still does not explain the behaviour (Manicas, 1987). 
Noting this limitation of positivist inquiry, interpretivism involves moving away 
from the assumption that reality exists separately from social actors and 
towards a social science that is about social meaning (Roth and Mehta, 2002). 
In particular, it implies that people’s understanding of the social world is created 
as they assign meaning to their actions; and furthermore, that when people form 
groups, this understanding must be constantly negotiated and renegotiated, 
such that social reality is constructed rather than fixed (Sandberg, 2005). 
Interpretivist research is then about the depth of understanding of the social 
context through the meaning that people give to it (Roth and Mehta, 2002). 
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From this perspective, there is no independent social reality; instead, it is 
intersubjective and always changing (Crane, 1999). However, this makes it 
difficult for social science research to examine relations of power in society, 
especially less overt ones that influence how people interpret their experience 
but over which they have little or no control, even if aware of them (Hartley, 
2010). Thus, the interpretation of social reality by individuals may not be 
connected to the hierarchies and other social structures they actually live within; 
that is, they fail to recognise that, since social actors have unequal access to 
resources, their creation of meaning is constrained and not solely a function of 
their understanding (Swartz, 1997). 
Critical realism was developed in the 1970s as an alternative, according to 
which ‘the primary aim of science and explanation is to identify and understand 
the underlying structures, capacities, mechanisms, etc. which causally bear 
upon (facilitate, influence, produce) surface phenomena, including events, of 
interest’ (Lawson, 1999: 233). On this view, rather than exclusively seeking laws 
or regularities (‘if x, then y’), and rather than only looking at meanings, critical 
realism also pursues the mechanisms that support the observed laws and 
interpreted meanings, such that the social world can be explained – indeed, 
these causal mechanisms are the explanation (Bunge, 2004), while the 
mechanisms are specific to whatever system is being investigated (Steel, 
2005). In social science, these mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient to 
explain social behaviour, because the critical realist can agree with the 
interpretivist that much of the social world is constructed, particularly norms 
(Bunge, 2004). An increasing body of literature argues that critical realism 
represents a development of and improvement upon positivism and 
interpretivism; therefore, critical realism was preferable as an overall approach 
to social science research for this study (Gorski, 2013b). 
4.3.2 Ontology 
4.3.2.1 Ontological commitments 
As a macro research paradigm, critical realism attaches particular weight to 
questions of ontology (Bhaskar, 1979) and how questions about how anything 
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can be known (epistemology) about the social world force researchers to ask 
about what exists (ontology) (Law and Urry, 2005). For Bourdieu (1996: 1), 
The goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of 
the different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as 
the ‘mechanisms’ that tend to ensure their reproduction or 
transformation. 
Critical realism in social science commonly means presupposing that 
knowledge claims must ultimately respond to a world that endures 
independently of social scientists and their subjects, and also that the entities 
proposed in theories to explain the operation of the social world actually exist 
(Bhaskar, 1994). Since the social world typically cannot be directly accessed, 
social scientists must content themselves with appearances and hence realism 
is fallibilist about what really exists (Wainwright, 2000). Realists emphasise 
causal explanations that are derived by uncovering the mechanisms that 
underlie social phenomena, with structures and individual agency both 
considered important (Delanty, 1997). Against positivism, critical realism 
refuses to correlate predictive success with explanation because social 
phenomena may be more or less prevalent in different circumstances and may 
interfere with each other, such that achieving a direct link between structures 
and their effects via correlation is impossible; instead, critical realists seek the 
structures and other mechanisms that generate the social phenomena 
(Wainwright, 2000). 
A distinction is made in critical realism between transitive and intransitive 
domains of knowledge, or what can be known about things that exist in the 
domain of social being and what can be known of things that exist whether 
there are people to ask about them or not (such as the universe itself) (Bhaskar, 
1979). These distinctions are also applied to the ontology of the social world, 
such that social structures can be intransitive. This is then important 
methodologically because one of the objections to realism in social science is 
that researchers create or construct reality when they investigate it.  
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For example, by undertaking an experiment, the researcher causes a sequence 
of events to occur and then interprets the events to mean that some 
phenomenon exists in the social world; but without the experiment, there would 
have been no need to posit the phenomenon. The critical realist would argue 
that the researcher does indeed bring about the events, but does not similarly 
create any mechanisms underlying them that, by virtue of undertaking the 
experiment, the researcher is now able to identify as mechanisms (Bhaskar, 
1979). In short: there may exist social laws or mechanisms that can only be 
identified by experiment and exploration of how they function. This means that 
the social world can be both real and constructed – linking but expanding upon 
the positivist and interpretivist perspectives – because whatever structures 
exist, social reality is constantly remade by the relationships between these 
structures and social actors, as well as between the social actors themselves 
(Tsekeris, 2010). 
Indeed, by their investigations of social reality, social scientists themselves 
enact it as much as they explain it (Law and Urry, 2005): their results are an 
expression of the social world at a specific moment in the ongoing explanation 
of it (Giddens, 1990). This is because social science participates in the social 
world as it tries to account for it (Law and Urry, 2005). For example, by 
obtaining data and defining suicide rates from them, Durkheim created a new 
element of social reality that then (and now) had effects in the world as people 
sought to address and account for differing regional rates (Durkheim, 1951). 
Here, the suicides existed independently of Durkheim and his research, but the 
latter constructed a new aspect of the social world that then became as real as 
the suicides. 
The critical realist thus resists the ‘epistemic fallacy’, or the claim that ontology 
collapses into epistemology; that is, to argue that social science can only speak 
of what exists in the social world in terms of what can be known (Bhaskar, 
1979). For a critical realist, social science does not reveal what precisely exists, 
but only that things like mechanisms exist, which it is then the role of the 
researcher to explore (Bryant, 2011); in this respect, it must be accompanied by 
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a fallibilist epistemology (Bhaskar, 1979). The manner of getting at these 
mechanisms is then analogous to police investigation: ‘the detective knows that 
a crime has been committed and some facts about it but he does not know, or 
at least cannot yet prove, the identity of the criminal’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 35). 
Indeed, if social reality both exists and is made by the actions of the social 
scientist, then epistemology is forced back into ontology as the researcher 
considers not just what and how she knows anything, but also what she creates 
in seeking that knowledge (Law and Urry, 2005). 
4.3.2.2 Criticism and responses 
A philosophical objection to critical realism is that it methodologically begs the 
question: it presupposes, ontologically and a priori, that there are causal 
mechanisms in the social world and then develops a methodology to identify 
them (Guala, 2005). To avoid methodological constraints, this critique 
advocates instead a pluralism of methodologies that are constrained by 
ontology only in the sense that the activity of the researcher does not lead to 
ontological incoherence; otherwise, the researcher can do as she chooses, 
without adhering to a rigid methodology. Ontological assumptions then arise a 
posteriori as part of an explanation that combines ontology with what is relevant 
in practice, as well as what the researcher aims to achieve (Van Bouwel, 2003). 
In short, if – like Bourdieu (1990) and Bhaskar (1979) – researchers want to 
engage in emancipatory or evaluative critique, then they should advocate 
methodological pluralism; but then this implies that ontology is a matter of 
pragmatism, at least prior to research commencing and before the results 
suggest what ontological commitments might be advised (Van Bouwel, 2003). 
This complaint can be accommodated by critical realism, though. The historical 
turn in the philosophy of science demonstrated that scientists violated 
methodological ‘rules’ (or post hoc assertions of what the scientific method 
should involve) as and when it suited them (Lakatos, 1978), so much so that – 
hypothetically speaking – insisting on these rules would have stopped dead 
what are now regarded as paradigmatic instances of great science (for this 
reductio ad absurdum argument, see Feyerabend, 1993). In social science, ‘the 
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problem is not so much lack of variety in the practice of method, as the 
hegemonic and dominatory pretensions of certain versions of accounts of 
method’ (Law, 2007: 4). Although methodology is typically fixed at the outset 
when conducting social science, there is no reason why it cannot be reviewed 
or adjusted as social reality is explored and constructed (Emirbayer and 
Johnson, 2008). On this view, the critical realist adopts an underlying concept of 
causation, but not a fully developed ontology, which then leaves her with space 
to innovate methodologically (Rudder Baker, 1993). Ultimately, though, there is 
no single social science methodology for divining the mechanisms that the 
realist assumes must lie behind social action (Bunge, 2004). 
A separate social constructionist criticism is that if the social world is always a 
reality experienced then it makes little sense to speak of reality beyond this: it is 
through experience that the world becomes real for people (Sandberg, 2005). 
From this perspective, even if reality existed as distinct from all subjects, it could 
have no meaning for them until interpreted through the lens of experience. 
Although realists assert that the reality of the social world has to be assumed 
before anyone can make knowledge claims (Cromby and Nightingale, 1999), 
social constructionists argue that there can be no neutral, ‘God’s-eye’ position 
from which to view the world and assess our knowledge claims (Nightingale and 
Cromby, 2002). 
However, constructionism need not mean that just anything can be socially 
constructed because the realist’s external world can still be accepted as playing 
a constraining role, even though, having created their social reality, people then 
come to experience it as existing independently of them (Dobbin, 2008). For 
critical realists, the constructionist perspective advances ‘thick’ descriptions of 
social phenomena in the place of ‘thin’ explanations, whereas what the critical 
realist actually seeks is thick explanation (Wainwright, 2000). For ethics, in 
particular, if it ‘is inevitably expressed in ways that are “thick” with culture, 
tradition, and institutional significance’ (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999: 57), then 
the critical realist aims to avoid removing both the thick micro context as well as 
any macro setting that could help identity social structures and other 
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mechanisms (Porter and Ryan, 1996). Focusing on the phenomenology of 
primary experience risks the researcher being unable to account for that 
experience at all (Bourdieu, 1995). 
From this perspective, explanation is more important than understanding in 
social science: the critical realist attempts to develop mechanisms that explain 
social phenomena, while providing empirical justifications for believing in the 
existence of these mechanisms and arguing that there are no better 
explanations (Wainwright, 2000). Moreover, relying too much on what social 
actors report runs the risk of the researcher ending up with folk beliefs that are 
counter to the available evidence (for example, that poverty does not cause 
poor health; see Blaxter, 1997). 
4.3.2.3 Social reality 
For a critical realist, then, social reality is neither singular (positivist) nor 
constructed and intersubjective; instead, it consists in three domains: the 
empirical, the actual, and the real (Bhaskar, 1979). The empirical domain is 
what social actors experience; it is empirical because data can be gathered 
from it, and is the focus of positivism. The actual is what social actors 
experience over and above the empirical, such as the meanings that are the 
goal of the interpretivists. Finally, the real is the domain of the mechanisms that 
generate the social world (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 2002). 
This conception of realism is called critical because, by uncovering 
mechanisms, it attempts to identify and challenge power relations in the social 
world (Bhaskar, 1998). 
Therefore, when the social constructionist researcher argues that meaning for 
people is not in the world but is constructed by their attempts to understand it 
(Clark, Zukas and Lent, 2011), the critical realist responds that there is more to 
social reality than what social actors express (Bhaskar, 1979). The social world 
can indeed be created as people interact with their surroundings and with each 
other (Miyahara, 2010), both in people’s minds as they experience it and in their 
behaviours as they embody their experiences to date (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992), but this remains the domain of the actual. Critical realists can accept the 
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social realities of the positivist and the interpretivist, but insist on moving a stage 
deeper by aiming at the mechanisms beneath both (Bhaskar, 1979). The reality 
that is then uncovered is too complex to be captured completely such that 
explanation comes to an end, but this is why social science must be fallibilist 
(Wainwright, 2000). 
Given these constraints on social science inquiry, the selection of an 
appropriate epistemology that can effectively work within these limitations is 
now considered. 
4.3.3 Epistemology 
4.3.3.1 Objections to standard social science approaches 
The critical realist’s search for mechanisms amounts to asking, ‘how does it 
work?’ (Bunge, 2004). To achieve this quantitatively, business research has 
focused on surveying attitudes, particularly those of managers, with the 
resulting data used to make an assessment; for example, of how ethical an 
organisation is (Crane, 1999). However, this approach presupposes that social 
reality is about the actions and decisions of individuals, so they are used as the 
unit of analysis rather than – for example – the organisation or some other 
proxy for the collective actions of individuals; but this means that social context 
and its influence is missed or explicitly ignored (Saini, 2010). Moreover, surveys 
have poor response rates for people occupying marginalised positions 
(Wainwright, 2000), yet these are precisely the people whom the researcher 
needs to access to avoid learning only about majority opinions or else assuming 
that those in leadership positions are representative, which is unlikely (Brigley, 
1995). Given that how people understand their business ethics obligations is 
precisely what this investigation seeks to uncover, it would be begging the 
question to presume that they act as isolated, rational individuals and then test 
whether ethics policies are being followed, ignoring the social context. 
From a qualitative perspective, research tends to involve interviews that are 
then abstracted and organised into themes; that is, generalising from the data to 
identify key terms (codes) that are repeated, and then drawing these together to 
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a higher level of generalisation as primary concepts or themes (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). However, there are no standards of validity for this coding process, 
which can lead to the researcher incorporating pre-conceived theoretical 
frameworks in her analysis (Bulmer, 1979). Moreover, the problem with coding 
is that ‘the literature of the ages has always suggested that the most essential 
meaning of a text may run contrary to the linguistic devices used to convey it’ 
(Biernacki, 2012: 130). 
Therefore, if results are coded on the basis that a specific code is valid because 
it fits or is correlated with other codes, this is begging the question by 
presupposing what counts as valid; but if valid codes are already known or can 
be determined, then there is no need to actually pay attention to data at all: the 
theory that allowed for this assessment of representativeness would already be 
the theory sought by the researcher. The point of Biernacki’s literature metaphor 
is that data take their meaning from their relationship to the wider cultural 
environment, but coding must strip much of this away to identify which aspects 
are most salient; and yet there is no way to know whether the parts remaining 
are the most important; so, even where another researcher identifies other 
codes, this can be attributed to transcription errors and the overall theory 
preserved. In short, the selection can never be falsified (Lakatos, 1978). 
There is still another problem, though: by coding data and observing similar 
meanings, the researcher presupposes that the data are referring to the same 
things; the codes are then generalised to provide a theory encompassing all of 
the data. However, the data may straightforwardly use identical terms and yet 
mean something different: they may be part of incommensurable paradigms 
(Kuhn, 1962); for example, the concepts of mass in Newtonian physics and 
quantum mechanics (Feyerabend, 1981). Precisely this form of 
incommensurability was found in the qualitative (interview) data; for example, 
‘project management’ meant different things in the MOD and in Industry. (This is 
discussed in Chapter 5.) Even where codes are commensurable, the researcher 
has no way to determine that this is intentional, so to speak – that like uses are 
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actually synonyms and that meaning is persistent across data sets (and across 
time) (Biernacki, 2012). 
4.3.3.2 Social knowledge via case studies as ideal types 
Just as there are no rules in the natural sciences for when a result disconfirms a 
theory (Galison, 1987) or what is allowed or disallowed in developing it 
(Feyerabend, 1993), the lesson of these quantitative and qualitative 
epistemological shortfalls is that both the natural and social sciences need to 
provide transparency in how interpretations were derived (cf. Weber, 1949a). 
This is achieved not by coding away detail, such that correspondence with an 
assumed reality becomes impossible, but by offering the original texts for others 
to contrast them with any conclusions drawn from them. One way to achieve 
this is via case studies, or ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring 2004: 342).  
Critics of case study research argue that generalisation is not possible because 
it implies losing the context that case studies capture in detail (Peattie, 2001); 
that is, exchanging ‘thick’ descriptions of social reality for ‘thin’ abstractions that 
then mean little to the people from whom they originate (Walzer, 1983). This 
objection can be rejected: case studies can simply be regarded as the end point 
of sociological research (Flyvbjerg, 2006) because with the empirical detail of 
conversations and actions captured by researchers embedded in the specific 
context (Linstead, Maréchal and Griffin, 2014), the hidden aspects of 
organisational life such as careerism and the pursuit of power are made 
available when they would otherwise be missed (Shapira, 2015). Indeed, from a 
critical realist perspective, generalisation is a positivistic requirement that 
addresses only the domain of the empirical, whereas the realist seeks to identify 
mechanisms in the domain of the real that case studies could illuminate 
(Ruddin, 2006). On this view, interpreting a case study is about developing an 
explanation that is overlain on the case, rather than trying to inductively 
generalise from it (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Although criticised for merely establishing 
the researcher’s prior ideas (Diamond, 1996), in fact the depth of understanding 
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arrived at through a case study makes it more likely to falsify those ideas than 
confirm them (Ragin, 1992). 
In any event, a case study can be used to generalise – even in positivistic terms 
– if it is constructed so as to be a critical case (rather than a representative 
one); that is, one that is associated with the falsification or confirmation of a 
theory (Flyvbjerg, 2001) and either a most likely or least likely case, respectively 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). (For some problems with falsification, see Lakatos, 1978.) For 
example, Aristotle’s theory of gravity, particularly its concepts of impetus and 
place, meant that a heavier object should fall quicker than a lighter one. 
However, Galileo was famously said to have used a single case to demonstrate 
that objects fall at the same speed by dropping items from the Tower of Pisa 
(Mitchell, 2000). Historians of science dispute whether this experiment actually 
took place, but it was repeated to demonstrate that Galileo could have 
undertaken it as he described (Settle, 1961). More importantly, in this instance, 
‘[a] particular case that is well constructed ceases to be particular’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 77) and the detail of this one case can be applied to 
others. Just as in the development of case law in legal judgments, a qualitative 
generalisation occurs, rather than a quantitative statistical inference (Ruddin, 
2006). Indeed, in common with the legal profession, only by developing 
experience of detailed single cases can expertise develop (Flyvbjerg, 2006), 
which is why most scientific knowledge is actually the result of case studies 
(Gerring, 2004). 
In this way, it becomes not only possible to generalise from a single case study 
because social problems share characteristics and ‘a finding that applies to one 
of them often sheds light on many of them’ (Steinberg, 2015: 168). Any 
inference about the whole can come only from building upon the detail of a 
single, thoroughly explored example (Flyvbjerg, 2001), which is then made into 
a critical case that explicitly emphasises how and where the researcher has 
constructed the paradigm (Biernacki, 2012). This is a Weberian ideal type, or an 
analytical construction that serves to stress the logic of social relations and 
interactions, allowing this construct to then be applied to other contexts: 
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An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more 
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, 
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its 
conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found anywhere in 
reality. It is a utopia. (Weber, 1949b: 90) 
If an ideal type proves useful in explaining a particular case, there is reason to 
suppose it will be similarly fruitful elsewhere unless and until the details of 
another case show otherwise (Bengtsson and Hertting, 2014). For example, 
Weber’s three kinds of ideal type involved historical particularities (for example, 
‘the Protestant ethic’), abstracting social reality (for example, ‘bureaucracy’), 
and reconstructing behaviours (for example, propositions about social actors in 
economic theory); these have been so successful that they have been largely 
adopted in social discourse (Coser, 1977). Like a point mass in physics, this 
ideal type does not exist (in the positivist’s sense) in the domain of the empirical 
and thus as an ideal it cannot be confirmed or falsified, but it illustrates the 
operation of mechanisms in the domain of the real, which can then be 
generalised to any similar context (Bengtsson and Hertting, 2014). 
Therefore, the case study is not just compatible with generalisation but 
constitutes the larger part of it, notwithstanding that the process of creating an 
ideal type is not described by a methodological formula (Weber, 1949a). In 
short, ‘[o]ne cannot think well except in and through theoretically constructed 
empirical cases’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 160), the impact of which is 
very much underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2001). For these reasons, the 
development of a Weberian ideal type through a case study was selected as the 
appropriate epistemological approach. 
4.3.3.3 Case studies of ethics 
To arrive at an ideal type when researching ethics poses several issues. Firstly, 
any investigation of ethics research risks social desirability bias, where people 
offer what they believe the researcher wants to hear – whatever is socially 
 82 
appropriate – instead of their true beliefs (Landeros and Plank, 1996). 
Secondly, and as a consequence, this reluctance to speak openly for fear of 
saying the ‘wrong’ thing then imposes the perspective of the researcher, since 
she is a proxy for social acceptance (Crane, 1999). This means that the 
researcher can only get at what people believe relative to the context they are 
being asked about, whether their family, their organisation, or society as a 
whole (Brigley, 1995). 
Investigating ethics in the way advocated in this methodology chapter implies 
identifying a case study (Yin, 2003) that starts with how people actually 
conceptualise ethics rather than imposing frameworks on them (Clegg, 
Kornberger and Rhodes, 2007). However, the case study would need to go 
beyond the domain of the empirical (in critical realist terms), which meant 
seeking to identify how people use ethics in practice through the domains of the 
actual and the real (Wainwright, 2000). The closer that research can get to its 
subjects and the more trust can be established with them, the more likely it is 
that (relatively) honest results will be obtained and bias minimised (Miyazaki 
and Taylor, 2008). This implied a need for the researcher to be embedded 
within the research context to some extent to gain an appreciation of the 
domain of the actual as well as an awareness of ethics as ‘something one does 
rather than something one has’ (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes, 2007). 
4.3.3.4 Narrative analysis 
To examine how people use ethics, insofar as it is possible to do so, narrative 
analysis is a way of learning about social reality that lets people tell their own 
stories and minimises the role of the researcher (Bauer, 1996), such that beliefs 
– including those about ethics – are inferred from the narratives and the social 
world they created, rather than asked about explicitly and so encouraging bias 
(Foster, 2012). It attempts to analyse the way in which people interact with the 
social world, particularly how they interpret their relationships with society and 
with others as stories within an overall life narrative (Miyahara, 2010). 
A narrative is ‘a method of recapitulating past experience’ (Labov, 1972: 359) as 
the conjunction of stories and a controlling plot (Franzosi, 1998). The narrative 
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analyst can ask people to recount events and how they were navigated 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). The goal is to then identify the plot – a kind of 
screenplay – that lies behind the narrative (Franzosi, 1998), which then sets out 
the roles of the different people involved and the social backdrop against which 
the stories play out, as well as providing a means of assessing the function of 
the narrative (Bryman and Bell, 2003). In general, a narrative will include a 
number of stories that illustrate particular instances in support of its overall 
themes (Feldman, Sköldberg, Brown and Horner, 2004). 
Critics of narrative analysis argue that narratives create order out of the chaos 
of everyday life and, therefore, are distinct from the critical realist’s domain of 
the real. On this view, narratives cannot be used to reveal social reality because 
they project an order onto it that does not actually exist (Mink, 1981). In 
particular, the more people have thought about their life stories, the richer these 
tales are likely to be; but the passing of time also permits the reconstruction of 
narratives to support what people think and aim at now, rather than as their 
lives actually played out (Bauer, 1996). 
However, the conclusion that narratives are epistemologically limited or even 
worthless is based on the positivistic ontological presupposition that social 
reality is that which is independent of any meaning given to it by social actors 
(Meretoja, 2014); that is, an ontology that privileges the empirical domain at the 
expense of the actual and the real (Bhaskar, 1979). For a critical realist, though, 
the actual is precisely a process of interpretation in which social reality exists 
and is constructed by social actors (Danermark et al., 2002). Thus, on the basis 
of a differing ontological commitment, if there can be no positivist’s experience 
of social reality as pure sense data, then the critical realist has no grounds for 
dismissing narratives as less real or as epistemologically frail (Meretoja, 2014). 
Moreover, since narratives are always interpretations, this concern with 
accuracy is misplaced because there is no means of determining the validity or 
otherwise of narratives anyway (Biernacki, 2012); after all, the point is to get at 
the narrative and its mechanisms (Hunter, 2010) and then develop an ideal type 
from it (Caine, Estefan and Clandinin, 2013). 
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Given a critical realist commitment to narratives, the primary reason why 
narrative analysis can help in researching ethics is that the way social actors 
narrate provides a window into their ethical beliefs and behaviours (Savin-
Baden and Van Niekerk, 2007): 
[T]hrough the events the narrative includes, excludes, and emphasizes, 
the storyteller not only illustrates his or her version of the action but also 
provides an interpretation or evaluative commentary on the subject 
(Feldman et al., 2004: 148). 
The researcher then indirectly approaches ethics via a tendency for people to 
recount their lives as a continuous narrative with ethical lessons and 
implications embedded within it, just as in folk tales and other stories (Hunter, 
2010). The narratives thus help reveal the social enactment of ethics, so any 
social desirability bias or other distortion – such as ‘tactical answering’ in line 
with dominant organisational themes – is a central part of these practices and, 
therefore, to be welcomed as part of the analysis (Diefenbach, 2009: 882). 
4.3.4 Methodology 
Having chosen narrative analysis as an epistemology to develop a detailed 
case study into an ideal type, this form of analysis became both the 
epistemology and the methodology of this research (Caine, Estefan and 
Clandinin, 2013). Moreover, insofar as people use narratives to define 
themselves as social beings, these narratives are also ontological: they provide 
people with social identities that influence how people act, but these actions 
then adjust and create new narratives (Somers, 1994). Narrative interviews 
were conducted according to a standard format (Bauer, 1996) and then 
analysed by setting the case study in its social context, an additional step that is 
often missing from other case study research, (Diefenbach, 2009). 
4.3.4.1 Methodological relationalism 
To do this, rather than suppose – with positivists – that correlations between 
variables imply causal relationships, critical realists focus on (necessarily 
unobservable) structures that condition but do not fully determine how social 
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actors behave, such that social behaviour is an emergent property of these 
structures (Bhaskar, 1998). For example, economic systems like socialism or 
capitalism emerged from the actions of individuals, including those writing 
foundational texts, but these systems then became structures that cause 
behaviours and cannot be attributed again to their individual creators or the 
social actors within the systems (Cruickshank, 2010). This means that it does 
not necessarily follow that all social mechanisms can be reduced to the agency 
of individuals (called methodological individualism, or ‘the doctrine that all social 
phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in 
terms of individuals – their properties, goals, and beliefs’ (Elster, 1982a: 453)). 
Social science explanations may limit the agency of individuals when other 
factors are strong, such as organisational inertia reducing the impact of 
individual management action (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Therefore, 
analysis has to move from a focus on individuals to one of relations (Tsekeris, 
2010). 
This view is contested, though. For methodological individualists, ‘large-scale 
social phenomena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions and 
beliefs of individuals’ (Watkins, 1955: 58). These explanations are contrasted 
with functionalism in social science, or where the function of a phenomenon 
explains why it exists (Elster, 1982a). Functionalist explanations are common in 
evolutionary theory and organisational ecology: in the same way that 
camouflage functions to help prey avoid predators and thus explains the 
former’s survival, the existence of particular organisations or structures is 
explained by their differential mortality rates (Steel, 2005). Methodological 
individualists object to functionalism in social science because it fails to specify 
the mechanisms that cause behaviour: whereas the explanation can point to 
natural selection, the social scientist cannot do so analogously, except insofar 
as she points to the role of individual agency (Elster, 1982b). 
However, in general, and against methodological individualism, the acceptability 
of functional explanations – or indeed of any explanation – is dependent on 
what is being explained (Steel, 2005). While it may be that a particular instance 
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of a social phenomenon can be described in terms of individual agency, the 
same phenomenon could arise for different reasons and in a different way at 
another time or place, so its explanation is underdetermined by methodological 
individualism (Wright, Sober and Levine, 1987). Indeed, following Davidson’s 
(1989) conception of meaning holism, beliefs cannot be ascribed to individual 
agents at all without an assumption that they can employ part or all of a 
language, which – since it is a social phenomenon that cannot be reduced to 
individual acts – implies that the meanings of agents’ beliefs are ‘as social as 
can be’ (Kumar, 2008: 199). 
A distinction can also be made between methodological and ontological 
versions of methodological individualism: a preference for explanations in terms 
of individual agency alone need not imply that only the actions of individuals 
exist (Van Bouwel and Weber, 2008). On this view, any explanation of social 
phenomena requires interactions between agents, so explanations of social 
phenomena must be in terms of both individual agents and the relations 
between them, as well as how they relate to social structures (Hodgson, 2007). 
That one of these might predominate, depending on the question being asked, 
need not exclude explanation in terms of the others (Van Bouwel and Weber, 
2008). 
This is a methodological relationalism that looks to the composition, structure 
and contents of social networks (Tsekeris, 2010), yet retains an assumption that 
individuals act rationally – or for a reason – insofar as they can (Bengtsson and 
Hertting, 2014; Bourdieu, 1998). Indeed, the difficulty for methodological 
individualism is that unless there is some way to aggregate separate 
explanations in terms of social phenomena that supervene on individual 
agency, no general explanation is possible. The function of a system remains 
an essential mechanism in explaining how it works, alongside other 
mechanisms like structures and agency (Bunge, 2004), and people are 
positioned within it relationally, such that they do not and cannot have a view of 
the whole (Maton, 2003). To put it another way, ‘to exist within a social space, 
to occupy a point or to be an individual within a social space, is to differ, to be 
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different’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 9); so how people differentiate themselves in relation 
to others becomes the focus. As a result, it is practice – as revealed in 
narratives – that must be the unit of analysis, not individuals (Bourdieu, 1990). 
4.3.4.2 Abduction and Retroduction 
Given narrative analysis as the appropriate epistemological approach, and 
given a methodological focus on relations rather than individuals, the research 
needed to then make inferences on the basis of any data collected. In social 
science, there are two traditional forms of inference that a researcher can use to 
account for or extend the data she gathers. A deduction moves from general 
principles to a particular case, as with the positivist’s covering law explanations; 
conversely, an induction moves from particular cases to general principles. 
However, there are significant philosophical difficulties with both. 
Firstly, making deductive inferences in social science is an instance of affirming 
the consequent, a formal logical fallacy because there are many possible 
causes of social behaviours (Law, 2007). For example, it might be argued that if 
social security benefit levels are increased in a country, then it should be 
anticipated that more people would choose to stop working within or to migrate 
to that country. If unemployment and migration subsequently go up, the 
proponent of this argument then declares that the rise in benefits caused 
joblessness and migration. However, since there are many possible reasons for 
both, this argument confuses subsequent behaviour with consequent (hence 
affirming the consequent, or post hoc, ergo propter hoc – ‘after this; therefore, 
because of it’). The critical realist would say that what is needed is the 
underlying mechanism, not the deduction, which – once the mechanism is 
known – becomes redundant. 
Inductive inferences also face issues. Regardless of how much data the 
researcher has, her interpretations are only supported by it; they can never be 
determined by it (Brigley, 1995). This is the problem of induction in philosophy 
(Hume, 2000), according to which generalisations are always underdetermined 
because the data can imply many explanations (Bonk, 2008). To expand on the 
previous example, a researcher might have discovered several instances of 
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migrants who say that they were motivated by an increase in benefits, but it 
does not follow that all migrants were so inclined; moreover, no number of 
additional interviews would make the inductive inference any more secure, 
unless it was somehow possible to access all migrants. Although it is possible 
to argue that a sample is representative (Williams, 1947), this is begging the 
question because then – in this example – the researcher would already know 
the distribution of migrants motivated by benefits and would no longer need an 
inductive inference. Social science cannot define some specified number of 
data points that a researcher needs because the inference can never follow 
from the data (Brigley, 1995) and, therefore, induction cannot generate theories 
(Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
A third form of inference is abduction or an inference to a best explanation 
(Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013), which is increasingly supplanting deduction and 
induction (Reichertz, 2010). What counts as the ‘best’ explanation is contested 
(Niiniluoto, 1999; Lipton, 2004), but abduction is essentially a conjecture at what 
hidden mechanisms lie behind social reality (Bunge, 2004) and – in addition to 
its use in science – is the reasoning people employ in everyday life and notably 
in history (Niiniluoto, 1999). Abduction bridges the philosophical gaps between 
deduction and induction because it sets the data alongside current theories and 
invites the researcher to conjecture an explanation (Bendassolli, 2013). Indeed, 
since mechanisms in both the natural and social worlds are unseen, 
researchers must guess or offer a hunch (Bunge, 2004); that is, in the manner 
of Bhaskar’s (1998) detective and based on the evidence available (Linstead, 
Maréchal and Griffin, 2014; Reichertz, 2010). Although abduction is necessarily 
creative, it assumes a detailed familiarity with the research literature and 
existing theories so that problems or gaps are emphasised and set up to be 
addressed (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
Abduction is often combined with retroduction and the two are strongly 
associated with critical realism (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). For critical 
realists, a distinction can be made between seeking a best explanation of 
unexpected findings (abduction) and using assumptions about social reality to 
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move beyond the empirical and develop theories to flesh out this explanation 
(retroduction) (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). Abduction is then about the 
interpretation of a social phenomenon through inference to a best explanation, 
whereas retroduction is an attempt to recreate the social conditions – in the 
domain of the actual – that bring about the phenomenon (Danermark, Ekström, 
Jakobsen and Karlsson, 1997). The combination of the two thus permits 
inferences in social science: abduction uses creativity to re-describe social 
phenomena and, in so doing, posit a better explanation; this having been 
undertaken, retroduction means searching for the social properties without 
which the phenomena could not exist and, thereby, inferring the mechanisms 
responsible (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). 
A combination of abduction and retroduction was thus the best form of inference 
for this study and, in combination with narrative analysis, could be used to 
generate explanations as to why people experience social meaning as they do 
(Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013). An account is offered as a best explanation of 
what the researcher has found, inferring mechanisms that allow the particular 
case to become an ideal type if the abduction/retroduction supports it (Ybema, 
Yanow, Wels and Kamsteeg, 2009). Like realist social science, an 
abductive/retroductive inference is always fallible (Reichertz, 2010), but it 
provides a way to get at ethical issues in research without prompting social 
desirability bias (Landeros and Plank, 1996); that is, by approaching ethics 
indirectly and trying to infer attitudes without explicitly asking about them. It also 
drives theoretical innovation (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
To summarise, in the same way that the natural sciences have been criticised 
as being able to use neither induction nor deduction (see Kuhn, 1962, 
Feyerabend, 1993), the social sciences can be understood as constructing ideal 
types from narrative case studies through analogy and abduction/retroduction 
(Biernacki, 2012). The validity of the ideal type and the narrative interpretations 
underpinning it are assured by providing the reader with the original data 
(transcripts) and setting out in detail the process of analysis (Feldman et al., 
2004; Biernacki, 2012). 
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4.4 Theoretical framework 
Given the critical realist approach taken to this research and the subsequent 
development of ontological, epistemological and methodology assumptions, the 
next step was to adopt a theoretical framework. Noting the merits of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice that were identified in the literature review, Bourdieu is also a 
critical realist who holds that the aim of social science is to: 
… uncover the most profoundly buried structures of the various social 
worlds which constitute the social universe, as well as the 'mechanisms' 
which tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 7). 
For Bourdieu, these mechanisms are both agents – through the deliberate 
behavioural choices that individuals make – and structures – the causes that 
underlie social or organisational behaviour (Manicas, 2006). As a critical realist, 
Bourdieu can allow that social reality is constructed, but nevertheless note that 
the positions from which people begin their constructions, the categories they 
can employ, and the limits on their ambition, are not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992). Bourdieu is emphatic in insisting that social action ‘lies neither in 
structures nor in consciousness, but rather in the relation of immediate proximity 
between objective structures and embodied structures’ (Bourdieu, 1996b: 38); 
that is, in the interaction of objective social structures like institutions and in the 
‘objectivity of the subject’ when these are embodied as people become 
socialised into them (Bourdieu, 1990: 135). 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice as applied to organisations was thus an optimum 
choice of theoretical framework insofar as it balances individual agency and the 
influence of social structures, thereby allowing for the conceptualisation of 
businesses as structures within which agents act and can come to see the ways 
things are as inevitable rather than an issue for ethics (Emirbayer and Johnson, 
2008). Moreover, Bourdieu’s work explores the notion that communication – 
whether of ethics or anything else – reflects imbalances in power between 
individuals who attempt to maintain or enhance their social positions (Shenkin 
and Coulson, 2007). Without this combined focus on power, structure and 
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agency, a theory of business ethics that takes account of contemporary 
research would not be possible, and acquisition could continue to employ – and 
recommend the further employment of ideas – that not only fail on their own 
terms, but actively preclude true ethical behaviour. To support this claim, 
Bourdieu’s account of social action is now discussed in detail. 
4.4.1 The theory of practice 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice begins with his conviction that power is central to 
the study of the social world (Wacquant, 2004). The focus of Bourdieu’s interest 
is what Lukes (2005: 143) defines as ‘the capacity to secure compliance 
through the shaping of beliefs and desires’, such that social order arises from 
habituation. Against social contract theorists, Bourdieu (1995: 168) holds that all 
social or political orders are essentially arbitrary and founded on violence, with 
any constitution ‘merely a founding fiction designed to disguise the act of 
lawless violence which is the basis of the establishment of law’. (See 
Oppenheimer, 1999, for a detailed discussion of this perspective.) Over time, 
the arbitrary becomes taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1990). Against this 
backdrop, several key concepts explain how Bourdieu theorises the operation of 
power in the social world. 
4.4.1.1 Capital 
For Bourdieu (1996b), power takes the form of – and is exercised through – 
capital, which is accumulated labour that social actors struggle to define, gain 
and control. Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes four forms of capital: economic, or 
the traditional equating of power with money and property; social, or the 
networks and relationships that people maintain in society; cultural, or 
knowledge of cultural objects and practices, as well as educational and other 
qualifications or marks of distinction; and symbolic, or authority and legitimacy. 
Bourdieu’s conception of capital is derived from Marx’s, although Bourdieu 
rejects the possibility that his forms of capital can ultimately be reduced to the 
economic (Swartz, 2013). (Note that subsequent work has identified other forms 
of capital; for example, see Hakim, 2010, for a discussion of erotic capital and 
Everett, 2002, for linguistic capital, although these may in fact be subsets of 
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cultural capital.) Like money (or economic capital), these capitals can be made, 
saved, exchanged or consumed, and to a certain extent translated (such as 
economic capital affording the means to accumulate cultural capital); they may 
also be more or less liquid or subject to degradation than each other (Bourdieu, 
1985). The possession of capital allows the holder ‘to wield a power, or 
influence’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98). Importantly, the other forms of 
capital – economic, social and cultural – become symbolic capital when they are 
legitimised; that is, when social actors recognise the possession of these 
capitals as conferring authority (Everett, 2002). For Bourdieu, capital is always 
dependent on the social context (Tacon, 2016). 
4.4.1.2 Field 
The existence and operation of capital only occurs relative to fields, or 
‘structured spaces of positions (or posts) whose properties depend on their 
positions within these spaces and which can be analysed independently of the 
characteristics of their occupants’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 72). Fields are then 
structures that are situated relative to other fields, and in which social actors 
struggle over capital relative to their positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
Organisations can be considered fields (Everett, 2002), within which the 
skirmish involves both how much capital people can gain and control, and what 
counts as capital in the first place; that is, the validity of a particular form of 
capital dominating the others. For example, an artist might argue that cultural 
capital is more important in her society (the field) than economic capital; a 
scientist might agree and yet argue that scientific knowledge is its highest form 
(Bourdieu, 1996b). 
In all forms, capital is a relation between people (Bourdieu, 1990). The 
boundaries of a field depend on how far the influence of power (via capital) 
extends, so they can be determined empirically, but – crucially – they are thus 
always contested as people fight for capital and positions within the field 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). In particular, the relational interdependence of 
field and capital means that analysis must be continual and iterative: the 
operation of capital depends on the structure of the field, but this structure 
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depends on the forms of capital and where they sit within it (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). If the field is instead regarded – for Bourdieu, wrongly – as 
fixed instead of in flux, it is easier to assume that organisations can be 
conceptualised as natural rather than as the result of a contested historical 
process (Everett, 2002). 
4.4.1.3 Symbolic power 
In addition to this battle for the dominance of capital to secure positions within a 
field, Bourdieu (1990) also distinguishes a separate and higher field of power, in 
which actors fight for a particular form of power to be recognised as primary 
across society as a whole. Normally, the right to adjudicate within this field of 
power now lies with the state and the field of power becomes a bureaucratic 
field, which essentially seeks to monopolise symbolic power and perform a 
regulatory function that establishes ‘exchange rates’ between forms of capital 
(Swartz, 2013). This symbolic power is, for Bourdieu, the most important type 
because it legitimates the way societies are structured and stratified into 
hierarchies. It allows him to explain why, in general, people do not resist or fight 
against unequal social orders: they misrecognise the way society is as natural 
and, therefore, inevitable, so they accept it without resistance except insofar as 
they compete within fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
4.4.1.4 Habitus and practice 
Social actors then embody this misrecognition through what Bourdieu (1977: 
72) calls habitus, or ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions’ that provide 
social actors with ‘an unconscious calculation of what is possible, probable, 
improbable, or impossible for people in their specific locations in the stratified 
social order’ (Swartz, 2013: 39-40). The field structures habitus, but habitus 
then structures how social actors perceive the field (Bourdieu, 1990); it 
becomes ‘what is called in sport a “feel” for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 25). 
Habitus covers cognition, preferences and perceptions, but it is not deterministic 
because it only operates relative to field and capital, including the positions of 
social actors within fields (Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury and Ramirez, 2009). 
Bourdieu (1962: 111) calls habitus ‘the social inscribed in the body’, and notes 
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that people will literally carry and conduct themselves in particular ways 
depending on their habitus. 
The resulting interaction of field, capital and habitus creates practice, or what 
social actors do in a specific field in specific circumstances (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Practice determines social structures as well as being determined by them: as 
people act to achieve their own purposes, they are constrained by social 
structures but also – in acting – create and recreate these structures (Swartz, 
1997). The importance of practice means that Bourdieu (1977) rejects 
methodological individualism because people are not themselves aware of the 
operation of habitus: focusing only on individual intent provides an insufficiently 
social perspective by ignoring the constraints of social structures (Swartz, 
1997). 
On Bourdieu’s conception, then, a field is stratified by the amounts of capital 
that people possess and how this permits them to occupy more or less 
dominant positions within the field, which may in turn overlap with other fields in 
which the same or other capitals operate. Those who are dominant will fight to 
maintain both their capital and the position it enables, as well as to acquire 
more capital and thence more power; meanwhile, those who are dominated will 
also seek to expand their holdings of capital or to enhance the legitimacy of 
other forms that they possess. However, having misrecognised how and why 
things are as they are, the dominated will share with the dominant the field’s 
doxa, or the ‘cognitive and evaluative presuppositions’ that people accede to, 
particularly an acceptance that capitals are valuable rather than essentially 
arbitrary (Bourdieu, 1995: 100). The doxa means that people take the 
established social order, or the order of a particular field, as natural rather than 
– to reiterate – as the result of a contested process (Everett, 2002). 
Importantly for ethics, a field’s doxa will define ‘what is politically sayable or 
unsayable, thinkable or unthinkable’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 172), which might also 
include what is ethical or unethical. Bourdieu calls this illusio, or when people 
accept – as part of their habitus – what is or is not conceivable and acceptable 
within a field (Bourdieu, 1986). The illusio acts as a kind of veil: underneath it, 
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social actors have agreed to the ‘rules of the game’ and that the game is to be 
taken seriously, such that acting in accordance with the rules is the natural thing 
to do and, therefore, not really a game at all (Golsorkhi et al., 2009); whether 
the game is worth playing is a question that would then never arise (Bourdieu, 
1998). Where people benefit from the game, it is in their interests to invest in it 
and thus retain the veil (Bourdieu, 1990). 
4.4.1.5 Symbolic violence 
When people naturalise the symbolic power involved by adjusting their social 
actions to it, their behaviour becomes a ‘practical adaptation’ rather than an act 
of consent (Bourdieu, 2001). Bourdieu calls this phenomenon symbolic violence 
because it leaves power structures intact even as the dominated misperceive 
their positions as inevitable and, thereby, preserve those of the dominant 
(Swartz, 2013). Indeed, even where the dominated fight for a better position in 
the field, they still maintain the illusio because they are merely trying to be 
better players of the agreed game, not to adjust the rules or question the doxa 
and change the game altogether (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). 
For Bourdieu (1989), the possession of symbolic power within a field is what 
permits the social world to be constructed by the dominant; or, in critical realist 
terms, to make and remake the actual. This occurs not overtly or as the 
intentional exercise of power, but through dispositions that become practice as 
people – both the dominant and the dominated – misrecognise and naturalise 
the contingent structure of the field and their places in it, even when this is 
against their own interests (Bourdieu, 1990); that is, akrasia. This 
misrecognition then means that the dominated are the authors of their own 
domination because they ‘apply categories from the point of view of the 
dominant’, which they then embody in their demeanour towards authority 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 139). It is this symbolic violence that helps Bourdieu address 
his concern that ‘what is problematic is the fact that the established order is not 
problematic’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1994: 15). On the conception of the 
theory of practice, it is how it is because people reproduce the mechanisms of 
social control by their own practices without realising it (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). 
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4.4.2 Criticisms 
There are several criticisms of Bourdieu’s theory. One objection is that he 
makes no distinction between symbolic power enabling power over people 
instead of as a means of empowering them (Lukes, 2005). This difference is 
akin to that between negative and positive freedom, or the freedom from 
constraints contrasted with the freedom of self-actualisation; that is, 
distinguishing between not being prevented from achieving something and 
actually being able to achieve it (Berlin, 2002). On this view, symbolic power 
could be a creative force, especially if harnessed by those in dominated 
positions. However, Bourdieu’s (1986) perspective is that the two collapse into 
one another, since power is all-encompassing and power to would become 
power over once new arrangements of domination exist. 
Another complaint is that Bourdieu’s symbolic power is not actually as powerful 
as he supposes. If it were then, on the face of it, there would be little need for 
physical coercion in the form of prisons, and yet some states have significant 
prison populations (Swartz, 2013). This is to say that Bourdieu focuses on 
symbolic power at the expense of the very real physical power that states have 
– a monopoly over violence that may outplay or dominate his symbolic form 
(Loveman, 2005). This critique depends to an extent on the degree to which 
compulsion by a state is independent of symbolic power (Mann, 1993), but 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on the symbolic remains a weakness of his theory. 
Bourdieu (1996a: 242) simply states that, ‘I do not contend that everything is 
symbolic; I would only suggest that there is nothing which is not symbolic at 
least in part’. 
A third and primary difficulty is the charge that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is 
simply too powerful: it reduces the agency of social actors because they have 
little choice but to act in accordance with their dispositions (Archer, 2007; 
Burawoy, 2005). This implies that people cannot challenge the doxa or illusio at 
all because they have misrecognised their situation and their habitus is not 
accessible at a conscious level. Bourdieu (1995) accepts this complaint, but 
argues that there is always some degree of tension between fields and habitus, 
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markedly recording in his fieldwork notes that people bent or broke social rules 
(Crossley, 2000). He holds that, where this strain becomes a jarring incongruity, 
change occurs (Bourdieu, 1990), which is why people in remote social positions 
are more likely to try to change society (Lockett, Currie, Finn, Martin and 
Waring, 2014). 
Indeed, this is Bourdieu’s response to the objection that, if habitus is as 
powerful as he supposes, then sociological investigation is unlikely to change 
anything (Swartz, 2013). His argument is that if people are made aware that 
their dispositions are ethically arbitrary and that power structures might be 
organised otherwise, they at least have the opportunity to be disposed to 
change them, especially when ‘[e]verything suggests that an abrupt slump in 
objective relative to subjective aspirations is likely to produce a break in the tacit 
acceptance [of the dominated classes]’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1997: 97). For 
Bhaskar, a commitment to valuing truth over falsity is ‘not only a condition of 
moral discourse, it is a condition of any discourse at all’ (1998: 63). Given this 
epistemic assumption, it is better to seek the truth and expose it, whether as an 
explanatory (Bhaskar) or emancipatory (Bourdieu) critique, even if the operation 
of habitus means that success may be limited. 
Moreover, Bourdieu emphasises the positive role of habitus by explicitly 
rejecting any similarity between symbolic violence and Foucault’s conception of 
domination through discipline (Bourdieu, 2008). This is because the dispersal of 
power along Foucault’s (1997) all-pervasive ‘capillaries’ does not equate to a 
person misrecognising their position relative to a field. In effect, Bourdieu 
argues that Foucault’s work was historical, seeking to understand why 
structures are as they are, whereas Bourdieu’s theory of practice is concerned 
with how an individual agent confronts these structures. For Bourdieu (and 
against the charge that habitus is deterministic), people do not necessarily pay 
attention to their discourses. They do confront fields that have been shaped by 
the history of ideas and contain dominant discourses, but they also are involved 
subjectively via their habitus, which is what links the inherited structures to 
inherited dispositions (Callewaert, 2006).  
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On this view, Foucault is conflating structure and agency, insisting that 
subjectivity is reproduced rather than produced (Schlosser, 2013); whereas 
Bourdieu explicitly separates them, claiming that the difference is between how 
a discourse or disposition has been produced historically and how it is actively 
created and sustained in a specific social context (Swartz, 2013). For this 
reason, Foucault’s (1997) focus on discourse is inappropriate because 
discourse does not cause actions and, therefore, does not help explain why 
people choose to act as they do. Indeed, the assumption is that the pre-existing 
structures limit them (Callewaert, 2006), whereas Bourdieu insists that the 
strategies people pursue depend also on their positions relative to these 
structures (the appropriate field), the amount of capital they have available, and 
their habitus or disposition to do something about their positions (Bourdieu, 
1992). He argues that people do proactively weigh their options; it is just that 
this weighing is constrained by their habitus (Everett, 2002). 
4.4.3 The theory of practice and research methodology 
4.4.3.1 Ontology 
To now consider Bourdieu’s theory of practice in terms of research 
methodology, there are two levels of ontology involved. Firstly, there is the field, 
or the institutions and other structures that have developed over time and form 
an objective backdrop to social action. Secondly, there is habitus, or ‘the life-
course history of dispositions stored in the psycho-motor and cognitive-
motivational system’ (Lizardo, 2004: 394). This means that fields are historical 
structures while habitus is biographical (the embodiment of these structures in 
people); that is, they are objective structures and internalised structures, but 
both can be considered structures (Bourdieu, 1990: 25) and, therefore, within 
the domain of the real. Note that neuroscience supports Bourdieu’s ontological 
conception of habitus here: observation is not just perceiving something but 
rather is a positive cognitive achievement, or perceiving that something does or 
does not obtain. Indeed, if, cognitively, social actors had no – or instead had 
fixed – hypotheses about the world then they could not learn anything from or 
adjust to it. This is to say that observations or experiences must be interpreted 
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before they have any meaning, so they are theory-laden all the way down to 
brain function (Churchland, 1991). 
For Bourdieu (1998), there is no contradiction between social reality being 
constructed and being real, since it can be a fiction and yet – because it is 
recognised collectively – really exist. Moreover, by adopting methodological 
relationalism, social reality for Bourdieu exists in the relationships between 
individual actors and social structures, not separately in their opposition 
(Swartz, 1997). This means that practice exists when habitus, capital and field 
combine to create social action, but cannot be reduced to anything less than 
their interrelationship (Bourdieu, 1984). 
4.4.3.2 Epistemology 
In epistemological terms, there are three forms of social knowledge for 
Bourdieu. At the lowest level, phenomenological knowledge makes social 
practice available to research by getting at the construction of social reality by 
social actors (Harrits, 2011). In this respect, it corresponds to the domain of the 
actual in critical realism. At the next level is objective knowledge, or the 
researcher’s knowledge from outside of a specific social context. This is an 
epistemological achievement insofar as it provides knowledge of structures, 
such as the operation of capital, field and habitus, which is not available to 
people within their social context and ‘reengender[s] theoretically the empirically 
observed social space’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 32). This objective knowledge would 
be of critical realism’s mechanisms in the domain of the real. 
The final level is praxeological knowledge, which Bourdieu (1995) characterises 
by the researcher making an intentional and decisively reflexive break with her 
research to avoid what he calls the scholastic fallacy. This is the tendency for 
social scientists to assume, unwittingly or otherwise, that people see the world 
in the same way as the researcher does (Harrits, 2011); for example, that 
people think in terms of capital and habitus in their daily lives. For Bourdieu, it is 
this break that helps ensure that the social scientist moves from studying 
structures to appreciating the limitations of her research and hence encourages 
a more accurate, yet fallible knowledge. This would be analogous again to the 
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domain of the real, but now with a focus on social practices as people 
themselves would know them; that is, by combining explanation and 
understanding (Bourdieu, 1990). 
4.4.3.3 Methodology 
Bourdieu (1999) considers his methodological approach to be a merging of 
constructionism, structuralism and the power tradition, or of social symbols 
performing first cognitively by constructing meanings, then communicatively to 
share these as structures, and finally in legitimating power relations. For 
Bourdieu, social structures like class begin as constructions (‘observation 
presupposes construction’ (1991: 37)) but become real in the sense that they 
begin to enter into relations with other constructions and people take positions 
relative to them: 
One has to situate oneself within ‘real activity’ as such, that is, in the 
practical relation to the world...To do this, one has to return to practice 
(1990: 52). 
It is Bourdieu’s concept of habitus that allows him to ‘analyze the social agent 
as a physical, embodied actor, subject to developmental, cognitive and emotive 
constraints and affected by the very real physical and institutional configurations 
of the field’ (Lizardo, 2004: 376). By combining this qualitative investigation with 
a quantitative stage to support the derivation of objective knowledge, Bourdieu’s 
(mixed methods) methodology allows him to make practice the unit of analysis 
(Harrits, 2011; Bourdieu, 1990), using methodological relationalism to structure 
them in terms of binary oppositions associated with the relative possession of 
capital (Swartz, 1997; Bourdieu, 1998). 
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s methodology involves explicitly undertaking case 
studies to develop ideal types: he argues that ‘the deepest logic of the social 
world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical 
reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as 
a “special case of what is possible” … that is, as an exemplary case in a finite 
world of possible configurations’ (1998: 2). Explanations arrived at in this way 
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can then address the mechanisms behind social phenomena and unify them 
into a single worldview (Salmon, 1998). With these ontological, epistemological 
and methodological aspects taken together, Bourdieu’s theory can be described 
as a critical realist one (Vandenberghe, 1999) that can take into account 
methodological criticisms (Van Bouwel and Weber, 2008). 
4.4.3.4 Reflexivity 
A specifically methodological criticism of Bourdieu is that he sometimes 
employed coding in his research that operated on the basis of his own prior 
prejudices, with the amount of capital ostensibly involved in an interview 
response being determined by Bourdieu himself rather than leaving the data to 
support the claim or otherwise (Biernacki, 2012). Bourdieu is aware of this and 
argues that it is not enough to merely conduct research; the researcher must 
also look to herself and the bias she may unwittingly include in her work 
(Bourdieu, 1990). Accordingly, Bourdieu (1995) advocates epistemic reflexivity 
to take into account three sources of potential bias: the researcher’s own social 
background; her position within the intellectual field of social science; and the 
bias (the scholastic fallacy) that results from taking a spectator’s view of the 
social world. 
Actually achieving reflexivity is problematic, though. If a researcher tries to 
make her work reflexive by focusing attention on the relation between her and 
her inquiry, she creates another object that she has a relation to. This process 
of reflexivity and new attention can then be an infinite recursion, but if she stops 
then at what point has enough reflexivity been undertaken? Bourdieu’s 
reflexivity becomes not part of an epistemology but a sociological account of it 
(Maton, 2003). 
Ultimately, social science research must point to the fallibilism inherent in critical 
realism and set out results for scrutiny (Biernacki, 2012). This means 
constructing an ideal type from them in a way that leaves meanings intact and 
with any abductive/retroductive inferences available for falsification, either by 
developing a better explanation of the data to support an amended ideal type or 
else by obtaining new data that is worked into an alternative. Importantly, given 
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the criticism of Bourdieu’s theory as too deterministic (Archer, 2007; Burawoy, 
2005), even if the research could make a case for understanding ethics through 
capital and/or habitus, it would not follow that normative ethics can be 
discounted as playing no role in people’s behaviour. 
4.4.3.5 Sociology as politics 
For Bourdieu, sociology can and should have what he calls ‘theory effects’, or 
the positive consequence that, in developing and expounding a description of 
the social world, a researcher can influence it by exposing and highlighting 
power structures or other aspects that were hidden from people or only implicit 
until revealed by the sociologist (Bourdieu, 1991: 132). This is the ‘critical’ 
aspect of realism (Bhaskar, 1979). The key methodological point is that a 
researcher cannot use Bourdieu without recognising that, as conceived in the 
theory of practice, the aim of sociological investigation is to change things; it is 
‘another means of doing politics’ (Swartz, 2013: 159). In turn, this poses the risk 
that, in researching the operation of social power and making the results 
available, the researcher aids those wielding it because they are then better 
able to adjust and improve their positions. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s hope 
instead is that the research empowers those who are disadvantaged, so he 
explicitly sides with them (Bourdieu, 2004). 
Therefore, there is a tension for the researcher employing Bourdieu. The 
traditional assumption is that (social) science is disinterested and impartial, and 
– on this view – the results need to be derived from a neutral methodology that 
can be reproduced, thereby giving them no more than the power to change 
affairs that is associated with scientific inquiry. However, for Bourdieu, the 
scientific field is itself subject to power struggles (although he does not argue 
that knowledge is thus relative to power; see Bourdieu, 2004); so, it is naïve to 
suppose that the results of scientific investigation do not help or hinder political 
conflicts to which knowledge can contribute, not least if the way the social world 
is conceptualised is shaped by habitus (Bourdieu, 1995) or, at minimum, there 
are no neutral observations (Feyerabend, 1981). 
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Indeed, it may even be that some facts are value-laden, so an historian may 
deliberately describe genocide not as a ‘population loss’ but as ‘mass murder’ 
(Bhaskar, 1998). Attempting to remove the value judgment to leave only the 
facts would obscure the reality that the historian’s values shape the description 
(Cruickshank, 2010), and without this it would be less accurate to the historian, 
the people affected, and to those reading and interpreting the results (Collier, 
1998). In the social world, at least, people do ascribe value to things (they are 
‘value impregnated’), so the researcher must account for this (Bhaskar, 1998). 
To be clear: this does not mean that the results of scientific investigation are 
influenced or constructed by the researcher, but only that research choices 
have political consequences if people are empowered or disempowered on the 
basis of what is described or discovered. Moreover, researchers are not 
immune from temptation and may call upon reputational power as a means of 
increasing support for their conclusions (Swartz, 2013). Ultimately, Bourdieu is 
a realist, arguing that truth in science is ‘irreducible to its historical and social 
conditions of production’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 84), such that researchers must 
submit to ‘the arbitration of the real’ (2004: 71). 
Moreover, for Bourdieu (2004), this is the methodological challenge: to minimise 
the influence of politics on scientific research while aiming to ensure that the 
research has the optimum impact on the world, especially if – to obtain 
credibility with peers – a researcher has to rely on specialist language that is all 
but incomprehensible to lay persons. (Ironically, Bourdieu’s own writing suffered 
from this problem; see Swartz, 2013.) Foucault (1997: 131) argues similarly that 
the academic’s role is not to seek to change the politics of others, but ‘to 
question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things’. Likewise, Bhaskar 
(1998) asserts that social science should move from facts to values, utilising 
explanatory critiques to illuminate structures that cause false beliefs and then to 
both negatively judge such beliefs and positively assess any rational responses 
that might address them – hence critical realism. 
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4.4.4 Researching ethics via the theory of practice 
The assumption in Bourdieu that everything is power implies that even shared 
goals in an organisation or field are subject to struggle (Swartz, 2013). This was 
important in exploring the role of ethics in Defence acquisition because the field 
is still relatively new and is being defined by actors within it. This meant that 
being able to describe some actions, options or behaviours as unethical could 
delegitimise them and so contribute to shaping the field; the question was, who 
should be entitled to do this? 
Defining a code of ethics or other framework is a means of delimiting the field 
and constraining behaviour (McGraw, 2004) or, in effect, encouraging the 
consent of people within the field by marking off other possibilities as unethical 
and, therefore, not to be pursued (cf. the manufacture of consent in Carey, 
1997). Although an ethicist could argue that such limits are normative and 
determined by philosophical analysis, for Bourdieu any boundaries are fictions 
designed to hide the fact that the original construction was ultimately an 
arbitrary use of power; over time, this is forgotten and laws, customs and even 
ethics become ‘natural’ (Bourdieu, 1995). Even if this analysis of the basis of 
power only holds in an historical sense (cf. Oppenheimer, 1999) and there exist 
rationally-derived values – such as those of the Enlightenment – that can serve 
as a basis for society, for Bourdieu what people accept comes from habituation 
to existing laws and customs, not from an original, rational analysis (Bourdieu, 
1995). (See Giddens (1993: 121) for a criticism of Weber and Nietzsche’s 
‘normative irrationalism’ or the view that there is never any basis for judging 
between value claims.) 
4.4.4.1 Ethics through capital 
That ethics could be examined via Bourdieu’s theory of practice is implicit in his 
definition of a resource constituting capital when it serves as a social power 
relation, particularly as symbolic capital concerned with authority and 
legitimation (Bourdieu, 1986). Recall that, on this view, ethics either serves as a 
form of capital itself, or – as actors contest what counts as the most legitimate 
form of capital in a field – it aids the struggle by performing as symbolic capital 
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to legitimise or delegitimise the extent of the field and other forms of capital 
(Swartz, 2013). For example, in a hypothetical Defence acquisition field, 
competition might exist between rank and experience, or else rank and 
academic qualifications, and thus a subordinate might be constrained from 
making better acquisition decisions by ethical limits on disobeying or 
disagreeing with superior officers. 
Here the danger – from a Bourdieusian perspective – is that the subordinate 
then misrecognises the inequality in rank as natural, which allows an essentially 
arbitrary code of ethics and social structure to delimit options (Swartz, 2013). 
Rank may also be misrecognised as legitimating competence if it is a form of 
symbolic or ‘bureaucratized’ capital, one that is ‘codified, delegated and 
guaranteed by the state’ (Bourdieu, 1994: 11). Furthermore, there may be a role 
for a reputational capital associated with ‘being good’ (Bazerman and Gino, 
2012), while a sense of the ethical may be constrained by the delegation of 
power through a (military) hierarchy (Bourdieu, 1991). In general, ethics may be 
reduced to individuals attempting to achieve social power: people behave in 
ways that are characterised as ethical when they have opportunities to increase 
their capital and, thereby, their position, relative to the field(s) they are in (van 
Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013). 
4.4.4.2 Ethics through habitus 
However, the Bourdieusian perspective outlined so far implied investigating 
ethics through capital when the operation and primary form of capital in Defence 
acquisition is yet to be explored and legitimised. Another approach was to 
consider ethics instead as habitus, noting that Bourdieu (1977: 77) insisted that 
it: 
… emerges through primary socialization from a practical evaluation of 
the likelihood of success of a given action in a given situation [and] 
brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical 
precepts (“that’s not for the likes of us”) [emphasis added].  
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For Bourdieu, habitus means that people are disposed to behave in ways that 
are most likely to succeed, given the resources (capital) available to them, their 
position in a field and their prior experiences of what works (Swartz, 2013). The 
limits that people operate within then take on a sense of inevitability and 
objectivity, leading to ‘“a sense of one’s place” which leads one to exclude 
oneself from the goods, persons, place and so forth from which one is excluded’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 471). Symbolic violence ensures that people will behave in 
accordance with – submit to – the doxa because it is etched in their habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1998). 
Given that empirical research into ethics suggests that people use heuristics 
rather than normative reasoning in making ethical decisions, it may be that 
behaviours are adjusted not by a sense of their ethical merits but by the 
operation of habitus. For example, adversarial narratives in Defence acquisition 
may go unchallenged because people have internalised heuristics (‘do as 
others do’ or ‘don’t get involved’; see Gigerenzer, 2010) and have adapted their 
conduct to avoid confronting matters that they have little chance of affecting, 
whether this is owing to their lack of capital alone or also if they are not in a 
position of power within the Defence acquisition field. Similarly, people may act 
in ways that are characterised as ethical (or otherwise) according to the field’s 
illusio because they are disposed to reproduce the field and its capital; that is, 
their habitus inclines them to act to maintain or enhance their positions without 
challenging the field as a whole (van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013). 
At issue methodologically is whether habitus includes these heuristics, such that 
people are ethical insofar as their habitus ‘fits’ with the external world and 
permits them to retain or improve the positions they hold within a field. This 
would at least permit the empirical investigation of how complying with ethics 
becomes a disposition (Luke, 2005) or how people self-select courses of action 
based on cultural assumptions about their ‘station’ in life, rather than via ethical 
norms (Swartz, 2013). On this view, it would be difficult to judge unethical 
behaviour normatively at all if it arises from habitus (Bourdieu, 1996b), 
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particularly if both the dominant and the dominated embody symbolic power, 
with any collective identity developing from that habitus. 
This is a use of Bourdieu’s theory of practice that, from the literature review, has 
had little attention (Sayer, 2010; see van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013, for a 
rare example, although Bourdieu (1998) did discuss ethics briefly in A 
Paradoxical Foundation of Ethics). It had a philosophical precursor in virtue 
ethics theories, which argue that ethics is incorrectly associated with normative 
choices, which is methodologically emphasised by a focus on thought 
experiments involving simplified decisions (Hauser et al., 2007). For some 
ethicists, this abstract approach actually removes ethics from being embedded 
in practice and from the experience of constant adjustment and reflection that 
characterises people’s lives (Murdoch, 1970), such that self-interpretation 
through narrative is necessary to achieve genuine responsibility (MacIntyre, 
1981). Indeed, this implies that ethical decisions have been taken before people 
consciously realise that there were choices, such that ethics is a continuous, 
lived process (Sayer, 2010). 
On the face of it, this perspective is consistent with Bourdieu’s (1995: 141) 
focus on ‘the ordinary order of things’ and how subjectivity arises through 
everyday events; that is, not how disciplined subjects are created through 
institutions (Foucault, 1997), or how they actively confront and make decisions 
without considering the influence of social power (Gordon, Kornberger and 
Clegg, 2009), but instead how people continually mould and create their 
dispositions such that social structures become natural. However, while 
Bourdieu (1993: 86) holds ‘the notion of habitus to encompass the notion of 
ethos’, he has very little to say about ethics as habitus (Emmerich, 2014). 
4.4.4.3 Additional criticism 
Recent work raises a difficulty with Bourdieu’s theory of practice that posed 
problems for applying the theory to ethics in this way (see Pellandini-Simányi, 
2014, for a summary). Bourdieu can be interpreted as arguing that ethics 
becomes part of habitus, particularly insofar as ethics forms an aspect of a 
person’s worldview (Sayer, 2011). According to Bourdieu (1984), even though 
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individual social actors may experience their ethical views as motivated by a 
commitment to ‘the good’ or doing the right thing according to some code or 
rules that are independent of them, from the outside – objectively speaking – 
they are still competing within a field for control of capital. The claim here is that 
the right to describe social behaviour as ethical or otherwise is part of the 
struggle over legitimisation; that is, that ostensibly disinterested ethical claims 
are actually exercises of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1991). The difference 
between Bourdieu and other theorists is that this occurs not consciously as a 
rationally derived strategy, but as embedded in the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Nevertheless, it implies that ethics is habitus. 
However, Bourdieu’s commitment to sociology as political (Swartz, 2013) 
means that there is an apparent contradiction: on the one hand, ethics can be 
reduced to habitus; but, on the other, Bourdieu wants to challenge injustice and 
assert that some forms of life are better than others, which presupposes an 
ethical assessment that is normative rather than merely an academic power 
play (Sayer, 2005). To resolve this inconsistency, Bourdieu (2004) argues that 
social science can aim at truth rather than at ethics, leaving descriptions of 
inequality to work on people as they will. The problem is methodological, 
though: whatever empirical data shows, such as examples of people actively 
engaging in ethical reasoning (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), Bourdieu (1991) 
can always respond that the centrality of competition in social life survives. In 
short, the theory of practice cannot be falsified. 
Whether this is an issue for Bourdieu depends on whether his commitment to 
competition as the basis for understanding social action is acceptable. 
Changing the associated auxiliary hypotheses permits the accommodation of 
apparent falsifications of theories, rather than giving up on the overall 
framework; this is one of the main criticisms of falsification as a concept in the 
philosophy of science (Lakatos, 1978). Even if there exist normative forms of 
ethics that apply universally and hence can be regarded as not fitting with 
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, these are then so ‘thin’ as explanations that 
they lose their value as mechanisms (Pellandini-Simányi, 2014). Given that 
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Bourdieu’s (1998) aim is to develop ideal types, it is no surprise that these then 
cannot be falsified by any empirical results: the ideal types do not exist, so they 
are valid insofar as they explain how the social world operates and until 
replaced by a better – more fruitful – exemplar (Bengtsson and Hertting, 2014). 
4.4.5 Summary of theoretical framework 
Researching ethics through capital and habitus thus provided an opportunity to 
address a shortfall in the literature (Sayer, 2010). That habitus relates the 
cognitive and bodily habits of social actors to those of others, as well as to 
social structures and practices, means that cognitive and somatic dispositions 
can be combined in a way that Bourdieu does not himself allow (Ignatow, 2009). 
Bourdieu’s (1995) conception recognises that shame and other emotions are 
embodied in habitus, but he does not follow this through to notice that such 
emotions motivate people ‘to want to fit in, to behave in a culturally acceptable 
fashion, and to avoid harming people’ (Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt, 1999: 
574); that is, that – as part of the social – ethics may also be a disposition that is 
‘inscribed in the body’ (Bourdieu, 1962: 111). 
Indeed, if emotional judgments occur before ethical ones, as the literature 
suggests (Haidt, 2001), then their embodiment in habitus should be amenable 
to investigation in the domain of the empirical as well as the actual. This is to 
say that if habitus provides social actors with dispositions as to what is or is not 
possible then ethical judgments should be included in it also (Ignatow, 2009). If, 
methodologically, habitus is taken to be composed of narratives (Drummond, 
1998), then research should expect to find that descriptions of emotions (such 
as shame) would be related to both ethical judgments and the content of ethical 
narratives (Ignatow, 2009). 
Although Bourdieu’s theory of practice is yet to be employed systematically to 
study organisations (Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008), it can be 
employed to investigate ethics within Defence acquisition as a field by 
identifying the operation of both capital (including which forms exist and 
dominate) and habitus. In addition to determining the doxa and illusio, contested 
boundaries could be anticipated because one implication from Bourdieu’s work 
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was that the Defence acquisition field does not need to be defined as it is now, 
so the research may support or challenge the dominant views (Emirbayer and 
Johnson, 2008). 
Moreover, on Bourdieu’s (1990) view, organisations – like individuals – behave 
not rationally (or even irrationally), but as a practice: any position taken (such as 
an opposition to the private sector) is then not the result of a single leadership 
decision but is, instead, a contested compromise across the field (Golsorkhi et 
al., 2009). These options needed to be explored in the Defence acquisition 
context. Finally, the research could have expected to see people who are in 
dominated positions in Defence acquisition trying to discredit the capital of 
those who are dominant (Everett, 2002) and using narratives that link ethical 
judgments to emotions (Ignatow, 2009). The detail of how these research aims 
were achieved is considered next. 
4.5 Research Design 
In pragmatically applying Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the theoretical 
framework for this research, there were three stages to consider (Wainwright, 
2000; Harrits, 2011). Firstly, the field needed to be mapped out to establish any 
relationships between positions within the field and the dispositions (habitus) of 
the people occupying them.  For Bourdieu (1996b), this is achieved best using 
statistical analysis (specifically multiple correspondence analysis) because 
social mechanisms consist in interrelationships rather than an aggregation of 
the operation of independent variables (Lebaron, 2009). This analysis sets out 
the structure of the field, or ‘differentiated positions, defined in each case by the 
place they occupy in the distribution of a particular kind of capital’ (Bourdieu, 
1998: 15).  The second step was to then explore how capital and habitus 
operate in the field, as well as how the particular field is related to the overall 
field of power (Swartz, 1997). Lastly, the doxa was investigated by explaining 
the field in terms of practice. Both the second and third steps are achieved 
using ethnographic research (Bourdieu, 1998); therefore, Bourdieu’s approach 
is an instance of mixed methods or analysis from within and without the social 
world (Harrits, 2011). 
 111 
To implement the theory of practice in this research, the association of 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework with critical realism, which was established in 
Section 4.4.3, was extended to his research methods. This provided an 
opportunity to test the application of Bourdieu’s method to business ethics, 
thereby potentially extending the theory of practice. 
According to this conception, researching the use of ethics in narratives could 
commence within the domain of the empirical by seeking a quantitative baseline 
within a specific case study; that is, the field structure within Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice, but approached indirectly to establish whether there is a separation 
between how the field is organised and how it could (or ought to) be. The 
distinction between is and ought originated with Hume and is now standard in 
ethics, referring to the apparent impossibility of moving from factual statements 
to an evaluative judgment, notwithstanding that ethical claims appear to take 
this form (Norton and Norton, 2007). Such a demarcation could be anticipated 
to be relevant in the acquisition context because Bourdieu’s theory presupposes 
competition for field position, or an assessment by individuals that their 
circumstances ought to be other than they are (unless, perhaps, they occupied 
dominant positions). This difference in field positioning would then be amenable 
to quantification through surveying, yet would need to be bounded to enable the 
subsequent analysis. 
The next stage would be to explore how people experience the discord between 
the positions they occupy within the field and where they might otherwise prefer 
to be, thereby uncovering the domain of the actual. This could be addressed by 
understanding the role of capital and how habitus is developed, utilising an 
opportunity to contribute comments to the survey to construct an overarching 
narrative of how social reality is experienced. 
To then access the domain of the real, the research would need to uncover 
mechanisms that explain the quantitative baseline in the empirical, as well as 
how people experience, in the actual, the failure of social reality to correspond 
with how it ought to be. For Bourdieu, such an explanation would be in terms of 
the theory of practice and would be achieved through an ethnographic 
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approach. However, in applying this to the research of ethics, it would be 
necessary to focus on how people either dominate the field or participate in their 
own domination; in short, how the field is prevented from being as it might 
otherwise be. Therefore, the research would need to be targeted at those in 
positions of power. Moreover, to access mechanisms indirectly because the 
subject remains the role of ethics, narrative analysis would be an appropriate 
way to limit social desirability bias. 
Here the comparison with Bourdieu’s method ends, but it would need to be 
extended to the creation of an ideal type. This is because the narrative 
approach, while able to uncover an explanation via the theory of practice, is 
likely to be too complex to serve as an exemplar precisely because narrative 
analysis retains the detail of the narrative rather than abstracting from it. 
Consequently, the abduction and retroduction with which critical realism is 
associated could be employed to generate an ideal type, which is then based 
on – yet extends – the theory of practice, producing an exemplar that captures 
the use of ethics and permits application in other research contexts through 
analogy. 
Finally, given that ethics in acquisition is under-theorised, it was appropriate to 
use a single case study to explore the context in depth, instead of several cases 
in overview, because this was a strategic case in which the relationship 
between the participants in acquisition was being observed intensely (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Indeed, in this respect it was a critical case insofar as it would set the 
conditions for the further collaboration across organisational boundaries in 
support of Governmental intent (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2013). Therefore, if the exemplar ideal case could be demonstrated to 
undermine rather than support collaboration, then it could be assumed that this 
would hold for other cases without formal support to buttress them (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Opportunities for such research on additional cases are identified in 
Section 7.6 below. 
Table 4-1 summarises this comparison of the research method in this work with 
Bourdieu and critical realism: 
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Research aim 
Bourdieu’s 
method 
Domain of critical 
realism 
Research method 
Field structure 
and associated 
dispositions 
Correspondence 
analysis 
Empirical Crosstabulation of data 
and Correspondence 
analysis via is/ought 
survey construction 
Operation of 
capital and 
habitus 
Ethnographic 
research 
Actual Narrative analysis of 
survey comments 
Explanation of 
field as a 
practice 
Ethnographic 
research 
Real Narrative analysis of 
interviews with people in 
field positions of influence 
Ideal type n/a n/a Abduction and 
Retroduction from 
narrative explanation 
Table 4-1: Comparison of research method with Bourdieu and critical realism 
The remainder of this section sets out how this research method was 
implemented. 
4.5.1 Case study selection 
Given the research methodology and the intent to develop an ideal type 
explanation, along with the focus on practice as the unit of analysis, a case 
study was selected that placed the researcher at the centre of the practice. This 
met the requirement to examine the interaction between the public and private 
sectors in Defence acquisition, but was also a pragmatic choice because the 
researcher had – through employment circumstances – access to a Defence 
ecosystem context. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the MOD was – as part of both the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review 2015 and of efforts to address severe shortages in critical 
skills – exploring the possibility of formalising a ‘Defence Enterprise’ of the MOD 
and the Defence Industry, potentially along with other organisations as well. As 
the Programme Manager for this work, the researcher was at the centre of a 
change initiative that confronted people with the problem of what kind of 
relationship the MOD should have with the Defence Industry. Moreover, given 
that the starting assumption of the programme was that collaboration should 
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replace competition, people were already discussing the relationship in 
adversarial and other terms, providing opportunities for the researcher to keep a 
field diary to note any additional data that arose during the case study. This 
diary could also be used to record any lessons from scrutinising internal and 
external literature associated with this proposed transformation, and to note the 
researcher’s own perspective and its influence on the research; in short, to 
observe whether the research would help or hinder an assessment of the 
viability of the programme. 
In Flyvbjerg’s (2001) terms, then, this case study represented a critical case 
because the MOD was deliberately seeking to change behaviours, so the 
change initiative could be expected to prompt either acquiescence or a reaction 
in terms of the relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry. 
4.5.2 Conduct of survey stage 
Based on the discussion of method in Section 4.5, the survey shown at 
Appendix A was developed to explore the dispositions of social actors to ethics 
relative to their positions within the Defence acquisition field. The survey was 
piloted with a limited audience prior to its use in this research and, in keeping 
with the design of methods, this confirmed the potential utility of adding 
comment fields to each question to allow respondents to expand on their 
answers. 
To minimise social desirability bias, the survey questions were based around 
the is/ought demarcation: each question was framed in terms of how, in the 
opinion of the respondents, an aspect of the relationship between the MOD and 
the UK Defence Industry currently is and then how it should be. In keeping with 
the research method, this provided a means to reveal how social actors in the 
field are disposed towards the relationship: it permitted people to express an 
ethical opinion (the difference between is and ought) without directly asking 
them to do so. This could then identify – and ideally quantify – a social 
phenomenon in the domain of the empirical, which would allow the research to 
establish the structure of the field. The question pairs were derived from the 
case study context, focusing on issues that the researcher identified as under 
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discussion by virtue of being embedded in it: the extent to which greater 
integration between MOD and the Defence Industry is undermined by a lack of 
trust; whether the two were co-dependent, as argued in some of the literature 
discussed in Chapter 2; how people were disposed to the cross-boundary 
movement of skills that was sought by the initiative; to what extent values 
differed; and how people were disposed to the ‘Defence Enterprise’ perspective 
advocated. 
Given the existence of the change programme, the research also took 
advantage of pre-existing contacts in both the MOD and the UK Defence 
Industry to achieve a wide survey distribution, including a snowballing effect by 
asking for senior stakeholder commitment. This meant that the online survey 
could be issued via email from these stakeholders instead of being sent directly 
by the researcher. Moreover, rather than selecting the subsequent interview 
population at random, the researcher was able to take account of the 
organisational structures that exist to identify participants from their positions 
within the Defence acquisition field (Brigley, 1995), as well as to leverage the 
survey results, continuing senior stakeholder endorsement, and researcher 
immersion in the context (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). (Note, however, that 
the convenience achieved by being embedded in the research context is also a 
potential criticism, insofar as the researcher could select interviewees in line 
with organisational politics or else to drive towards a particular (assumed) result 
(Diefenbach, 2009).) 
This approach was preferable to seeking to identify and survey a 
‘representative’ sample within the Defence acquisition context for several 
reasons. Firstly, the extent of the Defence acquisition system remains 
contested, so it was not possible to sample it in a way that accurately reflected 
a defined whole. Secondly, given the contingent nature of the case study, the 
sampling was time-bound: although it provided an opportunity to obtain data 
and to use senior sponsorship, it also meant having to be content with the 
responses provided rather than attempting to secure a greater number of 
survey responses at another time. Finally, the research could not access ethics 
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directly because of social desirability bias, so the indirect approach adopted 
aimed at representation in the sense of what the people surveyed believe 
ethically, not representation as a proportion of the total population. 
Therefore, the survey was sent to potential respondents in the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry via a hyperlink generated by Qualtrics Survey Software, which 
included a consent statement explicitly stating that the research was exploring 
how the relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry currently is 
and how it should be. To achieve Industry representation, the survey was 
initially targeted at the maritime Defence Industry in keeping with the scope of 
the case study, but respondents were asked to forward the hyperlink to others 
to facilitate snowballing. This approach led to a high response rate for the 
surveys and better interview possibilities, relative to the organisational context 
of survey fatigue in which both the MOD and the Defence Industry have 
struggled to achieve sufficient (let alone representative) survey data to measure 
employee engagement. Indeed, there was no ideal time to conduct a survey 
within this context, other than at this point when it was possible to leverage the 
change programme.  
This tactic also allowed the researcher to gain access to internal (MOD) and 
some external (Defence Industry) documents to help record the details of 
specific events as they happened (Watkins and Swidler, 2009). Moreover, and 
most importantly, it meant that the research could indirectly address business 
ethics without any research ethics impropriety: the success or otherwise of the 
change programme was believed by stakeholders to depend on behavioural 
attitudes towards public/private sector collaboration, so narratives about this 
initiative were focused on business ethics by default because they were a 
primary concern for the people impacted. A total of 124 survey replies were 
ultimately received, with an average of 108 responses per question (an 87% 
completion rate). The results were then analysed using SPSS and are detailed 
in Section 5.1 below. 
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4.5.3 Survey comment analysis method 
The inclusion within the survey of an opportunity to add comments yielded a 
large amount of supplementary data (almost 3,000 words of commentary), 
which then constituted what was essentially an additional set of (minor) 
narratives that could be analysed as such. To achieve this, rather than 
undertake the detailed narrative analysis planned for the interviews in the next 
stage and in keeping with the research method, the comments were used to 
identify any themes (Boyatzis, 1998), or the content of any narrative rather than 
how it was constructed (Riessman, 2005). This analysis employed a standard 
categorisation of narratives into an abstract, an orientation (the setting), a 
complication (the problem), a resolution and a coda; in short, the plot of the 
story or stories that the narrative is trying to tell (Bamberg, 2012). 
To achieve this without reducing the richness of the data, the comments were 
set against a default narrative of MOD distrust of the Defence Industry. This 
was selected because it was the hypothesis of the case study; that is, that the 
relationship between the MOD and Defence Industry should be more 
collaborative than it currently is. Approaching the data in this way meant that the 
comments could be contrasted with a pre-existing narrative, preserving their 
being embedded in the case study context rather than reducing their richness 
through coding or seeking an abstracted account. 
4.5.4 Conduct of interviews 
On the basis of the survey results and given the access for the researcher that 
was provided by the case study, interviewees were identified for the 
ethnographic (narrative) stages of this data collection process, which allowed 
the researcher to work within the context under investigation. These needed to 
be selected to be ‘most likely’ cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006), or people who could be 
anticipated to oppose public/private sector collaboration and thereby provide 
ethical reasons for their dispositions (and conversely for ‘least likely’ cases); this 
would then help the research assess how ethics contributed to preventing a 
collective Defence identity (or otherwise). Alternatively, they needed to be 
people in positions of power within the acquisition field who could be expected 
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to shape its future structure, whether for or against the intent of the case study. 
Indeed, given the restricted window of opportunity to access a change 
programme in progress, together with the organisational desire to make this 
change work, the researcher needed to obtain a general sense of the sentiment 
within the case study as a proxy for how such a change would be perceived 
more generally, but then to gain access to the powerful few. 
The interviewees were thus selected for their positions of influence – via 
possession of capital, primarily Rank – within the Defence acquisition field, as 
well as their roles in the case study (especially, therefore, the Royal Navy and 
the maritime Defence Industry). Ease of access was also a minor factor (to 
ensure that interviews could be conducted within the period of the case study) 
and hence interviewee availability was achieved through the researcher’s 
position within the project. There was (deliberately) no attempt to identify a 
representative set of interviewees because, following Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, the research sought to understand the capital actually employed in 
narratives about ethics in Defence acquisition and how this structured the 
acquisition field, using those who possess power to explore this; in short, using 
capital to structure the field, rather than gender or other identifying 
characteristics. 
A total of 10 interviews were undertaken; the selection of interviewees is 
discussed in Section 5.3 below. These interviews were conducted using the 
detailed narrative method described in the next section and then transcribed for 
analysis. In keeping with the requirements of research ethics – covered in 
Section 4.5.8 below – and with the assurance of anonymity given to 
participants, full transcripts are not provided here, but are held securely by the 
author. However, they are available for further research and to confirm or 
challenge the analysis conducted. 
4.5.5 Narrative analysis method 
Using a narrative approach meant reducing the role of the interviewer as much 
as possible (Bauer, 1996). Therefore, the interviews began with the prompt: 
‘Please can you tell me your impression of the relationship between the MOD 
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and the UK Defence Industry?’, with follow-up questions, as appropriate, on the 
role of leaders in the relationship. These stimuli were designed to reveal the 
operation of capital and habitus, as well as specifically what counts as doxa in 
Defence acquisition. 
In addition to minimising the number of prompts, the interviewees were 
encouraged to use their own language, which was recorded and transcribed 
exactly. The structure of the interviews involved an explanation of the topic to 
the interviewee, explicitly describing this as ‘the relationship between the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry’ and not mentioning ethics to help reduce social 
desirability bias. Each interviewee was then given the details of the research 
and asked to sign a consent form to agree to the interview and its recording. 
The interviewees were also told that at any time they could request that 
recording be stopped or could stop it themselves. The prompts described above 
were then used to ask the interviewees to narrate their experiences of the 
relationship, without interruption or other questions from the interviewer. After 
this, a questioning period (when needed) employed further prompts (such as, 
‘can you tell me more about that?’ or ‘what happened next?’) to invite the 
interviewees to add more detail of plot or stories. During this period, no 
questions about opinions (especially ethical views) or mechanisms were used, 
again to guard against leading the interviewees to ethics. Finally, the interviewer 
stopped the recording and an opportunity for any final informal discussion was 
offered. (See Bauer, 1996, for a detailed account of the narrative interview 
technique employed.) 
Once the interviews were transcribed (by the researcher, using Dragon Dictate 
software), the analysis of the narratives was divided into several phases. The 
first focused on structure, including key characters and events (Riessman, 
2008), as well as how separate stories were joined together as part of an overall 
narrative (Feldman et al., 2004). The next phase sought to identify the content 
of the narrative rather than how it is constructed, using the separation of the plot 
into abstract, orientation, complication, resolution and coda that was already 
described (Bamberg, 2012). The third step attempted to combine the previous 
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phases to assess the overall purpose of the narratives – such as apology, 
appeal, justification or explanation (Bamberg, 2003) – with their intended 
audience (Feldman et al., 2004) and (if possible) their function, especially where 
ethical decision making was implied (Bruner, 1990). 
Overlain on this analysis, the type of narrative(s) was considered: whether they 
were ontological (setting out a process through which people make and remake 
their identities); public or performative (aimed at telling a story to others); 
metanarratives (referring to larger, societal narratives); or else conceptual 
narratives that the interviewees had created for themselves as an exploration of 
their circumstances (Somers, 1994). Finally, the narratives were examined to 
identify the role of any of Bourdieu’s key concepts, but particularly the operation 
of capital and habitus. 
4.5.6 Generation of an ideal type 
Given the general methodological commitment to ideal types in this research 
and Bourdieu’s particular focus on them, it was necessary to construct a 
Weberian ideal type from the narratives and their mechanisms. To achieve this, 
the ideal type was placed as the end point of the methodological framework set 
out in Table 4-1 in Section 4.5 above: identifying a phenomenon in the domain 
of the empirical through the survey; exploring matters further through people’s 
reported experiences in the domain of the actual to then finally achieve an 
explanation in the domain of the real; and – the last step – creating an exemplar 
type. 
An ideal type is an abstraction that is intended to capture the substance of an 
activity, such as ethics in acquisition. Through providing this exemplar, it should 
help to illustrate how people interact in the social world by calling attention to 
the primary elements of a phenomenon. By construction, the ideal type does not 
exist and hence no individual person, group or organisation will display all its 
aspects; however, it is a heuristic that supports the production of further 
hypotheses, generalisation by analogy to other contexts, and/or options for 
other research to confirm the type or challenge and reinterpret it. The ideal type 
also allows the research to explain what the data mean, how the results are 
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consistent (or otherwise) with the existing literature, what new knowledge is 
proposed, and what limitations should be borne in mind. 
An ideal type is constructed by exploring the difference between how things are 
in the social world and how they ought to be, analysing what causes the 
separation (Mitropolitski, 2013). The method adopted in this research facilitated 
this construction because, by design, the quantitative survey stage sought an 
is/ought demarcation in the social world, coupled with data (the survey 
comments and the narrative interviews) on people’s experience of it. This meant 
that the explanation achieved through narrative analysis could become an ideal 
type through abduction and retroduction. In particular, having creatively re-
described the social phenomena and, in so doing, posited a better explanation 
(abduction), the analysis could then search for the social properties without 
which the phenomena could not exist and, thereby, infer the mechanisms 
responsible (retroduction). 
To achieve an ideal type from the explanation arrived at in the narrative 
analysis, it was necessary only to create ‘an exemplary case in a finite world of 
possible configurations’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 2). In this research, this meant setting 
out the ways in which acquisition could be understood as a Bourdieusian 
practice, offering this description as an idealised version of the explanation that 
could then serve as an exemplar to generate knowledge, rather than constitute 
it. For Weber (2012: 126), this fecundity is the standard by which the resulting 
ideal type is to be judged: 
[I]t is never possible to determine in advance whether [ideal types] are 
mere fantasies or whether they constitute scientifically fruitful concept 
formation. […] the only standard is whether [the ideal type] is useful for 
acquiring knowledge of concrete cultural phenomena – their context, 
their causal determination and their significance. Consequently, the 
construction of abstract ideal types can only be considered a tool, never 
an end [in itself].  
There were three important caveats to this process, especially given that ethics 
is the subject of the analysis. Firstly, the research as a whole, and the ideal type 
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in particular, was not concerned with whether the way acquisition is undertaken 
is itself ethical, but only with how people narrate their experiences of it. 
Secondly, the research did not argue that any behaviour observed or captured 
in the empirical work is normatively unethical, even if a separate case to this 
effect could be made, because this was beyond the scope of an ideal type. 
Finally, and most importantly, since the research was located within the critical 
realist paradigm, the ideal type should not be understood as definitive or 
unchanging. While such a conception would violate Weber’s methodological 
guidance and intent, it would also ignore the critical focus: if an ideal type 
characterises social reality in a particular way, it does so to help people to 
change that reality (for the better). 
4.5.7 Repeatability of the method 
The development of the methodology in this research, together with its 
application to researching ethics as a specific method, is repeatable by 
following the stages set out in Table 4-1, which align critical realism with 
Bourdieu’s approach and the intent to achieve an ideal type. In particular, this 
methodology insists that the explanation is overlain on the case, rather than 
being generalised from it. This means that the ideal type as exemplar 
explanation can and should be used unless or until contrary data or a better 
explanation is provided; in short, it serves as ‘an operational exemplar whose 
suggestiveness sparks a search for analogues’ (Biernacki, 2012: 144). 
Furthermore, Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1993) set out how paradigmatic 
examples in the history of science, such as Galileo’s explication of 
heliocentrism, used a single, detailed case study to create a new ideal type that 
explains reality in a new way; or, in the terms of this research, redescribes the 
domains of the empirical and actual in terms of the real. The meaning of the 
resulting ideal type cannot be separated from the demonstration of it, but it 
permits researchers to move from case-to-case via analogy with the type as an 
exemplar, not by abstracting from it. People then make reference to these 
exemplars – for example, to Weber’s (1958) Protestant ethic – rather than to 
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specific predicates within them, even though there is no one to whom the 
Protestant ethic applies exactly. 
Finally, the exemplar is exposed to scrutiny via additional research, but it is not 
separated from the cases that it becomes a paradigmatic example of. Moreover, 
the intervention of the researcher is evident in the construction of the ideal type 
precisely because there is no claim that the type really exists and it retains the 
original detail to support it (in this case, the detail of the narratives). This makes 
the ideal type an open and honest form of research because the investigation 
can be repeated step-by-step: by surveying other populations; by analysing or 
re-analysising survey comments; by conducting and analysing other narrative 
interviews; and by offering other abductive/retroductive explanations that 
account for the data in different way, thereby improving upon the ideal type. 
4.5.8 Research ethics 
In addition to the overall approach taken in this research and to account for 
research ethics requirements in general, the Cranfield University Research 
Ethics System was used to obtain permission to conduct the research, 
alongside the MOD’s process as set out in Joint Services Publication 536. 
Confirmation of these approvals is at Appendix B. 
A key concern was the confidentiality of the research participants, notably the 
risk that comments can be attributed to individuals and result in damage to their 
organisational standing (Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynaden, 2000). As a result, all 
data were anonymised for both the survey and the interviews, and storage of 
identifying detail was limited to the researcher in password-protected files. All 
printed copies of transcripts were kept in secure cabinets and destroyed on 
completion of the research. 
Another issue was to take care with the subject matter (ethics), which was 
addressed in the interviews in part by using narrative analysis to indirectly 
approach ethics and avoid placing respondents in difficult positions (such as 
admissions of ethical violations by themselves or by others), although some 
evidence suggests that people are willing to do so to support beneficial 
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research (Graham, Grewal and Lewis, 2007); this also helped to reduce social 
desirability bias. To minimise the danger that the research misrepresents the 
subjects of the interviews (Chataika, 2005), the transcripts of their interviews 
were made available to the participants, along with the subsequent researcher’s 
analysis (but only of each person’s section of the research), which is to 
acknowledge that, in narrative analysis, the participants are co-creators of 
knowledge (Grafanaki, 1996) and grant them a form of quality control and 
assurance. All survey respondents and interview participants were required to 
give their informed consent prior to being interviewed on the basis of 
information about the research, and the researcher’s contact details were also 
provided; the consent form used is at Appendix C. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter positioned the research within a critical realist paradigm, setting 
out the ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments to social 
reality that critical realism entails and responding to potential objections. This 
approach then enabled a focus on narrative analysis and the goal of developing 
a Weberian ideal type via abduction and retroduction as the best way to explore 
the function of ethics in the Defence acquisition context. The use of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice as a theoretical framework was then justified, particularly 
through the potential for employing the concepts of capital and habitus to ethics. 
Finally, the employment of the theory in the research design was explained, 
including the use of mixed methods to provide a quantitative baseline of field 
position (with capital) and habitus, followed by a targeted qualitative analysis to 
explore dispositions via narratives. This methodology and the results it 
generated are now illustrated in Chapter 5. 
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5 RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter sets out the results of the quantitative survey and the subsequent 
qualitative (narrative) interviews, culminating in the development of an ideal 
type. 
5.1 Survey results 
As described in the methodology, the survey was the first of two stages of data 
collection. Its aim was to map the Defence acquisition field through 
correspondence analysis, which would ideally structure the differentiated 
positions that people occupy and suggest the relational capital that they might 
employ. In practice, this meant exploring the relationships (if any) between 
variables using SPSS software, treating each of the questions in the survey as 
a variable and using each of the identifying characteristics (Sector/Service, 
Rank/Position/Role, Education Level, Age and Gender) as supplementary 
variables. The first survey question is covered in this chapter as an example, 
with the remainder of the detailed analysis at Appendix D. 
Given the number of survey responses obtained (n=124), some supplementary 
variables – specifically, Age and Gender – did not achieve sufficient diversity to 
make analysis meaningful; that is, the majority of respondents were male and 
aged 40-59, reflecting demographic trends in Defence as a whole and limiting 
the ethical experience available. Therefore, Age and Gender were not 
subjected to the additional correspondence analysis. 
5.1.1 Example of survey results: MOD trust of the Defence Industry 
For each variable and supplementary variable pair, the results at Appendix D 
display the crosstabulation followed by the correspondence analysis. This 
approach tracks the design of the survey, in which questions were based 
around the standard is/ought demarcation in ethics: each request of the 
respondents asked their opinion on how an aspect of the relationship between 
the Ministry of Defence and the UK Defence Industry currently is, and then how 
it should (or ought to) be. 
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Tables 5-1 and 5-2 display the first set of results as an example. The original 
question assessed trust between the MOD and the UK Defence Industry (‘To 
what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK Defence Industry?), and 
in this instance the responses are crosstabulated against the Sector or Service 
of the survey participants: 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK 
Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 2 6 17 3 0 28 (26%) 
Army 0 8 14 0 0 22 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 0 9 13 0 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 0 9 11 1 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 0 2 13 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 2 34 68 4 1 109 
Table 5-1: Data example – crosstabulation of Sector/Service against MOD trust of Industry (is) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the 
UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 6 14 7 1 0 28 (26%) 
Army 1 12 7 1 0 21 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 1 15 6 0 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 2 14 5 0 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 4 8 3 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 14 63 28 2 1 108 
Table 5-2: Data example – crosstabulation of Sector/Service against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
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Of note, the questions – in common with the others – asked about belief, so it 
was appropriate to ask Industry personnel about what the MOD should do (and 
vice versa in the converse questions that followed). To help analyse these and 
the other survey results, an assumption was made that the responses ‘fully’ and 
‘mainly’ could be considered a proxy for the matter at issue in the responses – 
in this example, the question of trust between acquisition system participants. 
On this view, the data show a shift between the two variants of the question – 
the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ versions – of 33% to 71% (see the bold-italicized entries in 
Tables 5-1 and 5-2). Notwithstanding the limited data set (n=124) and the low 
proportion of Industry respondents (n=15), the movement from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ 
was consistent across MOD and Industry, and was found across the other 
supplementary variables in the subsequent tables (see Appendix D). 
Having discovered this is/ought shift, the next step in applying the research 
method was to establish if there was any relationship between positions within 
the field and the dispositions (habitus) of the people occupying them, and then 
to describe this relationship. This step was achieved through correspondence 
analysis (Bourdieu, 1996b), undertaken using the appropriate functionality 
within SPSS. Figure 5-1 graphically displays the first pairing of ‘is’ and ought’ 
results via SPSS outputs; specifically, how MOD trust of Industry is interrelated 
with Sector/Service through proximity in two dimensions, or the ‘distances’ 
between row and column cells in the crosstabulations (Lebaron, 2009). 
The correspondence analysis should be read as a geometric representation of 
the interrelationships between variables: the changes between the two plots 
reproduced the is/ought shift from Tables 5-1 and 5-2. However, the additional 
information provided by the correspondence analysis was that these 
movements also suggest a correspondence between field position and 
disposition/habitus. For example, Figure 5-1 suggested that, on the face of it, 
the closest ‘ought’ association is between the Royal Navy and the Defence 
Industry (because both are closer to ‘fully’ in the second (‘ought’) version of the 
correspondence analysis): 
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Figure 5-1: Data example – correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and MOD trust of Industry (is/ought) 
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In general, the correspondence analyses displayed within the results at 
Appendix D were sometimes skewed by ‘no opinion’ responses, but otherwise 
suggested the same shift or ‘movement’ that was noted in the crosstabulations. 
This shift was displayed also in the association of trust with Rank/Position/Role, 
Education Level, Gender, and Age (see Appendix D for the detailed analysis). 
Moreover, the closer ‘ought’ association of the Royal Navy and the Defence 
Industry with ‘fully’ in this example provided for additional information because it 
supported the assumption of the (maritime) case study that the relationship 
between the two would serve as an exemplar for how the MOD might 
collaborate more with the Defence Industry.  
5.1.2 Summary of survey results 
Taken together (with the sole exception of the movement of personnel from the 
MOD to the Defence Industry), the survey responses at Appendix D showed a 
definite shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. This was a result within the domain of the 
empirical that required an explanation because it demonstrated that the people 
surveyed regarded the relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry 
as other than it might be. 
Furthermore, the correspondence analysis suggested that Sector/Service and 
Rank/Position/Role are more important in influencing the perceptions of the 
Defence acquisition field. Since these were thus likely to be the primary forms of 
capital that structure the field, they were given greater prominence during the 
subsequent interviews by prompting the researcher to seek out interviewees 
from within the case study context who held significant capital (whether rank or 
influence) or occupied positions of power. Finally, the closer ‘ought’ association 
between the Royal Navy and the Defence Industry supported the assumption 
that the specific relationship between the two, as embodied in the maritime case 
study, would be a ‘most likely’ case in the terms set out in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Analysis of survey comments 
As detailed in the methodology, with the exception of identifying data (the 
supplementary variables of Sector/Service, Rank/Position/Role, Education 
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Level, Gender, and Age), each survey question provided respondents with the 
option to record comments against their chosen answer. Although each 
‘comment’ was almost exclusively a single line, analysis using the framework 
set out in the methodology revealed that several common themes were 
involved. 
5.2.1 Summary of overall survey narrative 
In the survey comments, those who were positively disposed towards Industry 
told the same story: no one intends to do anything unethical, but the acquisition 
process is unwieldy and the MOD is unable to articulate its requirements in 
detail, usually because it does not know fully what it wants; but this means that 
Industry has to guess and, when the MOD then inevitably changes its mind, it 
typically results in increased costs and the commencement (or reinforcement) of 
an adversarial narrative. This is essentially an example of organisational 
akrasia. 
Using the narrative analysis method set out in Chapter 4, here the 
orientation/setting is the acquisition context; the complication is the reality that 
requirements have to change over time, contrary to the need for fixing them as 
part of the acquisition process (“we are viewed as an unreliable customer”); the 
resolution is missing (because there is none or, if it is identified – as commercial 
upskilling or greater collaboration with Industry – then it is currently out of reach: 
it is “impossible to fully trust them until we pay contractual staff in Defence as 
much as they do in Industry”); and, finally, the coda is the inevitability of discord 
(“there is an inherent distrust”). The purpose of narratives that follow this outline 
plot is explanation or (sometimes) apology: they seek to set out why there is a 
lack of trust and to place the blame on the acquisition process rather than with 
individuals and their behaviour, or else with the power structures that enable or 
encourage it. These narratives are performative insofar as they set up the 
discord between the MOD and Industry as unavoidable, rather than a choice or 
something to be challenged. 
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5.2.2 Survey narrative metaphors 
Three metaphors were used in the survey comments to strengthen this 
narrative. The first is from farming: the MOD is a “cash cow” that Industry milks 
for easy profit. There are several implications to the use of this metaphor. 
Industry’s behaviour is, by implication, consequentialist: if it collaborates with 
the MOD or seems to behave well towards its customer, this is due to a desire 
not to kill the cow, rather than because Industry values the cow in itself. (In 
Kantian terms, the MOD is a means rather than an end.) This implies that any 
collaboration between customer and supplier is, for the supplier, only 
undertaken for consequentialist reasons: to not harm the easy source of 
revenue and continue to “take advantage of MOD’s dependence on them”. 
However, the metaphor functions at another level: although many people 
depend on dairy products and accept the use of farming, the lived experience of 
a cow is associated with exploitation. This is then the purpose of employing the 
metaphor, which reinforces an opposition between the motives of MOD and 
Industry. The former must deliver military capability that the latter assists with, 
but only insofar as it can constrain the MOD cow in a way that continues to 
produce milk (profit). This also places Industry is a position of control and 
dominance, from which it is “always looking for ways to make a quick buck”, 
rather than a “symbiotic relationship” that develops the assessment that UK 
Defence is “not large enough” for the MOD and Industry to not be mutually 
dependent. 
The second metaphor is sexual: the MOD is described as being “in bed” (or 
“getting in bed”) with Industry. This has the effect of simplifying (personifying) 
the MOD and Industry into single actors who then share a bed in a way that 
suggests infidelity (or worse, “incestuous” conduct), which is aimed at an MOD 
audience and implies that the MOD actor who has too much interaction with 
Industry has been unfaithful. By appealing to a behaviour commonly understood 
to be unethical, the metaphor then delegitimises the relationship. 
Using ‘in bed with’ as a root metaphor in narratives about the MOD and Industry 
thus shapes worldviews (habitus), as well as structuring the acquisition field by 
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setting the two apart and not recognising cross-boundary experience as capital. 
Indeed, it may be more accurate to say that such experience is negative capital, 
such that the more a person has worked with Industry, the more she is 
unfaithful and hence unethical. The use of narratives of infidelity then 
encourages people to avoid cheating, which means acting in ways that 
disempower or reduce the likelihood of collaboration succeeding. 
The third metaphor is a legal one, or – perhaps more accurately – criminal: 
Industry is accused of “poaching” the best people from the MOD, which 
weakens the latter while strengthening the former. This delegitimises not only 
collaboration but also the movement of personnel across organisational 
boundaries, particularly from the MOD to Industry. This is in line with the results 
of the survey analysis, which showed that the transfer of people from Industry to 
the MOD was considered more acceptable than the reverse. Although this is 
challenged (“there are a large number of [ex-MOD] personnel working in 
Industry who still have the best interests of the Service in mind”), it is 
undermined when the narrative involves a requirement that those who transition 
“use their moral compass to give a good service”, insinuating that this compass 
is necessary to prevent the otherwise adverse impact. 
The poaching metaphor suggests that Industry is behaving in a way that is 
unethical (actually, illegal): rather than say – perhaps more accurately – that 
Industry offers greater remuneration or stability to employees, the implication is 
that Industry is taking (or stealing – “good MOD people will be stolen by 
Industry”) something that does not belong to them and, moreover, is protected 
for the use of the MOD; here ‘poaching’ suggests the land use rights associated 
with kings or nobles. The effect of the poaching is to then destabilise or threaten 
the viability of the population from which people are being taken. In the absence 
of a counter-narrative, this casts Industry as predator, hinting at criminal 
violence and engaged in literally killing off the MOD as it hunts public sector 
people or, using the second metaphor, encourages them to get into bed with it. 
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5.2.3 Survey narrative function 
The function of these narratives and the metaphors they employ is to construct 
or strengthen – in Bourdieusian terms – a doxa, according to which the friction 
between the MOD and Industry is entirely natural. This then allows the speaker 
to create and maintain a false dilemma that forces people to choose between 
the MOD and Industry (“profit ethic versus military ethos”), contrasting public 
service with private enrichment. Such narratives are immune to falsification 
because positive examples of collaboration can be undermined by talk of 
Industry “outwardly appearing to have the same aims” (thus implying deceit) or 
suggesting that it “does the minimum required to fulfil its contract” (thus actually 
delivering what was asked, which is then not enough). To speak positively of 
the relationship between the MOD and Industry risks not being taken seriously 
(because the speaker is another cow being milked) or accused of being too 
close to Industry (in bed with it and ready to be poached to a new, profit-
focused job). Moreover, it is very difficult to trust and engage with people who 
are criminals and/or who engage in infidelity. 
This doxa can be challenged in two ways: by objecting to one or more premise 
of the arguments (for example, “we must accept that profit is their motivation 
and that this is good for [Value for Money] and innovation”), or – following the 
theoretical framework – by identifying how habitus sustains the doxa by creating 
homogeneity through narratives or deliberate simplification (such as when a 
speaker “assume[s] that Defence is sufficiently homogenous” to be able to 
share values). Whether and how this occurs is now explored through the case 
study and detailed analysis of the narrative interviews conducted. 
5.3 Interview analysis 
The people interviewed comprised Royal Navy personnel (three), either 
employed in acquisition and directly engaged in attempts at collaborative 
working with Industry, or playing leading roles in professionalising acquisition; 
senior military Officers (one Army, one Royal Air Force) involved in shaping 
policy and strategic intent; a Civil Servant with experience across several 
Governments – including in Ministerial offices – and active in the case study 
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context; and Defence Industry workers (four) who had transitioned from prior 
military careers (spanning very short periods to almost four decades, all with the 
Royal Navy). In the analysis, a number in square brackets denotes each 
interviewee. 
5.3.1 Narrative summaries and structures 
Interview 1 was with an acquisition professional in the Royal Navy and was a 
discussion of the context of Defence acquisition with a focus on training 
systems. The interviewee emphasised the importance of contracting for driving 
behaviours, arguing that the separation of customer and supplier disincentivises 
collaboration before then insisting, to the contrary, that this demarcation is 
necessary because there is a requirement for holding suppliers to account for 
delivery. The narrative is public/performative in type, functioning as a 
justification (of how things work), but is also ontological insofar as the topic 
serves to sustain an identity of separation. 
The narrative is comprised of stories that take acquisition as the setting and the 
profit motive of Industry as the complication. A further complication is the formal 
commercial process, which drives an adversarial relationship in which the need 
for procedure implies (or presupposes) the risk of unethical activity; after all, 
without this threat, at least on the face of it, there would be no need for scrutiny. 
(That is, the principal-agent problem discussed in the literature review means 
“there is a barrier between MOD and the sectors that we deal with”.) The stories 
then offer several forms of resolution. Firstly, that the use, by Industry, of ex-
military personnel provides an opportunity to build trust because “there is that 
personal connection”; secondly, that a person “will never take as much 
ownership as if they’ve got the whole” of the acquisition process; but, thirdly, 
“there does need to be that customer/supplier relationship” because the MOD 
needs to be assured of what it is receiving when it spends public money. 
Interview 2 was with another Royal Navy acquisition professional and was an 
explanation of why adversarial tension exists between the MOD and the 
Defence Industry, using stories that illustrate the breakdown of relationships in 
acquisition and the rigid contractual remedies that are employed. The plot of 
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each story was repeated: the setting is an ostensibly collaborative or partnering 
arrangement in which requirements changed and, with them, costs rose (the 
complication), undermining confidence (“I wouldn’t trust [company] to lick the 
toilets”) and resulting in a stricter commercial resolution that assumes an 
adversarial approach. 
The narrative type is again public/performative, functioning as a justification of 
why things inevitably go wrong. It offered two variants of the same story, which 
emphasises both the desirability of collaboration and the inevitability of failure. 
Given that “there’s only one defence sector, so there’s one customer and a 
handful of significant defence contractors”, it makes sense to aim for mutual 
prosperity; but resources (especially people) are finite and this creates 
competition (the complication). With the MOD “being driven by a Government 
policy” to assess value for money through competition, the only way to find a 
resolution is for companies to “bid low” because “we all know that MOD change 
their mind, so [Industry will] be able to recoup some of that money”. This is a 
case of explicitly unethical behaviour (“lowest compliant bid wins”) because – 
according to the interviewee – everything encourages it, especially the MOD’s 
“archaic commercial arrangements”. 
Interview 3 was the final example of a Royal Navy acquisition professional 
explaining how the acquisition field operates and includes the same insistence 
of failure being baked into the system through “insufficient information” being 
provided on the MOD’s plans. It repeated the story from interview 2 of 
requirements changing “overnight”, which occasions rework, but “the worst thing 
is that the MOD will then charge Industry with driving the cost up, when it was 
actually MOD in the first place”. Perhaps owing to the maritime context of few 
prime contractors, the interviewee also pointed to competition-as-default adding 
cost because “if [a contract renewal] doesn’t go to the current people you’re 
building in risk and discontinuity”. Indeed, accepting the limited structure of 
maritime acquisition but insisting on competition to satisfy commercial process 
means “you’ve just taken their eye off the ball when they could’ve been building 
in innovation or spending their time doing more”. 
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In this instance, the narrative type is conceptual, aimed at and appealing to 
people who would challenge the field as it is currently structured. The important 
claim raised in this narrative is that it is always easier for the people involved in 
acquisition to defer to procedures and the wishes of their superiors (“you have 
assurance and protection and, you know, you’re all pointing in the same 
direction”), so the limitations of their behaviours are self-selecting through the 
illusio. This is returned to in subsequent analysis, but it reproduces the ancient 
challenge of Socrates – covered in the literature review – that akrasia (acting 
against one’s better judgment) is impossible. The implication in the acquisition 
context is that there is no unethical behaviour: people do not “act with any 
malicious intent; they do it because they think that they know what’s required”. 
Interview 4 was an exploratory narrative from a senior Royal Air Force Officer in 
a policy role. Few stories were used, but the interviewee pointed repeatedly to 
people retreating to a defined identity (narrative the complication), from which 
unconscious bias limits options. Appealing then to the increased use of talent 
management in the MOD as a resolution, “we shouldn’t say you’ve got to be 
thirty, you’ve got to be this age, you’ve got to have four reports, that does not 
make sense.” This reference to identity work structured the narrative and is 
covered in greater detail in the narrative analysis below. 
Interview 5 was with a very senior Army Officer in a strategic position of 
influence. It was partially conceptual, functioning as an explanation and apology 
by setting out stories that explain the distrust of Industry that, according to the 
interview, the MOD still harbours: 
I would characterise MOD’s approach as saying, ‘I don’t trust Industry to 
do what it says it’s going to do and deliver; therefore, I’ve got to have a 
contractual stick to beat them up with each time. 
A story detailed how the MOD attempted to acquire a software system, “with no 
concept, as Defence, as to how to build software programmes in those days 
[the 1970s]”. This was a problem that was solved by specifying in detail in the 
microchip to be employed. The complication was that this microchip “was 
obsolete before it was even off the drawing board”; but, since the MOD had 
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specified its use, this is what Industry provided to satisfy the contract (the 
resolution). The perverse consequence of this story is that its coda is the 
opposite of what may otherwise be anticipated: rather than point to MOD 
failings in the original contracting, the interviewee instead used Industry’s 
honesty (about the microchip’s obsolescence) as a justification for increasing 
MOD distrust (“we were suspicious of them, that all they wanted to do was 
increase their profit margins”). Consequently, it is no surprise that this “checking 
and confirming […] puts an attitude of distrust into the relationship”. 
The narrative also repeats a (deontological) concern for public resources, which 
arises because “those who are responsible for setting the contracts that the 
MOD goes into have a duty, above all, to get value for money for taxpayers’ 
money”. Repeating some of the challenges raised in the introduction to this 
research, another story asked if value for money means rigid contracts that 
demonstrate savings in the short-term, yet come at the cost of better capability 
(“whether it actually delivers what you want it to deliver”). The complication is 
thus “an immediate tension between the person designing the contract, who 
wants best value for money because it’s not our money, it’s taxpayers’ money, 
and somebody who wants the best output, which may or may not be the 
cheapest contract”. In this story, the problem cannot be solved “until we change 
contractual staffs to trust that actually a little bit more expense might be the 
better way of going”. 
Interview 6 was a performative justification through a mid-seniority Civil Servant 
perspective of extreme scepticism. The interviewee argued for Defence 
acquisition as a means of transferring public money to businesses – essentially 
a conspiracy that is out in the open for all to see (“how can we convert public 
money into private sector profit?”) – in which the only difference between forms 
of government is their size (smaller or larger) to bring about this redistribution. 
The root story of acquisition is then that the public sector uses competition to 
get the best from business (the setting), but does so without understanding the 
flow of money or what is actually being acquired (the complication). The cynical 
resolution is simply that this transfer is the whole point: 
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[T]here’s a colleague of mine who’s running a [multi-million pound] 
contract, and I said to him, ‘so how do you scrutinise the money?’ And he 
said he doesn’t need to; he just hands it over. 
In this vision of acquisition, the coda is that there is no accountability; Industry 
merely takes advantage of its monopsony position in the Defence context 
because the businesses involved are ‘too big to fail’ (“[y]ou might as well just 
have an accountant saying, ‘here’s your cheque; come back to me in three 
months when you want more’”). 
The other significant aspect to this narrative is a story of unethical behaviour 
that attributed blame to symbolic power. This tale related the experience of 
working with Ministers and their seeking “to be seen to be doing the best by 
Defence” against a backdrop of pressure on resources. In the story, a Defence 
Minister was presented with evidence for the best course of action, but was 
challenged in Parliament and decided that the choice, although optimum in the 
circumstances, would be viewed negatively. The narrative resolution was then 
to change the evidence until it suited what the Minister wanted to say, an 
explicit example of akrasia: 
And it got to the point where [military advisor] actually had to say to the 
Minister, ‘so what is it you actually want to say and I will produce the line 
that proves that’s what you want to say?’ And the Private Secretary at 
the time actually reinforced it and said that, ‘whilst the advice may conflict 
with what you want to say, we understand that you have to stand on the 
floor of Parliament and justify this decision, and at the moment you can’t 
justify [the advice]; therefore; you should consider overruling it.’ 
The coda to this story is the cynicism engendered: 
If we wanted to spend £20M, we just had to produce the Business Case 
that is more presentationally appealing for the Minister to stand on the 
floor of the House and say, ‘we’re spending £20M on this’, and we would 
probably get it. 
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On this view, there are no challenges to what happens because the truth of a 
particular matter is in no one’s interest unless it aligns with what those in power 
want to do; the role of military staff and especially of the Civil Service is to justify 
after the fact whatever decisions Ministers have already made, even if these 
pronouncements are akratic. The narrative concludes with a final story of the 
Government having changed and the interviewee adjusting a speech to support 
the new Minister at the expense of the old: “I did it, even though the [Civil 
Service] code says that you’re to remain apolitical”. 
Interview 7 was the first of four Industry perspectives and was with a former 
junior Royal Navy Officer who moved into the Defence Industry after a short 
career. The conceptual narrative included stories that confirm those from other 
interviews, but from an Industry perspective: everyone wants to work together 
towards common goals (abstract), but there is “a desire or encouragement that 
Industry will go and do things in advance of all the [commercial] arrangements 
and things being put in place” (setting); this then implies risk for Industry, which 
often becomes an issue when the MOD changes its mind and is then not able 
“to live up to the encouragement they provided” (complication), which results in 
a loss of trust and increased weariness from Industry or pricing in risk 
(resolution) that the MOD can then point to as cost escalation (coda). 
At the heart of the narrative is the principal-agent problem and whether 
requirements should be loose and seek collaboration yet leave the potential for 
abuse, such as “a huge number of contract changes needed just to update it”, 
or else be strict and create adversarial tension through an assumption of 
misbehaviour (“I always joked that [the contract] actually defined how you were 
to boil the kettle if you wanted a cup of tea”). In this story, the MOD’s response 
is to create an interface between customer and supplier – the ‘customer friend’ 
– to ostensibly translate between the two, which instead “set up an arrangement 
where [the customer friend] was in his world, he got paid for creating as much 
hassle as possible, so he created problems for both sides and it just fostered an 
adversarial relationship”. Other stories build on this to explain how people are 
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incentivised to behave as they do, even though overall the acquisition system 
and military capability are negatively affected.  
Interviews 8 to 10 were narratives of transition, from medium/long (25 years) to 
very long (35 years) careers in the Royal Navy into areas of the Defence 
Industry that support it. The interviewees told stories of how they sought to 
position themselves to best make the change and how people coming to the 
end of military service will manage this process. These were narratives of 
justification, seeking to legitimise MOD to Industry movement, and are partly 
ontological because of the identity work they involve (notably, to counter the 
assumption observed from the survey data that such transitions should be 
opposed). The stories involved a realisation that another job is necessary (the 
setting – “I realised that the only certainties in life were death, taxes and a 
second career”) combined with the reality of regular reappointments making it 
difficult to acquire marketable skills, especially for people with operational 
backgrounds at sea (complication); this was then resolved by negotiating for 
particular roles, usually to the detriment of further career progression, to 
deliberately acquire capital that can be used in Industry (“I walked out of the 
door on a Friday and on Monday I walked back in in a suit”). These narratives 
are explicitly identity work, aiming to explain how the transition was managed to 
minimise the uncertainty and appeal to continuity-yet-improvement (see Newall, 
2014, for a more detailed treatment of identities in transition). 
Each of the ten narratives relies on a standard cast of characters that greatly 
oversimplify the social reality, a fact that some interviewees note: 
[T]here are a number of people, including myself, that all we’ve ever 
done in our lives in been in the Royal Navy. [1] 
I can only really talk for the MOD side because I haven’t worked in 
Industry. [3] 
[M]y view is broadly perception rather than reality… because I’ve not 
worked in acquisition. [4] 
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[T]he MOD is huge; Industry is large and diverse. So it is probably 
difficult to characterise it as being a single relationship. [7] 
Having offered these caveats, though, the narratives went on to treat both MOD 
and Industry as singular entities, ripe for generalisation and occupying two 
‘sides’ of a binary relationship rather than a continuum (“you have one 
organisation over on the left, one organisation over on the right, and the 
processes and the relationships are the strands between them” [1]). The 
interviewees, as the primary social actors, then interpret this relationship. 
The other significant player sitting behind the stories in these narratives was 
‘the taxpayer’ – apparently deeply concerned at the destination and usage of 
her money – who is the ultimate authority and to whom the public sector 
employee has a sacred duty. It is this taxpayer who desires value for money, 
albeit reinforced by the Government acting on her behalf (“it’s not our money, 
it’s taxpayers’ money” [5]), notwithstanding that this requires an act of cognitive 
dissonance because both public and private sector people working in 
acquisition are themselves taxpayers. Even the ostensibly profit-focused private 
sector recognises a responsibility to spend carefully in this deontological sense, 
despite the protections afforded to the taxpayer through commercial process 
seldom being invoked (“I’m not sure I can put my hand on a single time when 
we’ve had a DEFCON [Defence Condition] called up and used as such” [7]). 
The problem is that using contractual conditions to support an unspoken 
deontological acquisition ethics – guarding against the principal-agent problem 
or inevitable bad behaviour (“it’s there as a background protection” [7]) – is 
tantamount to creating a doxa of separation and adversarial tension; in 
philosophical terms, it is begging the question. In short, the adoption of an 
ethics creates the behaviour that it was meant to address. 
5.3.2 Narrative themes 
Having summarised the narratives, the analysis next sought to determine the 
main themes by exploring the content of each story’s plot elements. As detailed 
in the methodology chapter, this was achieved using Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice to examine the function of each element and the overall story. 
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Beginning with a brief further consideration of the metaphors identified in the 
survey comments, this section thus employs each of Bourdieu’s concepts – with 
examples from the transcripts – to analyse the narratives in detail. 
5.3.2.1 Narrative metaphors 
The three metaphors identified in the analysis of survey comments were seen 
again in the narratives. The MOD “cash cow” that is milked by Industry is “seen 
to be a bit of a meal ticket” by those who have left the former and “know exactly 
the level [of work] that’s expected” [1]. This allows Industry “to cut corners, 
exploit us” [1] and to “keep an order book going, even when the business model 
might need to be changed.” [6] In addition to being a cow that is milked for 
money, the MOD is also a sheep that is repeatedly “being fleeced” [2], 
continuing the farmyard leitmotif. 
Those who challenge this metaphor are confronted with the accusation, “you’re 
in bed with Industry” [3], and support for Industry “almost feels slightly 
incestuous” [6]. Although there is little discussion of poaching, the narratives 
focus on Industry attempting to “spin us for every penny” and “rip us off” [5], 
both of which are wrapped in the same sexual implication that “we’re now going 
to screw you for more money” [4]. The MOD’s people then have no choice but 
to act in an adversarial way, “because if I don’t you’re going to screw me.” [5] 
This sexualised sense of exploitation gives rise to another metaphor: the 
relationship between the MOD and Industry as a form of combat. Acquisition is 
then “fighting an uphill battle” [3], in which “everyone gets into entrenched 
positions” [7] with “people throwing stones” [3] and “mudslinging” [4] or sitting on 
“the other side of the barricade with rocks being thrown over” [2]. In this battle, 
MOD personnel need “to have a contract stick to beat them up with”, either 
“slapping across the interface” or “beat[ing] each other around the head” [7]. 
5.3.2.2 Acquisition as practice: the doxa 
Given these metaphors, particularly their prevalence across both quantitative 
and qualitative data, the analysis begins with doxa. As detailed in the 
explanation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and its application as a theoretical 
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framework in this research, doxa is part of habitus and comprises the cognitive 
and evaluative presuppositions that people accede to, especially acceptance of 
capital as valuable rather than ultimately arbitrary. Throughout the narratives, 
the key component of the acquisition doxa is that the MOD and Industry have 
“different drivers”; specifically: 
[The MOD is] answering to, ultimately, the Government, who wants to 
see us doing more with less; and the shareholder pretty much wants to 
achieve as much as possible with as little investment, maximising their 
returns. [2] 
The challenge in analysing the narratives is that these motives are explicitly the 
same, to the extent of being almost identical in description. Ostensibly the 
distinction is that, in Industry, there is always the possibility that “I could move 
into another sector and use my manpower or my resource to generate a better 
return” [2] (implying a threat that is used to justify the MOD’s doxa); however, 
this is the equivalent pressure that the MOD faces when the Government 
conducts spending reviews and may choose to reduce Defence resources in 
favour of other Departments. 
One of the aims of the narratives, then, is to set up a false dilemma using the 
assumption that the MOD provides a non-negotiable service to the nation via 
altruism, contrary to a Defence Industry focused exclusively on profit making. 
(“Half the [Defence] Enterprise are focused on shareholder value; half are 
taxpayers working for Queen and country” – senior officer response to the case 
study; field diary, 9 October 2015.) This doxa is repeatedly called upon 
(“[y]ou’re dealing with the private sector, who have shareholders and will need 
to make a profit for their shareholders” [1]) and used to justify a demarcation of 
public and private sector motives (“there is a barrier between MOD and the 
sectors that we deal with” [1]). On this view, while the MOD invests in 
acquisition to deliver security for the UK, for Industry it is “just another serial that 
needs to be achieved” [1]; once the profit has been made, Industry must “move 
on to the next task” [1]. Consequently, “mistrust happens” [3] and is an 
inevitable part of the relationship between the MOD and Industry. 
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In one of the stories, the strength of this doxa is illustrated when an Industry 
interviewee (perhaps unintentionally) supports this assessment by challenging 
the mistrust in (economic) capital terms: 
If there is a view, which sometimes gets expressed, that sometimes the 
MOD doesn’t trust Industry, that’s a very narrow view of the world 
because, you know – take my business: yes, we have export stuff, don’t 
forget that, but there’s a substantial UK business and we exist because 
the MOD will pay, and if the MOD absolutely got to the point of saying, 
‘well, this company doesn’t deliver’, they wouldn’t pay and we wouldn’t 
have a business. [7] 
However, because this argument repeats the appeal to a form of natural 
selection in business, it merely confirms the MOD doxa that “you have Industry 
trying to make as much money out of us as possible because they need to 
survive”. [5] 
5.3.2.3 Acquisition as practice: ethics through capital 
The establishment of this doxa is important because it creates the conditions for 
how capital is valued. Recall that capital is made, saved, exchanged or 
consumed, with its possession allowing the holder to wield power or influence in 
a social context; in this case, the acquisition field, in which social actors struggle 
over how much capital they can gain and control, and what counts as capital in 
the first place. Capital becomes symbolic when it is legitimised; that is, when it 
is recognised by others as conferring authority. Holding this capital then justifies 
the way the field is structured and stratified into hierarchies: once social actors 
possess symbolic capital and a position of influence in a field, they have the 
symbolic power to construct the social world. 
Since the MOD already controls contracts in the acquisition field as a default, 
the separation doxa provides the MOD with the ability to legitimise capital and 
use it to reinforce its symbolic power. For example, in one story, the MOD 
attempted to work collaboratively with Industry on the training for a capability: 
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We started out in that instance of having, ‘we’ll have a fairly loose 
contract that we all sort of work around for the greater good’, without 
being explicit about ‘thou shalt do’; and that didn’t work, that – the 
outputs we were seeing from the trainers, we weren’t getting what we 
wanted… [emphasis added]. [2] 
Although this was supposed to be a collaborative endeavour, the narrative 
recollection assigns greater symbolic power to the MOD (“we’re having to put in 
a revised contract… it’s become very prescriptive… that’s how we’ve had to 
deal with it” [2]). The interviewees can employ the doxa to assert that failures 
like this are inevitable, ensuring that the MOD’s symbolic power is thus 
misrecognised as natural; after all, when “you start coming up against the 
buffers or difficulties, which will be the inevitable ones, which are time, cost, 
quality, then you start going back into a more contractual, adversarial 
relationship” [emphasis added] [2]. 
Here not only are tensions inescapable, but this becomes the default position to 
which the acquisition system returns, as if finding its equilibrium. It means that 
collaboration, which works “[w]hile things are going well”, is delegitimised 
because “all too often those initial aspirations tend to fall down” [2]. The 
implication of the story is thus supposed to be that the initial effort was naïve 
because it failed to appreciate the natural order of things – it was chasing “an 
ideal world” [2] that is unachievable. 
This inevitability of failure is, in the narratives, just a fact of life, rather than 
something created from the MOD’s position of dominance within the acquisition 
field through its symbolic power of contracting (“whatever we do is the 
customer’s idea in the end” [10]) and reinforced, continually, by the doxa. For 
instance, “it’s no surprise when quotes or the tendering process is [sic] 
undermined, because [Industry] are quoting on insufficient information” [3]. By 
withholding knowledge of equipment plans, ostensibly to achieve value for 
money through competition, the MOD creates (or rather sustains) an 
information asymmetry that preserves its position, using “contract conditions 
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and the attitudes that go around [them]” to contribute to “outcomes that may not 
be as good as they could otherwise have been”. [7] 
Here the MOD can insist that it is “bound by [its] own rules on competition” [3], 
but the symbolic power of contracting structures the entire acquisition field 
because it assigns the ability to legitimate capital exclusively to the MOD, which 
Industry must – and, in the narratives, does – accept as a condition of market 
entry. In contrast to Australia, say, which publishes a ten-year Capability Plan to 
help Industry predict future requirements, UK acquisition is “driven by this ‘us 
and them’ situation” [3] that is not inevitable at all. (On the other hand, attempts 
to make this adversarial approach a default can be seen in the US, although 
policy makers have vigorously contested it. (‘We must treat our contractors like 
they are criminals. Before we find out anything wrong, we assume they are 
doing something bad.’ (Shuster, 2012: 8)) Even when senior MOD personnel 
concede that some form of collaboration may be worth considering, they 
undermine it by presupposing an adversarial relationship anyway as part of the 
doxa (“both want partnership for their own ends, but both are suspicious of how 
much they can actually get away with… and that’s not terribly healthy” [5]). 
When Industry also accepts the doxa that contracts set up an inevitable 
demarcation (“[o]bviously there is a contractual relationship across a boundary” 
[7]), even if this is considered “unhelpful”, people within the field as a whole are 
not incentivised to challenge it (“we kid ourselves that having this ‘us and them’ 
combative approach drives in efficiency” [3] – akrasia again). 
Here one story demonstrates the symbolic power involved: 
I think Industry are still calling for partnership and the question that we 
were asking in the [case study] and other issues is, ‘partnership on 
whose terms?’ Is it partnership on our terms, which means a genuine 
partnership, which says, ‘we’ll give you a slightly more generous 
contract, but we want your innovation and imagination built into it’, or is it 
partnership in terms of, ‘we’ll give you a long-term contract, we’ll give you 
a contract, but screw you for every penny’. Sorry – ‘we’ll screw you for 
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every modification from the contract’, which they then make us pay for 
[emphasis added]. [5] 
This exemplifies symbolic violence, in which people adjust their behaviour (their 
habitus) to symbolic power rather than challenging it, leaving the structure of the 
field intact and encouraging the dominant to regard their power as natural, just 
as the dominated must accept their lack of it. In this case, a member of the 
dominant group shows the dominated that the symbolic power of the MOD is 
naturalised and that any other options are to be considered deviations. This 
alternative is then delegitimised from the outset because it is not “genuine”, 
such that MOD personnel are again faced with the false dilemma of the doxa: 
support the natural position of an adversarial relationship unless the MOD 
defines the terms of partnership, or advocate the MOD being ‘screwed’ by 
Industry. (“The Defence Industry, which is driven by the need to maximise profit 
and shareholder value, is very pro this [the collaboration case study], so what 
does that tell us?” – Civil Servant response to the case study; field diary, 11 
March 2015.) 
When the narratives default to the claim (the doxa) that differing capitals are 
involved in MOD and Industry, they set up the combat metaphor and ask 
whether “we, as the public sector, [are] ultimately always going to lose out, 
because a lot of human nature is driven by money?” [1] To support the 
delegitimisation of collaboration, this retreat to doxa is implied to be more 
realistic (“here comes the cynical head” [1]). It is also supported by an 
assumption that causation works in a particular direction only: “we won’t modify 
the process for [project] because we don’t trust them” [1], rather than the lack of 
trust driving the refusal to adapt the practice, which is embodied in habitus and 
as a presupposition in doxa because it separates (and thus shapes) MOD 
identity, securing a position of power within the acquisition field. Even when 
reporting a feeling of powerlessness (“he just hands [the money] over” [6]), 
continuing allegiance to the system as it stands is what secures field position.  
One of the interviewees recognised this akratic possibility (“potentially we’re 
ultimately driving an inefficient process to support our mistrust of defence 
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industries” [1]), but immediately undermined this insight by appealing again to 
the doxa that “mistrust happens”, instead of being created: 
… the literature says it should work, everything says it should work, but 
fundamentally when things start becoming tight, human nature, 
individuals start looking at us going, ‘am I doing as well out of this deal as 
they are?’ At which point, it then breaks down [emphasis added]. [2] 
This is important because the companies for which the process can be modified 
are those that accept that military capital is symbolic. One narrative told a story 
about a company employing lots of ex-military training specialists, which helps 
the MOD since “you are aware of the professional capabilities of that person for 
that team and, therefore, have developed a degree of confidence.” [1] This is 
using capital to structure the field: to repeat, as the contracting body, the MOD 
is in a position of power within the acquisition field, which it uses here to define 
military training experience as symbolic capital; this then forces (or – more 
accurately – encourages) Industry to accept this capital as symbolic and seek it 
out because the contract will be easier to run and more likely to succeed – it is a 
means of “driving credibility, which then breaks down that [barrier to achieving 
trust]”. [1] 
The result is that the symbolic capital of military experience structures the field 
and creates a further doxa that doing things in the (ex-)MOD way is correct: 
people who have or acquire this capital will succeed in delivering what the MOD 
(thinks it) wants, which then makes the relationship between the MOD and the 
contractor successful (“because [company] developed a centre of excellence, a 
centre of gravity of [ex-MOD] training knowledge, they realise the importance of 
getting it right” [1], where ‘right’ is whatever the symbolic capital specifies). To 
the contrary, when a company is mistrusted, “that’s going to drive us to do more 
work and we, therefore, allocate more resources”, sustaining “a need for a 
degree of cynicism” [1] about Industry unless things are done as MOD capital 
specifies. 
This symbolic power of being able to make decisions on trustworthiness, 
facilitating Industry performance with greater or lesser amounts of collaboration 
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depending on the extent of (ex-)MOD capital invested, makes the original doxa 
unfalsifiable: even when collaboration appears to succeed, “ultimately you could 
argue that the additional work they do is almost a bit of a loss leader to 
generate further work downstream” [1]; and if anyone claims that the 
collaboration is genuine and delivering results, they can be dismissed as 
chasing “a nice warm feeling because we’ve got collaboration and we’re 
delivering the output of the here and now.” [1] This also delegitimises attempts 
to challenge the doxa because the “nice warm feeling” comes from believing the 
contrary; therefore, it is associated with embarrassment at being taken in by 
simplistic but unrealistic ideas (“we mustn’t be naïve” [1]). This is symbolic 
violence, adjusting habitus to what is permissible or thinkable as options (the 
illusio), and the advocate is to be ashamed of her naivety. 
Worse than being credulous, though, is being Industry’s advocate. (Note that 
the author was repeatedly delegitimised in this way over the course of the 
research – for example, “I heard you’re working for BAE Systems now”; field 
diary, 1 December 2015.) Even the one interviewee who was willing to 
challenge the field structure was concerned at the risk of this perception (“I’m 
not painting Industry to be whiter-than-white”) and drew attention to explicit 
delegitimising activity: 
[T]here is this suspicion that those military people, or even Civil Servants, 
who advocate a closer relationship with Industry are ‘on the make’, that 
they’re about to jump ship and join Industry or they’re getting back-
handers. That’s where I’m quite incensed because I’m a big fan of 
working really closely with Industry, but you would never get… I will 
never work for Industry. [3] 
This kind of commentary from others (“the accusation, ‘you’re in bed with 
Industry’. I’ve heard that before” [3]) undermines by suggesting that proponents 
of a contrary doxa are behaving unethically. The allegation then serves to 
devalue cross-boundary capital such as business qualifications or experience 
with Industry, forcing the speaker to declaim any such influence as a condition 
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of contributing to the discussion (“to which I note that Industry have got nothing 
on me” [3]). 
The result is a climate of guilty-until-proven-innocent, which exists and is 
vigorously sustained precisely because it challenges the illusio – that part of 
habitus that defines what is thinkable. Taking up a position in the field under the 
illusio means both agreeing to the ‘rules of the game’ and believing that it is 
worth playing; consequently, people take their identity from the illusio and thus it 
cannot be questioned without a powerful sense of threat to self. Given the 
influence of the illusio at this level (“deep down there’s a suspiciousness” [3]), 
those dominant in the acquisition field can afford to allow experiments with 
collaboration (“they’ve paid lip service to it” [3]): they can assume that even the 
dominated will help to defeat change because everyone’s positions in the field 
depend on doing so and this is embodied in their habitus (“they are still 
ingrained in a culture which is, ‘don’t trust Industry; anything collaborative must 
be wrong because competition is the answer’” [3]). 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the narratives also recognise the inevitability 
that some people move from the MOD to Industry; after all, these are the ex-
MOD personnel who have the symbolic capital necessary to help Industry 
succeed in ways that do not challenge the MOD’s dominance of the field. 
However, the survey data showed that the movement of people from the MOD 
to Industry was considered to be higher than it should be, and the narratives are 
consistent with this insofar as they undermine transitions in two ways. 
Firstly, and most straightforwardly, when people attempt to obtain Industry or 
cross-boundary capital, via a temporary exchange or otherwise, the capital 
acquired is not valued and thus is not symbolic (“you do that secondment and 
then you get sent somewhere completely different” [2]). This is a matter for 
career management – and for return on investment – rather than narratives, 
though. Secondly, and more importantly, the stories that are told about 
transition point to “evidence of bad behaviour in the past: people who leave then 
sell stuff to us that, actually, only later do you realise that this is a bad deal” [4]. 
Here the issue is not transition itself; instead, “[t]he difficulty with a lot of those 
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who used to be in the military is actually they were in the military five, ten, 
fifteen years ago, and MOD has changed.” [4] The implication is that whatever 
capital is translated or taken across the boundary will decay over time (“we 
have a shelf-life” [4] and people have to be careful because “the moment their 
skillset begins to fade – they don’t build on it – they’re going to go” [10]). 
Consequently, the transitioned person “can occasionally be playing into a 
generational gap that hasn’t caught up to where this generation is trying to get 
to” [4]; in short, the symbolic power to determine what counts as capital remains 
with the MOD. The result is outwardly supporting the movement of people (“flow 
our new guard backwards and forwards so the new guard are talking to each 
other and are on the same page” [4]), yet delegitimising it through retaining the 
separation doxa (“yes, you can go and work for them” [4]; emphasis added) and 
continuing to suggest naivety (it is “the old-fashioned thing” [4]). Worse still, the 
movement of skilled people is described via the poaching metaphor and those 
who join Industry, having taken their knowledge with them, “are probably using 
it against us now” (because “the generic capability [remaining in the MOD] is 
perceived [by Industry] to be low” [7]). 
Therefore, the demarcation remains part of the doxa and the motives for 
transitioning are questioned: “are people doing this in the interests of their 
business, or are they doing it in the interests of their mates?” [4] At its most 
cynical, transition is something that occurs for personal gain rather than 
organisational benefit: 
I think that the senior leadership involved in the military side are 
predominantly approaching the latter end of their career; they’re thinking 
about what they’re going to do when they leave and they’re just looking 
to open doors for their post-retirement activities. … So I don’t think that 
the Armed Forces leadership are doing the best for Defence. I think that 
they’re doing the best for their Service and where they’re going to take 
their careers next. I do believe that the majority of them are actually 
doing it for themselves. [6] 
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This is the so-called revolving door problem, discussed widely in the literature 
and referred to in the aims and objectives chapter, where it was noted that the 
limited research conducted to date suggests that such movement is actually 
positive for both public and private sectors. This is evident in the narratives of 
transition, but the sociological insight is that, from a theory of practice 
perspective, it is through capital that these benefits are sought. 
Specifically, the stories that the interviewees told were all concerned with the 
proactive acquisition of new capital to make it easier to secure a position within 
a new field (“I engineered as best I could my last couple of jobs in the Navy to 
give me a broader industrial base” [9]). Although this is common across the 
stories told, the complication is that it is not actually a new field at all because 
acquisition spans the public/private sector interface. Therefore, the transitions 
relied on leveraging existing capital (“what they were looking to do was expand 
their operators’ experience” [9]) while trying to acquire the new. Here the illusio 
remains because – notwithstanding the doxa that the private sector is only 
interested in profit – ostensibly everyone in acquisition is working towards 
Defence outputs and believes in the value of this endeavour. However, for the 
individuals involved, the doxa has to be adjusted slightly to accommodate the 
possibility – or ideally the inevitability – of transition; otherwise, the field position 
occupied and the capital held by individuals is at risk, especially the loss of the 
symbolic power of rank: 
You've also got to learn your place and it's particularly difficult, I think, 
when you are almost back in the world you were in but wearing a suit. 
The fact that you were a Lieutenant Commander, a Commander, 
Captain, it doesn't matter what you were, it doesn't matter two hoots: 
your reputation is based on what you know and how you perform. [10] 
The survey data suggested Rank/Position/Role as the primary form of capital in 
the acquisition field, but the narratives add a complication: whether that capital 
is lost (“you’ve got to learn how to interact with people on a level where you 
have no power” [10]), retained (“[senior officers are] thinking about what they’re 
going to do when they leave and they’re just looking to open doors for their 
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post-retirement activities” [6]) or was never translatable in the first place (“the 
same language is being used but they’re actually very different skill sets, and 
that in itself is a mismatch and can cause tensions” [7]). The individuals 
transitioning deal with this friction and threat to identity by attempting to retain 
their habitus and the capital that is associated with influence: 
[Y]ou find yourself missing – there's not the wardroom, there's not the 
get-togethers, there's not the companionship to talk through. Easier if you 
got a job like mine when you're in an office with three contractors and 
[Royal Navy] people; you sort of, you don't miss it because you're in that, 
the same environment. […] you haven't fully left behind the mentality, 
that ethos, because you're likely to be customer facing. Probably different 
if you're in the back with no input, you're just making widgets or 
whatever, if you've got a customer-facing role you don't lose your 
contacts, your ethos, so it's easier to still feel included [emphasis added]. 
[10] 
These individuals are thus moving to Industry yet trying to retain what they have 
(“if you're working in the defence industry, certainly customer facing, and 
delivering something, even if it's like training, you feel like you're contributing to 
the [Royal Navy] still”; otherwise, “it’s going to be painful” [10]). 
This is then why transitions are portrayed as straightforward (“I actually left the 
Navy on a Friday and changed into a suit and tie and went to work for the 
company on the Monday” [9]) and as having been achieved through experience 
(“I am working in the defence sector, which is obviously an area I know having 
spent [number] years in the Navy” [9]). The challenge for individuals is to adjust 
their habitus as necessary (“leaving the military after so many years is largely a 
state of mind” [9]), emphasising continuity to reduce the threat to their identity 
and to the capital held (“having spent [number] years in the military, branching 
out into something completely new has huge risks associated with it” [9]). 
The distinction here is that, while research into transitions has focused on 
identity work (Newall, 2014), the role of capital needs to be included also. In 
particular, those transitioning are motivated to retain the illusio because it 
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contributes significantly to their identity, but also because the value of the 
capital they hold is guaranteed by that illusio. Individuals are then in a (field) 
position to appeal to the need for Industry to leverage this capital to tackle the 
adversarial relationship with the MOD (“Industry’s always coming up against 
individuals in uniform who are new in the job” [9]). The transitioning individual is 
thus benefitting from the illusio as it stands (“everything from the language that 
people talked, to understanding people’s problems within the military sphere, is 
made a whole lot easier” [9]) and hence retains the doxa (“[a]ny company is 
there to make money. End of story. It doesn’t matter what they tell you. The 
profit was it”) [10]. 
Nevertheless, and consistent with the survey data, movement from the MOD to 
Industry is still delegitimised (“we are suffering from a lack of a system to be 
able to bring on the experience of our people” [1]). The narratives drive habitus 
by suggesting that actions that contribute or add to this “suffering” – such as 
“los[ing] those people into Industry” [1] – should be avoided, creating a tension 
for the individuals transitioning. Sometimes in the narratives this is noted in 
explicitly ethical terms (“I was told I was being disloyal to the Service because I 
was leaving a gap”; “most of them think, ‘oh, he’s jumped ship, he’s a different 
person now’” [8]). Those who move for reasons of necessity or self-actualisation 
are then forced to describe the transition as occurring almost by accident, 
reducing their individual agency to preserve their habitus and sense of self: they 
create narratives that make the cross-border movement an inevitability, rather 
than a response to limits on their field position (“I realised that the people who I 
did it for, you know, the great and the good in the Navy, were only a bit older 
than me, but they weren't any wiser, and I didn't have a great deal of faith in the 
leadership” [8]). In short, they pass the responsibility to fate (“the sort of synergy 
of the planets aligning” [8]) rather than understand the symbolic violence being 
done to them. 
The power of the illusio thus creates a strong identity, which people want to hold 
on to (“my motivations all come from, you know, these are my people, these 
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other people that I belong with” [8]), but it also associates a sense of 
embarrassment or even dishonour with leaving the MOD: 
… when you go from Services here [in the UK] and go and work in the 
defence industry, you know, it almost carries a shame with it that, you 
know, in the sense that there's a revolving door and you’ve just gone 
through the revolving door and, you know, you're just lobbying now and 
‘you would say that, wouldn't you?’ [8] 
This narrative implication of abandonment is something that the individuals 
cannot avoid because the value of the capital they wish to take with them is 
contingent on preserving the illusio. Therefore, it is addressed by seeking 
affirmation from former colleagues (“I do what I do so that guys look up to me in 
some way, shape, or form – that enjoying my peer review of their activity, or 
that, you know, looking down on me from the point of view of a resource to help 
them” [8]). Even so, it is still undermined by the turnover of personnel (“six 
people have been in the job I did in [location] in the last five years, if not more” 
[8]), which means that the capital earned from undertaking a role is precarious 
and potentially devalued because so many people have it by virtue of their MOD 
experiences. Moreover, the adversarial doxa persists when people “take an 
antagonistic view that we are only here to steal taxpayers’ money and line our 
pockets then that sets an agenda of, you know, people are only in it for 
themselves”. [8] 
The result is that capital is still made symbolic by the original organisation (“I 
haven’t yet snipped the cord” [8]) and the transitioning individual needs to 
emphasise continuity of identity (via the illusio) to retain capital: 
… my safety and my kids’ safety is underwritten by the fact that we do 
have, you know, they get their identity from the institutions we have 
defining the country and part of that is the Royal Navy so, you know, in 
that sense I want the best for the Royal Navy… [8] 
Ultimately, this is why transitioning from the MOD to Industry is referred to as 
‘going outside’: it achieves the ‘othering’ of Industry to support MOD identity 
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work, sustaining both the doxa and the illusio, but also places control of the 
separation with the MOD because it has the symbolic power to set exchange 
rates of capital. The original position (working within the MOD) then becomes 
the default (doxa) and then privileges MOD capital, even when ‘outside’, such 
that people in both MOD and Industry adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is 
the very definition of symbolic violence: “you might be able to talk the customer 
into doing things a particular way and lead them, and there’s a sort of art in that: 
you almost have to end up it being their idea.” [10] 
One story offered a challenge to this dominant narrative by insisting that 
competing capital is necessary and, in fact, should be legitimised as symbolic: 
the adversarial doxa exists “because [people] are not trained in acquisition.” [3] 
By implication, this training would create cross-boundary understanding and 
help to develop contrary capital and habitus; but this will come at the expense of 
the value of (some) existing capital, as indeed it must if the latter was falsely 
legitimised. However, the primary difficulty with this approach is that those in 
current positions of symbolic power have little incentive to validate this 
hypothetical new capital because they themselves lack it (“it’s those in the 
decision-making positions who haven’t been trained in acquisition or don’t 
understand the issue” [3]), so “their natural disposition will be to say no”. [3] 
Moreover, their habitus has been shaped by long careers acquiring a particular 
form of capital and being rewarded for doing so (“we promote in our own image 
– they’re like us, that’s the kind of thing we like, that ethos, that corps, that 
mentality… it does generate a degree of homogeneity” [4]). There is thus no 
incentive for those with symbolic power to change. 
This leads to a key claim in the narrative that contested the dominant practice 
(and it is supported in others): 
I’m not saying they [reject alternatives] with any malicious intent; they do 
it because they think that they know what’s required, and because they 
themselves aren’t up to the task. They themselves want the best for 
Defence, but they’re just not in a position to deliver that. [3] 
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On this view, no one is behaving unethically in the normative sense because 
people always act as they believe they should. The assertion is that this is what 
happens in the acquisition field, both for the MOD (“[w]e all like to think of what 
it is that we do is kinda right” [4]) and for Industry (“you've got very clever people 
for whom return to shareholder will always win. And they don’t do that at MOD’s 
expense to get one over us; they will just get their return to shareholder 
because that’s their requirement” [3]). 
This is thus a restatement of akrasia in the acquisition context: people are 
acting against the better judgment of the literature review and the arguments in 
favour of collaboration, yet believe – with Socrates – that this is impossible 
because they are doing what they think is right. The original Aristotelian 
response to akrasia was that acting against one’s better judgment is caused 
either by weakness of will (making a choice through reason, but following a 
passion instead) or by being impetuous (not reasoning things through at all and 
acting immediately on the basis of the passion). The narrative analysis offers a 
sociological alternative: akrasia is due to a desire to retain capital and field 
position (to do what senior people want and will reward), as well as driven by a 
habitus that embodies a disposition to sustain the illusio, regardless of what 
reason dictates. This implies that the options available to people (such as 
collaboration) are actually cognitively and behaviourally limited by their positions 
in the field, the capital they possess and their need to preserve both. (This claim 
is returned to in Chapter 6.) This reinforces their habitus and the illusio, which 
everyone is dependent upon for their activities to be meaningful (some people 
“can’t [do things differently] because they got scarred or damaged by 
something” [4]). Indeed, it establishes a virtue ethics narrative tradition as part 
of the MOD ethos. 
Consequently, asking about ethics in acquisition would be a fruitless task that 
no one could make any sense of: 
[P]eople who will end up [in influential positions] will want to be like the 
bosses – so the bosses will select people who think in their own mental 
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image. And it happens in other areas of Defence that we create people in 
our own image; that’s who we are [emphasis added]. [3] 
To get to the field positions they are in, then, people will thus have been acting 
as they were required to (“because we bottom-feed – we grow people bottom-
up in Defence – there’s a certain bit of you’ve got to go through certain hoops” 
[4]) and always in the best interests of Defence as they understood them 
(“[e]veryone is guilty of perpetuating what they believe to be right” [3]). 
Therefore, from the perspective of the social actors, the possibility of being 
unethical in the normative sense could never arise; or, more accurately, there is 
no set of norms or an ethical code that would result in people behaving other 
than as they already do. Furthermore, it would follow that the illusio must be 
ethical also. It thus should be little surprise that people use ethical narratives to 
undermine alternatives because, by contradicting the illusio, these are 
straightforwardly unethical and to be opposed. 
5.3.2.4 Acquisition as practice: ethics through habitus 
If this argument holds then the akrasia should be embodied in habitus, which is 
what provides people with ‘a feel for the game’ and represents the dispositions 
that unconsciously tell them what is or is not possible, including emotions like 
shame. Such a form of habitus motivates people to want to fit in, rather than 
challenge symbolic power, and it should be expected to also involve the 
defence of the illusio in normative terms. 
In support of this claim, the narrative metaphors identified are again used to 
imply that the doxa, itself part of habitus, captures the appropriate dispositions: 
[A]s a general perception of how we as the MOD view the private sector 
is that we don’t trust them, we think that they will look to, let’s use ‘rip us 
off’, at every opportunity… [1] 
This is a direct appeal to normative ethics because ‘ripping off’ implies deceit, 
but in the narratives this is a preconception (“[t]hose prejudices rise and make it 
difficult” [1]). For example, in one story, a collaborative venture between the 
MOD and Industry began well, but “little changes [to the contract] became quite 
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big changes over time”, resulting in a “mindset change” (specifically, a 
declaration that “we’re being fleeced here” [2]). The interesting claim in this 
story, which is supported by the survey data, is that the real influence was at 
upper/middle management level: 
[T]he [locations] were getting what they wanted, the people in the 
[company] were providing what was asked for, everyone was happy. If 
you look at the two tops, so the head of [company] and the head of 
[organisation] as it was at the time, they were happy and talking nicely. 
It’s [at] the immediate level between those two that it all started to go 
wrong. [2] 
It was then at this level that “ingrained concerns” were raised and became: 
… a self-fulfilling prophecy of, ‘I’ve got a concern, you’re not telling me 
the right answer, or the answer I’m expecting; therefore, you do have 
something to hide, so I was right’ [emphasis added]. [2] 
Here the doxa is inscribed in the habitus of MOD people as an expectation. 
When combined with the symbolic power that the MOD has as the contract 
holder, things “quickly fall off the cliff” into a “purely adversarial” relationship; 
after all, “[y]ou can’t have a win-win situation where you’ve got your middle 
management all sitting there going, ‘you bastards, you’re fleecing us’” [2]. In this 
instance, the field structures the dispositions of the MOD staff, but their 
unconscious assessment of what is possible and permissible (habitus) also 
constrains their ability to identify alternatives. Indeed, following the earlier 
narrative criticism of MOD people lacking experience of Industry, the implication 
in Bourdieusian terms is thus that its people (literally) “don’t see” the other side 
of the fence that “rocks and abuse” are thrown over. From the literature review, 
they can be said to be suffering from bounded ethicality, except that here they 
are actually limited by the illusio: 
What is it that’s actually stopping us doing this? Is it legislative, which is a 
big deal? It takes a lot of time to get anything through the legislative 
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process. Is it financial, where there’s something we just can’t do? Is it 
Treasury rules? People hide behind these [emphasis added]. [4] 
This is the veil of illusio in operation: confronted by difficulties, the interview 
subjects demonstrated that they are afraid of losing their field positions and, 
rather than challenge the blockers they identified, they believe that it is better to 
assume that they are insurmountable because of the investment in the game 
that has already been made. Here the people involved have individual agency – 
albeit constrained by field and capital – but their choices support the illusio 
because they are afraid that the entire field will be undermined by change, 
threatening their capital accumulation and relative positions. They then defend 
themselves by creating and embodying a doxa that only gradual change can be 
accommodated (“we’ll aim for something perfect and that, probably, is a wasted 
effort” [4]). 
On this view, those whose habitus ultimately caused the “self-fulfilling prophecy” 
– a degeneration between the two sides – can appeal to the inevitability of 
conflict to excuse what was actually a reaction to their dominant MOD capital 
being threatened by an early success of collaboration (“the first time we come 
up against difficulty or we perceive that somebody’s doing better than us, we’ll 
go back to an adversarial, win-lose mentality” [2]). After all, in a collaborative 
venture, there is less need for two (or more) sets of finance and commercial 
officers, which is precisely where the challenges in this story originated. 
The interviewees also appealed in their narratives to the importance of 
contracting in driving habitus (“[i]t’s almost like unconscious bias over the way 
you treat people” [4]). On the face of it, they are inclined to accept collaborative 
approaches as delivering greater benefits because “the person doing [some 
element of the acquisition cycle] will never take as much ownership as if they’ve 
got the whole cylinder of that process” [1], or else because “if you’re delatching 
a support contract, particularly in the training area, you may be disincentivising 
the collaboration and again driving this attitude that it’s a business step that I 
need to get completed so I can move onto the next” [1]. However, this actually 
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privileges the MOD’s position: it is only when things are done in accordance 
with MOD process that life is easy and true collaboration is seen. 
Indeed, the MOD is advantaged by its symbolic power. In one example, it was 
because “the approach [a company had] taken has very much been at odds 
with what we think they should have taken […] that relationship and 
collaboration never got the opportunity to grow” [1]; that is, the collaboration 
was to be on MOD terms (“partnership on our terms, which means a genuine 
partnership” [5]). The problem for Industry is that, since MOD people are not 
incentivised to achieve acquisition capital, the process invariably involves 
failure: 
[T]here’s an expectation that Industry will deliver something because 
we’ve asked them to, when actually we haven’t asked them for alpha, 
we’ve asked them for beta, and when they deliver beta against our 
requirement that we specified as alpha, then Industry is ‘seeing us off’ 
again. [1] 
However, even where the narrators recognise – as in this excerpt and in the 
common story identified from the survey comments – that the blame is actually 
with poor (MOD) requirements setting, the doxa of an inevitable 
customer/supplier relationship, in which there “has to be a degree of 
formalisation” [1], means that individuals are not accountable. This need for 
holding to account, born of the duty to spend public money well, shifts ethics to 
process and becomes a form of symbolic violence as people adjust their 
expectations. Indeed, this creates suspicion in Industry through “the incredibly 
tight way these contracts are formed; you know, it gives Industry no leeway [to 
innovate]” [5]. As a result, Industry does not innovate, which then allows MOD 
staff who have transitioned to Industry to reconfirm the doxa (“[y]ou don't deliver 
more than the customer has ordered, because if they want more then there is 
more money to be made” [10]). 
In short, it is a form of principal-agent problem in which the desire to employ 
process to safeguard public money creates an assumption of dishonesty in the 
agent/supplier, which is then embodied in habitus: 
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[I]f they can prove to us that their costs would be much, much more, but 
they’ve kept it down so that they can win the contract and they believe 
they can do it, then it’s us who looks distrusting. But there’s this distrust 
that’s built in from simple things like that [emphasis added]. [5] 
The adversarial relationship then becomes mutually reinforcing because the 
doxa is that distrust is inevitable (“built in” [5]), which justifies the existing 
commercial process (“the answer’s competition” [3]) that protects against that 
distrust (“there is no way around it” [3]). Given the MOD’s symbolic power, 
though, the narratives are still able to cast Industry as culpable: “I’ve not seen 
the honesty come back the other way of going, ‘oh yeah, you know you’ve not 
got this right, but we’ll do that; oh, you didn’t contract for that, you didn’t set 
that?’” [4] The implication is that Industry is lying in wait for MOD errors (“thanks 
for that; we’re now going to screw you for more money” [5]) because Industry 
has different (profit) motives – the separation doxa again, but now as a 
disposition (habitus). 
Another example of inscribed habitus in the narratives is when they refer to the 
MOD as risk-averse, which is then described as driving an “underlying cynicism 
within our leadership that we must remember that at the end of the day we’re 
dealing with a commercial organisation”. [1] On this view, MOD leaders are 
“caught in a risk analysis” [5] and do not want to have to ask for more 
(economic) capital (“[Defence] wants the capability, but doesn’t want to pay for 
it” [5]) because an admission of failure to deliver with what they have could 
harm their own capital with respect to the larger bureaucratic field, in which the 
Government holds symbolic power. Instead, they exert symbolic violence by 
preferring to define the alternatives as unachievable and guided by ulterior 
motives (both then part of the doxa). The capital at the highest (political) level is 
thus shaping habitus (“the politics is one of ‘we must provide the very best, and 
if you can’t afford it then how do you reduce costs?’” [5]), driving inflated 
requirements and blaming Industry if these prove unaffordable or obsolete 
(“giving us what we want when they know they’ve got something better on the 
shelf at the same price” [5]). 
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This provides a summary of the delegitimising process: Industry is motivated by 
profit, differently to the MOD; and the MOD has a duty to spend public money 
well; therefore, it is safer (as well as more realistic) to assume that Industry will 
behave badly and hence to default to leadership behaviours as they are (“we 
tend to lead with a position of mistrust” [3]). Positions within the acquisition field 
can be secured against the influence of the political field by blaming Industry for 
failures, a heuristic that no one will challenge because of the doxa and a need 
to save face (“the ultimate message that gets in front of the Minister is, how can 
they be held up in a slightly higher regard with their constituents” [6]). 
Furthermore, this writes behavioural dispositions into the organisation when 
individuals act as their leaders – those with symbolic power over them – prefer 
(“that came about from the management pressure, which was, ‘don’t tell me 
there are problems; just tell me that it’s all fine’” [7]). 
In the example of an attempt at collaboration that went wrong, then, the story 
reported that the situation required the leadership to say, “’yeah, they’re a 
commercial company, of course they’ve got to make money; you know that 
what they’ve done is exactly what we’ve asked them to do. What’s your beef 
with them doing exactly what we’ve asked them to do?’” [2] However, it was 
easier to blame Industry and, without a positive intervention (“the seniors didn’t 
want to hear it or weren’t willing to stamp on it” [2]), relationships were 
poisoned:  
[I]n terms of some of that baggage and some of that experience and 
history, you can’t help but be – ‘scarred’ is possibly the wrong word – you 
can’t help but be informed by it. [4] 
This scarring is habitus being (literally) inscribed in/on the body, especially 
when people have been let down by their leaders (“I didn't have a great deal of 
faith in the leadership” [8]). Over time, with their deferral to symbolic power, the 
adjustment of their habitus becomes misrecognised as natural (“it’s just human 
nature and it sticks” [1]), which then excuses individuals and absolves them of 
agency – again, challenging the need for an ethics of acquisition. This 
motivation could then be behind the ostensible admissions of lacking capital 
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(“all we’ve ever done in our lives is been in the Royal Navy” [1]) because it 
legitimates the habitus as it is and avoids blame. 
5.3.3 Acquisition ethics as practice 
To now further link the influences of habitus and capital, the analysis so far 
suggests that habitus is driven by a fear of acting in a way that risks capital 
accumulation and, with it, position in the field. Consider this example: 
Comfort. And there’s a lot of fear about that. It’s interesting – it’s a 
Governmental one, it’s an inside-Defence one: once it becomes comfy, 
we’re suddenly not challenging. [4] 
Here the dominant narrative is able to change the very definition of a word 
(‘comfort’), such that to behave in existing ways – to advocate or incentivise an 
adversarial relationship – is perceived as challenging, whereas to offer an 
alternative is comfortable and easy. Consequently, people who want to improve 
or maintain their field positions need to be confrontational, not collaborative, and 
adjust their dispositions accordingly. All of this is enabled by the inherent short-
termism of the defence sector, which structures habitus through reward 
systems: 
So, I go in. ‘Right, here’s your project: you’re to deliver this bit of kit, this 
grey box, to this price, within this time frame.’ Okay, I can do that. I’ll 
make a few – I’ll take a short-termism view. If I painted it slightly 
differently, if I put this cheaper paint on, I can get it in. It’ll increase the 
costs overall, but you know what? I hit my target of getting it in on time 
and on budget. The fact that I’ve increased cost throughout the life of this 
box, I’m not going to be judged on that. I move on, nobody comes back – 
my report’s written – nobody comes back to me and goes, ‘[name], why 
did you make that decision?’ My report’s been written that says ‘delivered 
the project to time and cost, he can drive this, he knows how to achieve 
success’. I get promoted and I’m on an upward trajectory. [2] 
In a field structured in this way, people acquire capital by being “perceived to do 
the right thing” [2], even if the right thing is wrong in the longer-term; this is the 
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akratic behaviour that is written into their dispositions, in which moral hazard is 
encouraged. 
Another example: one story refers in detail to the MOD (especially the military) 
using the concept of the organisation and its people having a ‘can-do’ attitude. 
This is used to structure habitus by prioritising MOD capital: “we expect the 
same of others we deal with, when in reality it’s 9 ‘til 5, it’s what’s written in the 
contract, and we shouldn’t expect to get anything for free” [1] – as though 
somehow MOD personnel work for nothing. It also reinforces the separation 
doxa by presupposing that only the MOD is ‘can-do’, so only its people will go 
beyond expectations. 
This is another unfalsifiable perspective, since if Industry did so consistently 
then going beyond would become the expectation. Indeed, when a company 
does behave in a can-do way, this is reinterpreted to be because the 
individual(s) ultimately responsible “thinks he’s still within the navy, and 
therefore he will do things that he is not contracted to do because he sees the 
overarching benefit” [1], whereas with others, “what you ask for is what you’ll 
get” [1]. The former individual is “the one we prefer to work with because he 
very much reflects our own mentality of can-do” [1]. However, if the MOD can – 
contractually – only ever receive exactly what it asks for, then the “mentality of 
can-do” is mythical, except that the theory of practice explains it as overlain on 
events in a way that reinforces habitus and capital. 
The result is that it is in no one’s interest to challenge the system and, therefore, 
MOD personnel embody habitus accordingly. They are incentivised to act in 
ways that retain an adversarial relationship by cutting corners (“if I put this 
cheaper paint on” [2]) and blaming Industry for the results (“there are an awful 
lot of people in the Civil Service that, because of the way the structures work, 
they feel perhaps less direct association between what they do and the impact it 
has on them individually” [7]). This is why individuals reaffirm the illusio, even 
though – under its veil – they may be in positions of lesser symbolic power. For 
example, when asked about senior leadership behaviours, one interviewee 
said, “I’m going to try to duck this question” [1]. That is the illusio in action: a 
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middle-ranking officer lacking symbolic power tries instead to “twist [the 
question] around to governance” [1] rather than challenge the symbolic capital 
of rank and lose the benefit it affords. 
After all, when “all you’re judged on is what’s in your report” [2], people will 
adjust their behaviour to whatever those in power require (“they will 
automatically go down the combative route because they’ve been told that’s 
what they need to do” [3]). This further legitimates ranks as symbolic capital and 
encourages people to misrecognise the structure of the acquisition field as 
natural, rather than as an exercise of symbolic power (“you’ve got people there 
and it doesn’t make any difference to them whether something takes a week or 
a year because it has no personal impact” [7]). People are then rewarded for 
following process (“the answer’s competition; what’s the question?” [3]) and 
responding to their leadership’s aims (“congratulations, you’ve done really well, 
you’re promoted” [2]), creating a habitus that is underpinned by the symbolic 
capital of rank and of experience in a competitive context (“you get Civil 
Servants who think they understand how to manage projects because they’re 
[called] Project Managers” [7]). 
To challenge this would require both new capital and a new illusio, but no one is 
incentivised to do so even if they can acquire the former. It is simply easier to 
defer to symbolic power (“they’ll then blame the Government” [3]). Moreover, 
since individuals in Industry are aware of these reward mechanisms, either from 
experience (and being “scarred”) or through having transitioned from the MOD 
themselves, they “don’t believe the MOD can be serious” [3] when new talk of 
collaboration begins and also contribute to the doxa of inevitable failure 
(“already you’ve got people throwing stones at [the case study], both senior 
industry and at middle manager level in MOD” [3]). 
Finally, disputing this overarching narrative is also dangerous because of the 
“fear of failure, or a rapidity of British society to blame for a mistake” [4], which 
again makes it safer to remain within the field as it stands and try to improve 
position instead (i.e. to retain the veil of illusio). This is especially so when 
resources are limited (“we don’t have time or money, political will, risk appetite, 
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to get stuff wrong” [4]), but the point of the narratives is that here it is capital in 
general that is at risk, not just money. Therefore, “we’ll tell Ministers what is 
presentationally more appealing, rather than what’s the correct business model 
to follow” [6], because positioning within the field is contingent on agreeing with 
and supporting symbolic power, not opposing it. In these circumstances, 
unethical decisions are taken (“what is it you actually want to say and I will 
produce the line that proves that’s what you want to say?” [6]) because the field 
structure determines priorities (“Defence came at the bottom of the pile” [6]). 
These actions are enabled by habitus and people’s need to retain or acquire 
capital, all in accordance with the illusio. 
Consequently, “there is too much conformity” [6] and codes of ethics have no 
impact: 
So it’s how passionate you are about upholding the values … but it’s at 
what point [people] are almost prepared to accept the inevitability that, ‘if 
a Minister says that we’re going to do it then we’re going to do it and I’ll 
make it work somehow’. I think that’s how the – it might not be the right 
word, but – the dichotomy is being held by a series of values that you’re 
expected to uphold, but you’re also expected to serve, so you’re almost 
encouraged to park your values [emphasis added]. [6] 
Habitus is amended accordingly, with people who “serve” rewarded via capital 
accumulation and field position: 
[I]t tends to be the ones that break into senior leadership roles who are 
much more comfortable being able to park that passion for public 
service, to serve the Government of the day, and latch onto that. [6] 
As a result, any available ethical code is simply overwhelmed by symbolic 
power (“it just says, ‘we’ll all be nice to each other’ […], which doesn’t do 
anything” [7]). 
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5.3.4 Summary 
In conclusion, the implication of the results is that everyone involved in Defence 
acquisition has individual agency and can act ethically or otherwise, but if 
people want to succeed then they have to “park [their] values” and adjust to 
symbolic power. By the time they reach positions of influence themselves, the 
structure of the field and its habitus will have been naturalised, so they are 
unlikely to recognise any ethical challenge to how things are. Consideration of 
ethics via habitus thus suggests the same conclusion as with the focus on 
capital: there is no set of norms or an ethical code that would result in people 
behaving other than as they already do. Therefore, it seems that there can be 
no ethics of acquisition; instead, acquisition is a practice in the Bourdieusian 
sense that what people do is a result of the interaction of field, capital and 
habitus, to which can be added the claim that their behaviour is typically akratic. 
The implications of this interpretation are explored in more detail through the 
discussion in Chapter 6, but it means that the narrative analysis is an 
explanation, in the domain of the real, of the is/ought gap that was identified in 
the domain of the empirical, and of people’s lived experiences as narrated in the 
domain of the actual. However, to develop this case further through analogy in 
other areas, it was necessary to create an exemplar via an ideal type. 
5.4 Development of an ideal type 
As detailed in the methodology, a Weberian ideal type was constructed from the 
narratives and their mechanisms. This was achieved via abductive/retroductive 
inferences from the survey data, together with the associated survey comments 
and the narrative analysis. The result was then used to set out the original 
contributions to knowledge that are proposed from this research. 
5.4.1 The ideal type: acquisition as practice 
The ideal type developed here lists essential or typical characteristics of 
public/private section interaction, generalised from the specific Defence 
acquisition context, together with brief comments to expand on these. 
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5.4.1.1 Ideal type 
As an ideal type, public/private sector interaction as a practice will be 
characterised by those in the public sector: 
 Using contractual conditions to support an unspoken deontological 
ethics, yet doing so to ostensibly guard against the principal-agent 
problem or inevitable bad behaviour is tantamount to constructing a doxa 
of separation and adversarial tension. Since the public/private sector 
interface is a practice, the adoption of this doxa actually contributes to 
creating the behaviour that it was meant to address. 
 Employing narratives of duty to exacerbate this tension, which then 
ends up justifying public sector control as the dominant social 
actor. Once they possess symbolic capital and a position of influence in 
a field, social actors have the symbolic power to construct the social 
world. By employing the doxa to assert that failures are inevitable and 
that public/private motives are in conflict, the public sector’s symbolic 
power is misrecognised as natural and becomes the equilibrium to which 
the system should return if confronted with any challenge. 
 Using ethical supremacy to scapegoat the private sector for public 
sector shortcomings, especially in the skills of its people and the ability 
to deliver outcomes. This places blame on the acquisition process rather 
than on individuals and their behaviour, or the power structures that 
incentivise them. It also feeds into a wider societal narrative of the public 
sector as providing non-negotiable services to the nation via altruism, 
while being taken advantage of by a private sector focused only on profit 
making. 
 Encouraging public sector ‘othering’ of Industry as part of an illusio 
that guarantees field position and capital accumulation, thereby 
maintaining symbolic power over the private sector. This also achieves 
control over public sector personnel, who are willing to misinterpret the 
separation as vital identity work because they benefit from maintaining 
the value of their capital. 
 Paying lip service to a code of ethics and ostensibly permit 
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challenges while assuming they will fail. This is because the dominant 
social actors can assume that even the dominated will help to defeat 
change since a person’s position in the field and her capital 
accumulation, as well as her identity as embodied in habitus, all depend 
on preserving the illusio. Given the incentives to discount potential future 
benefits, people within the practice will behave in an akratic way, creating 
and employing adversarial narratives – with ethical content – to 
delegitimise alternatives. 
5.4.1.2 Behaviours 
Given this ideal type, it will encourage particular types of behaviour. As 
characteristics of a general person (or persons) working in the public/private 
intersection, especially in the public sector but also in the private, people will: 
 Appeal to the inevitability of conflict between public and private 
sectors. This doxa excuses what is actually a reaction to their dominant 
capital being threatened by any possibility of collaboration, even if it is 
against their best interests. 
 Privilege public sector way of doing things. Since the public sector 
has the symbolic power to legitimate capital and set exchange rates, this 
structures the field and incentivises people in both public and private 
sectors to do things in ways consist with public sector capital. People will 
define their identity via a public sector illusio because this guarantees the 
value of their capital. 
 Emphasise blockers to avoid threats to capital and illusio. Rather 
than challenge these blockers, it is better to assume that they are 
insurmountable because of the investment in the game that has already 
been made. Therefore, public sector leadership will prefer inaction above 
innovating-but-failing. They can safeguard their capital with respect to the 
larger bureaucratic field by blaming the private sector for failures. 
 Discount the future benefits of collaboration between public and 
private sectors to favour capital accumulation or preservation now. 
Over time, with their continuing deferral to symbolic power, the 
 173 
adjustment of people’s habitus will become misrecognised as natural, 
which then excuses individuals and absolves them of agency, disputing 
the need for a code of ethics. 
 Use ethical narratives to undermine alternatives. Since change 
threatens an individual’s field position and capital value, she will interpret 
this as contradicting the illusio and oppose it, claiming that her identity is 
at risk and that she has a (deontological) duty to achieve value for money 
for the taxpayer. She will use sexualised and/or exploitation metaphors to 
delegitimise the proposed change to achieve this. 
5.4.2 Challenging the ideal type 
The narrative analysis suggested that options for falsifying the doxa, as 
captured in the ideal type presented here, are limited because suggesting that 
the private sector is engaged in loss-leading activity can undermine any 
successful public/private sector collaboration. Even if a code of ethics for 
acquisition in particular can be provided or referred to, such as the previous 
Defence Values for Acquisition in the Defence Industrial Strategy (MOD, 2005), 
an implication of the narrative analysis is that codes do not achieve anything 
when confronted by symbolic power. 
The most fruitful response to the ideal type is to repeat and adopt that offered 
by Bourdieu (in reply to the objection that habitus denies individual agency): if 
people can become aware of acquisition as a practice, understanding how the 
interaction of capital, field and habitus incentivises them in akratic ways, then 
they may come to appreciate that their dispositions are ethically arbitrary and 
that social structures could be organised otherwise. This would provide for the 
possibility of a significant dislocation between people’s aspirations and their 
likely prospects, given the influence of symbolic power as it stands. However, 
this must be realistically set against the disincentives of hyperbolic discounting 
and bounded ethicality at the cognitive level. Given the importance of capital, it 
may be possible for new incentives to develop if some senior leaders begin to 
advocate and model change; this could then make a difference to the prospects 
of the case study or of greater integration of customer and supplier in Defence 
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acquisition. Nevertheless, this would still not impact the inappropriateness of 
codes of ethics. 
It can be argued that, as a deliberate fiction that does not exist in the critical 
realist’s domain of the real, the ideal type can only be assessed in terms of 
empirical adequacy. Therefore, the ideal type and the narrative analysis on 
which it is based represent the biases of the researcher, including personal 
value judgments (for example, that the acquisition doxa ought to be opposed). 
Weber (1949b) addressed this criticism when the concept was originally 
developed, insisting that an ideal type should openly declare for a value 
position, without which the type’s meaning would be ambiguous and the 
position of the researcher would be obscured. This candour mirrors Bourdieu’s 
(1995) insistence on epistemic reflexivity and his demand that the aim of 
sociological investigation is to change things, not merely report them (Swartz, 
2013). It also accords with the critical realist’s desire to reveal false beliefs with 
the intention of replacing them (Bhaskar, 1998). In short, the research can only 
present the ideal type in these terms and invite others to improve upon it. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This penultimate chapter combines the literature review with the results of the 
data analysis to develop an ideal type and discuss the implications of the 
research. 
6.1 Findings of the research 
To reiterate, the aim of this research was to examine the extent to which ethics 
in Defence acquisition functions as part of narratives to legitimise or 
delegitimise options, rather than as a normative framework to guide or assess 
behaviour. Utilising the applied ethics context of the acquisition of UK military 
capabilities, in which an adversarial relationship between customer and supplier 
has been the default, an empirical investigation sought to explore how this 
relationship operates from a sociological perspective and the role of ethics. 
The overall research question addressed in this research was: How does ethics 
function in narratives of Defence acquisition? 
This was examined via two sub-questions: 
 How do people involved in Defence acquisition talk about the relationship 
between the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
 What does this reveal about the role of ethics in narratives of Defence 
acquisition?  
The proposition was that people in Defence acquisition employ ethics not in the 
traditional, normative sense, but as part of their narratives to legitimise or 
delegitimise potential or actual courses of action. This was studied using a 
methodology comprising Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the theoretical 
framework and the development of an ideal case, focused on a specific 
acquisition case study (a change programme to consider whether critical skills 
in UK Defence should be managed as a wider, collaborative enterprise). 
To restate the research findings to this point: 
 The literature review showed that normative ethics – the standard 
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approach to business ethics – is challenged by empirical work and likely 
to be inappropriate for an ethics of acquisition, notably because it does 
not account sufficiently for the influence of social structures and the limits 
of people’s cognitive abilities. 
 A quantitative exploration of the acquisition context via a case study 
established that there is a perceived gap between how things are and 
how they should be (reproducing the standard is/ought demarcation of 
ethics), a result that was in need of an explanation because it implies that 
something is preventing the acquisition system from operating as its 
people would otherwise wish. 
 Qualitative analysis of acquisition narratives demonstrated that this 
is/ought shift is due to the influence of field, capital and habitus on how 
people behave; in short, that acquisition is a practice in Bourdieusian 
terms. It further suggested that the behaviour captured in the data is 
akratic, implying that codes of ethics can have little or no influence. 
 An ideal type characterised the intersection of public and private sectors 
as an exemplar to be developed in other cases. 
Before applying these results to answer the questions posed in the introduction 
and discussing the implications and limitations, the final stage of the research 
was to construct an ideal type to help set out the meaning of the findings. 
6.2 Reviewing the research 
Having constructed an ideal type, the final section of this chapter reviews the 
research against the original aims and intent. 
6.2.1 Meaning of the data 
Both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (narrative interview) data were 
collected as part of the research. The former was used to examine the gap, if 
any, between acquisition as it is and as it ought to be, following the standard 
demarcation in the ethics literature. Using a survey in this way was a deliberate 
methodological decision and design, which was intended to minimise social 
desirability bias. The findings imply that this was successful and suggest that 
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the acquisition system could – or should, for the respondents – be more 
collaborative than it is. 
Given the separation of is and ought in this data (a consistent 33% to 71% ‘shift’ 
between the two in favour of greater collaboration, as discussed in Chapter 5), 
the ideal type was developed via narrative analysis to explain this phenomenon. 
This comprised the second stage in adapting Bourdieu’s theory of practice to 
researching applied ethics, and provides a means of answering the questions 
posed in the introduction and the formal research questions set in Chapter 3. 
The opening question – ‘What counts as unethical in Defence acquisition?’ – 
can be answered definitively, but with a significant caveat: unethical behaviour 
is whatever the dominant narratives say it is; but this does not mean unethical in 
the standard, normative sense. This proviso is made for two reasons: because 
the literature review demonstrates that normative approaches to ethics fail, and 
because the research reveals that acquisition is a practice in the Bourdieusian 
sense. 
Consequently, the further question of whether acquisition should follow existing 
theories of business ethics or, given its unique context, requires a new theory of 
acquisition ethics, is no longer valid. That is, the existing theories are 
inadequate because they fail to account for empirical research, particularly in 
neuroscience and behavioural science, which shows that people are cognitively 
limited when it comes to ethics and in fact do not (and cannot) apply normative 
theories. Furthermore, the literature shows that these theories need to account 
for the influence of social context, especially social power. Finally, the narrative 
analysis established that ethics has no function in acquisition as a practice, 
except in narratives of delegitimisation. 
This, of course, was the aim of this research, and permits the conclusion – and 
a response to the overall research question – that ethics in Defence acquisition 
functions solely as part of narratives to legitimise or (primarily) delegitimise 
options, rather than as a normative framework to guide or assess behaviour. 
The narrative analysis sets out in detail how people in acquisition talk about the 
relationship between the MOD and the UK Defence Industry, as well as what 
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this reveals about the role of ethics in narratives of Defence acquisition. This is 
summarised in the ideal type and its associated behaviours, generalised – as 
explained in the methodology – to the intersection of the public and private 
sectors. 
6.2.2 Consistency with existing knowledge 
The results are consistent with the existing literature insofar as they confirm: 
 That normative ethical theories are not actually used by people (at least 
in the Defence acquisition context), except insofar as they are employed 
as part of narratives of delegitimisation; 
 That people are constrained in how they approach ethical problems, 
except that this research focused on behavioural (sociological) rather 
than cognitive limitations; 
 That social power is considerably more important in how people behave 
than normative theories of ethics; 
 That the interaction of capital, field and habitus via Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice provides a means of explaining why people behave as they do in 
the acquisition context; and 
 That people engage in akratic behaviour due to social influences. 
An alternative explanation of these findings is that the sociological perspective 
taken, and the theory of practice in particular, can (or will ultimately) be 
explained via descriptive ethics approaches such as neuroethics. While the 
literature review noted that neuroethics largely excludes social factors, it may be 
that eventually become encompassed within the scope of neuroscience. 
Another possibility is that the concept of identity can be extended to account for 
these results, including akrasia, such that the theory of practice is no longer 
required. 
6.2.3 New findings 
Having constructed an ideal type from the research, there are three main 
findings of note that add to the existing literature. 
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6.2.3.1 Customer/Supplier collaboration in Defence acquisition 
The research data obtained from the quantitative survey demonstrate that 
people regard the relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry as 
less collaborative than it should be. The subsequent narrative analysis details 
why this is the case, even though – other things being equal – the disparity 
would imply that the acquisition system should be moving to a collaborative 
approach. That the acquisition system should be understood as a Bourdieusian 
practice is offered as a best explanation for why Defence acquisition has 
achieved limited success in integrating customer and supplier roles to deliver 
improvements. 
Of note, the research shows that Sector/Service and Rank/Position/Role are 
most important in impacting perceptions of Defence acquisition, with the Royal 
Navy more likely to favour a collaborative approach and middle ranks having 
more influence than other levels, albeit in response to the requirements of a 
practice. Therefore, the focus in the MOD’s Enterprise Approach (the case 
study) on a maritime pathfinder is confirmed as appropriate. 
6.2.3.2 Akrasia and practice 
Acting against one’s best interests – akrasia – has a sociological explanation: it 
is due to a desire to retain capital and field position within a practice, and is 
driven by a habitus that embodies a disposition to sustain the illusio, regardless 
of what reason dictates. This implies that the options available to people, 
whether facing ethical or other challenges, are behaviourally limited by their 
position in the field, the capital they possess and their wish to preserve both. In 
a practice structured in this way, people will acquire capital by being perceived 
to do the right thing, even if this is actually disadvantageous for them or their 
organisation from a longer-term perspective, and this will be the akratic 
behaviour that is written into their dispositions. 
This result builds on the behavioural science literature by adding a sociological 
dimension: the influence of hyperbolic discounting in incentivising akrasia (that 
is, when people fail to notice contradictions in their short- and long-term 
valuations) is supported by the desire to retain capital and field position. In 
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Bourdieusian terms, people literally do not see ‘the other side’ of an adversarial 
relationship, not just because they may be cognitively limited by bounded 
ethicality and hyperbolic discounting, but because they are not incentivised 
behaviourally by their illusio to do so. On this view, to seek a business ethics of 
acquisition is to miss the point of why people behave as they do. 
6.2.3.3 Ethics in Defence acquisition 
Given their likely akrasia, individuals involved in Defence acquisition can act 
ethically or otherwise, but if they want to succeed then they have to adjust to 
symbolic power and not concern themselves with normative ethics (which, in 
any case, is not capable of providing them with a code of ethics as a guide for 
behaviour). By the time they themselves reach positions of symbolic power, the 
structure of the field and its habitus has been naturalised, so they are not 
incentivised to recognise any ethical challenge to how things are done. This 
explanation represents a novel application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to 
the context of public/private sector integration. 
Although people will use narratives that include normative ethics as a means of 
delegitimising options in acquisition that threaten their field position and capital 
accumulation, there is thus no place in Defence acquisition for a set of agreed 
norms or a code of ethics. This is because, as a consequence of acquisition 
being a practice in Bourdieu’s terms, any such code cannot result in people 
behaving other than as they already do. In short, symbolic power simply 
overrules an ethical code and habitus is amended accordingly. Therefore, there 
is no need to seek an ethics of Defence acquisition. 
As noted with reference to the ideal type, this conclusion can be objected to on 
the same grounds as Bourdieu’s concept of habitus was critiqued: it is all too 
deterministic and does not allow for individual agency; for example, that people 
act as they do because acquisition is a practice but also because they are 
guided by their own ethics. The problem with this complaint is that insofar as 
people do this – they have and apply their own ethics – they do not need an 
ethics of acquisition; and where they do not and their behaviours are guided by 
something else, the research has proposed that this is best explained through 
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understanding acquisition as a practice, characterised by the ideal type. 
6.2.4 Unexpected findings 
Although akrasia was covered in the literature review, it was not anticipated to 
form an important part of the research findings and arose because the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data provided for an exemplar of 
‘best interests’ in the acquisition context, against which narratives could be 
analysed. The ability to offer a sociological explanation of akrasia that builds 
upon the existing empirical body of research is a cross-disciplinary contribution 
that links philosophy, applied ethics, behavioural science and sociology. Since 
akrasia was not the focus of the research, this result provides an opportunity to 
pursue further investigation and greater integration with behavioural science. 
6.2.5 Limitations 
The research was constrained to the case study detailed in Chapter 3 and, 
necessarily, by the unrepresentative population involved in Defence acquisition. 
(As shown in the results and findings, this is largely male and middle-aged in 
the Defence Industry, and with women and ethnic minorities underrepresented 
in the MOD; Defence Statistics, 2014.) This was addressed in part through the 
methodology selected and the use of an ideal type, which – by construction – 
does not exist in the social world but instead sets up an exemplar of how 
narratives function, which can then be generalised to different demographic 
contexts. Nevertheless, in practice this meant that only 9% of survey 
respondents were female and that the interviewees were exclusively male, so 
focusing on women’s experiences and how they differ (as narrated) from men’s 
could extend the research. 
While the data collection exceeded this researcher’s expectations and was 
sufficient to permit detailed analysis, additional survey responses would have 
made the quantitative case more powerful. In particular, the underrepresented 
populations could have been deliberately targeted (notably women) to assess 
whether the prominence of Rank/Position/Role as capital extends across 
genders. Given the surprisingly widespread use of comments in reply to each 
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survey question, generating effectively an additional data set, further attention 
could have been paid to this to design the survey to achieve more detailed 
notes to support the subsequent narrative analysis. Extra interviews would also 
have assisted with this, but at the cost of considerable time and the ability to 
manage still greater narrative data, which was already challenging. 
The research was also not longitudinal, except insofar as narratives are created 
over time and cannot be isolated as temporal instances because their meanings 
must always be interpreted (Biernacki, 2012). Given that the researcher was at 
the centre of the case study, which was repeatedly hastened by senior MOD 
leadership, it was not possible to repeat the quantitative or qualitative data 
collection over a longer period for comparison. Furthermore, since a specific 
case study was employed and both the MOD and Defence Industry populations 
were unrepresentative of wider society (with young people, women and ethnic 
minorities disproportionately omitted), the results could be challenged as only 
applying to a narrow context. This may be contested because of the 
methodology used and because the ideal type can – by design – be 
generalised. Moreover, ‘representation’ in Bourdieusian terms is associated with 
possession of capital and field position, not gender or other identifying 
characteristics. Nevertheless, further work could be undertaken in another 
sector to investigate how other populations narrate challenges to existing 
practice. 
This research provides for no recommendations on codes of ethics in 
acquisition because it concludes that these can have no impact. However, it did 
not survey in depth the voluminous philosophical literature on ethics, so it was 
not possible to consider normative objections that could be made; that is, to 
review the philosophical arguments at length and in still greater sophistication, 
which would require significant interdisciplinary work. Similarly, while the 
literature review considered the influence of neuroscience and behavioural 
science, the research did not explore the implications of the results at the level 
of brain functioning, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Finally, the literature review on which the research is based is restricted to 
(almost exclusively) works in English and relies in particular on translations from 
the original French for Bourdieu’s work. This investigation has not considered 
research in other languages, except insofar as this has already been translated, 
which is a limitation to the extent that important literature may, therefore, have 
been missed. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Purpose 
The challenge of this research was to consider why people behave as they do 
in the context of UK Defence acquisition, as well as why they should not act 
otherwise – the matter of ethics. In the hypothetical cases proposed in the 
introduction, acquisition agents faced a number of incentives to respond 
unethically, especially if they could deliver improvements in military capability as 
a result. The default response is that social actors are guided in their conduct by 
ethics and, therefore, that the acquisition context is no different. 
Taking the case of acquisition and the increasingly close relationship between 
customer and supplier therein, the research aim was to understand how ethics 
functions in narratives of Defence acquisition – the interrelated stories that 
people tell one another about what happens across the public/private sector 
interface. This was addressed by exploring how people talk about the 
relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry, and by considering 
what this reveals about the role of ethics. 
7.2 Methodology 
This work began with the proposition that ethics in business functions to 
legitimise narratives rather than as a normative framework to guide or assess 
behaviour. The applied ethics context of the acquisition of UK military 
capabilities was used to identify a case study, in which the MOD is exploring 
options for collaboration with Industry to address critical skills shortages. 
A comprehensive literature review was conducted to thematically analyse the 
existing research and identify any gaps. This focused initially on normative 
approaches to ethics, which have been standard in business ethics and ethics 
more generally, setting out philosophical bases for how people ought to behave 
with limited empirical support in the form of thought experiments. The second 
part of the review considered descriptive studies, which emphasise the role of 
people’s cognitive abilities and the influence of social structures in how 
decisions (ethical or otherwise) are made. Bourdieu’s theory of practice was 
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justified as an appropriate theoretical framework to explore the research 
questions. 
A critical case study was then undertaken in in two stages. In the first, 
quantitative step, a survey of MOD and Industry personnel was created to 
explore ethics in acquisition while attempting to minimise social desirability bias. 
This involved pairs of questions to ask how aspects of the relationship between 
the MOD and Industry are and how they should be, reproducing the standard 
is/ought demarcation of the ethics literature. The second step was to undertake 
qualitative analysis, both of the comments that had been received as part of the 
survey and, more substantially, of ten narrative interviews that were conducted 
on the basis of the survey results. This quantitative and qualitative data was 
then used to develop an ideal type that captured the primary elements of 
public/private sector interaction from the case study, together with the 
associated behaviours. 
7.3 Findings 
To return to the aim of the research, the overall research question addressed 
was: How does ethics function in narratives of Defence acquisition? 
This was examined via two sub-questions: 
 How do people involved in Defence acquisition talk about the relationship 
between the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
 What does this reveal about the role of ethics in narratives of Defence 
acquisition? 
The literature review revealed that normative ethics, although the traditional 
(philosophical) approach to business ethics, has been undermined by recent 
empirical work in descriptive ethics. In particular, research in neuroscience and 
behavioural science has demonstrated that people’s cognitive limitations mean 
that their ethical reasoning abilities are bounded and not as rational as they 
assume; as a consequence, people tend to use heuristics to help them or else 
behave in ways that are self-defeating. Furthermore, the sociological literature 
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argues for greater attention to social structures, notably the power of narratives 
in shaping beliefs and behaviours. 
The quantitative component of the case study indicated that something is 
preventing the acquisition system from operating as its people otherwise would 
have it. Specifically, when asked how some aspect of the relationship between 
the MOD and Industry is and then how it ought to be, the data showed a 
movement in people’s responses from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. 
The qualitative analysis of the narratives then established that this is/ought shift 
could be explained by acquisition being a practice in the Bourdieusian sense, as 
detailed in the methodology. This meant that the influence and interaction of 
field, capital and habitus – Bourdieu’s key concepts – on how people behave 
would incentivise them to use narratives involving normative ethical claims as a 
means of delegitimising options that threaten their field position and capital 
accumulation. The disparity between the survey responses and the narratives 
also suggested that this behaviour is an example of akrasia (acting against 
one’s best interests). 
Finally, the ideal type proposed that the general characteristics of the 
intersection of the public and private sectors would be: 
 Using contractual conditions to support an unspoken deontological 
ethics. 
 Employing narratives of duty to exacerbate this tension, which then ends 
up justifying public sector control as the dominant social actor. 
 Using ethical supremacy to scapegoat the private sector for public sector 
shortcomings. 
 Encouraging public sector ‘othering’ of Industry as part of an illusio that 
guarantees field position and capital accumulation. 
 Paying lip service to codes of ethics and ostensibly permitting challenges 
to business practices, assuming they will fail. 
These characteristics would be associated with several behaviours: 
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 Appealing to the inevitability of conflict between public and private 
sectors. 
 Privileging public sector way of doing things. 
 Emphasising blockers to avoid threats to capital and illusio. 
 Discounting the future benefits of collaboration between public and 
private sectors to favour capital accumulation or preservation now. 
 Using ethical narratives to undermine alternatives. 
Therefore, answers to the original research sub-questions can be given: 
 How do people involved in Defence acquisition talk about the relationship 
between the MOD and the Defence Industry? This relationship is talked 
about in adversarial terms, employing a doxa of ethical separation that 
demarcates an altruistic public sector from profit-motivated private 
companies. This ethical distinction is reinforced through the 
characteristics of interaction and the behaviours that were identified in 
the ideal type above. 
 What does this reveal about the role of ethics in narratives of Defence 
acquisition? The results suggest that the role played by ethics is not to 
make normative judgments of behaviour or to guide the business of 
acquisition, but instead to help people retain or improve their relative 
social power by using ethical language to delegitimise possibilities that 
threaten social capital and field position. This implies that people are 
effectively adopting a heuristic of 'what will best preserve or improve my 
field position?' 
7.4 Implications 
The research has several implications that represent original contributions to 
knowledge and answer the research question of how ethics functions in 
narratives of Defence acquisition. Firstly, the research involved an application of 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the context of public/private sector integration, 
which does not appear to have been undertaken previously, and uniquely to 
Defence acquisition. This extends the utility of the theory, applying its concepts 
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to ethics in a novel way and confirming the methodological value of this 
approach. 
Secondly, the finding that people consider the relationship between the MOD 
and the Defence Industry to be less collaborative than it should be is of interest 
to acquisition professionals and policy makers in both the public and private 
sectors, particularly when UK Government intent in the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review of 2015 has been to encourage greater collaboration. The 
disparity between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the data imply that Defence acquisition 
should be moving towards this, so the argument that the acquisition system 
should be understood as a Bourdieusian practice is offered as a best 
explanation for why the UK has achieved limited success in integrating 
customer and supplier roles to deliver improvements. 
Thirdly, the detail of the narrative analysis implies that akrasia can be 
accounted for in sociological terms that complement the existing behavioural 
science explanations. That people in a practice desire to retain their capital and 
field position, and that this is embodied as a disposition to uphold the 
associated illusio, regardless of what reason dictates, means that they can be 
incentivised to act against their best interests. The implication is that preserving 
field position and capital possession can cause a motivated blindness, which is 
a behavioural limitation that complements both bounded ethicality and 
hyperbolic discounting. In short, when people can sustain or improve their field 
positions by acting in particular ways, even if these are actually wrong for them 
or for their organisations in the longer-term, this will be the akratic behaviour 
that is inscribed into their habitus. 
Fourthly, this link to akrasia implies that it is misguided to seek a normative 
ethics of acquisition because this has no connection to why people behave as 
they do. That acquisition should be understood as a practice that involves 
akratic actions does not mean that people lack individual agency, but it does 
indicate that they are required to adjust to symbolic power if they wish to be 
successful in their organisations. The research suggests that even if it were 
possible to offer a normative code of ethics, which the literature review 
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demonstrated is highly unlikely, when this aim is set against the incentives 
involved in a practice and of hyperbolic discounting, there is no sense in which 
the code would result in people behaving other than as they already do. 
Furthermore, symbolic violence means that the structure of the field will have 
been naturalised as people progress within in, so they will not be inclined by 
their habitus to challenge how things are done if or when they themselves reach 
positions of influence. 
Finally, the research developed a novel methodology that established a 
correspondence of Bourdieu’s methodological stages to the domains of critical 
realism. Although Bourdieu has been characterised as a critical realist before 
(Vandenberghe, 1999), the re-describing of his approach in critical realist terms 
offers an opportunity for subsequent research to work through the steps in an 
organised manner. This increases the accessibility of Bourdieu to business 
ethics research, as well as enhancing both the repeatability of the research and 
the ability of other researchers to falsify it. 
Therefore, the research question can be answered. The question was: How 
does ethics function in narratives of Defence acquisition? The research 
suggests that: 
The actual function of ethics in acquisition is within narratives that include 
normative ethical statements as a means of delegitimising options that 
threaten people’s field positions and capital accumulation.  
Ethics thus serves as part of a rhetorical strategy to maintain dominance over 
illusio and to shape the doxa within a field. On this view, a code of ethics has no 
utility and hence cannot be recommended. Moreover, this is not just because 
symbolic power will overrule the code, but also because advocating one is to 
deflect attention from the influence of this power by shifting it to a set of norms 
that ostensibly stand outside or above the organisation(s). 
7.5 Gaps 
The philosophical literature on ethics is vast, spanning thousands of years, and 
it is entirely feasible that normative theories will eventually come to account for 
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empirical criticisms, including social and behavioural factors. Therefore, it is not 
possible to advocate definitely that ethics should be discarded in favour of 
greater attention to behavioural science. In particular, people have plural 
identities and do not enter a specific context without bringing elements of these 
with them, such as ethical codes that may be related to religion, philosophy or 
upbringing. While these may themselves be subjected to analysis via the theory 
of practice, it is unclear how a sociological investigation could wholly detach a 
business practice from plural identities to ascertain the extent of influence. 
Given the methodology employed, the ideal type developed in this research can 
be generalised by analogy from the acquisition context and the specific case 
study therein, thereby serving as an exemplar for further research. However, it 
is not clear whether the elements of this type extend into public and private 
sector organisations or are only relevant at the interface. These organisations 
are diverse internally and it is not the intention of the research that the ideal 
type or the associated behaviours should be taken to apply across them without 
local variation, especially relative to the value and types of capital therein. This 
is consistent with the sociological use of an ideal type. Given the importance 
associated with rank or grade as symbolic capital for the MOD, it would be 
worthwhile to identify if this persists in some form for people who move into the 
Defence Industry and if it has an equivalent in other public sector acquisition 
functions. 
Although this research has concluded that a code of ethics for acquisition is 
inappropriate, this does not imply a positive recommendation that the 
acquisition system should exclude such a code from consideration if there are 
benefits to adopting one that are determined to outweigh the criticism that such 
a code will have little or no effect. In this event, however, this research should 
enable attention to be focused on symbolic power, rather than on norms. 
7.6 Recommendations for further research 
This research applied Bourdieu’s theory of practice but it was not longitudinal, 
except to the extent that people are constantly recreating their narratives. 
Therefore, additional research could be undertaken to repeat the narrative 
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analysis over a set interval, attempting to thereby understand how the 
narratives develop with time, particularly insofar as the case study matures or is 
cancelled. It would be particularly interesting and useful to test how narratives 
adjust if senior MOD and Industry stakeholders decide to commit to a more 
collaborative approach, or else to analyse the discussion of the commitment to 
collaboration on critical skills if this ultimately fails. 
Further research could challenge the conclusion that there is no need for an 
ethics of acquisition by exploring the extent to which Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory can be adjusted to incorporate Bourdieusian practice as 
constitutive of micronorms, preserving the possibility of hypernorms (potentially 
via an overlapping consensus that includes both public and private sectors).  
The aim of such research could be to argue that practice is important but is 
delimited by hypernorms, although this would still imply that ethics specific to a 
context such as acquisition would be overtaken or replaced by macro-level 
(societal) norms. 
The suggestion that Bourdieu’s theory of practice provides a sociological 
explanation of akrasia could be pursued in greater depth by leveraging the 
existing research on hyperbolic discounting in understanding self-defeating 
behaviour, building upon it by seeking to undertake narrative analysis focused 
specifically on akrasia. The challenge would be to identify – or else design 
sociological research that is able to posit – another example of ‘best interest’ 
that people act against via practice. 
Finally, these conclusions, in the form of the ideal type set out, should not be 
taken to represent an enduring social reality. Indeed, the case studied relied 
upon in this research requires an assumption either that the ideal type identified 
here does not exist or that it can serve as a motivation to transform social reality 
(and, thereby, the ideal type). Specifically, by setting out an explanation that 
captures the current structure and the lived experience of the Defence 
acquisition field for the people surveyed, including accounting for why people in 
power do not use their agency to change it, the research has constructed a 
social reality that needs to be challenged. 
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That is, a critical realist could use this characterisation of social reality to 
challenge people within the case study context: 'You say you want to work 
collaboratively, but this is the social reality'. Both those people in dominant 
positions and those who are dominated may then react strongly to this ‘fixed’ 
reality by making plans to change it. If this was successful, then the ideal type 
would not hold any more: the research results would have been falsified, but it 
would have contributed to the change to make this so. For the likes of Bourdieu 
(1995) or Bhaskar (1998), this should be the aim of sociology. 
The overall contribution to knowledge is then that, given that the social world of 
this case study can be accounted for by overlaying the theory of practice and 
then developing, through abduction/retroduction, an ideal type, this exemplar 
would be likely to function as an explanation in any other context in which 
similar circumstances exist. To test the fecundity of the ideal type, the research 
methodology could be employed in another public sector procurement context, 
such as a health service; within the private sector, whether a defence company 
or not; or within another nation’s acquisition system. It should also be repeated 
in a more gender-representative context to explore whether women’s 
experiences in the actual are explained in the same way as men. 
7.7 Policy recommendations 
Given the results of the research and the conclusions that have been reached, 
several policy recommendations can be made for the case study context and 
potentially beyond it. Firstly, the case study intent to share people across 
organisational boundaries should be enacted because this could help create 
capital and habitus that span the sectors, similar to what has been achieved in 
Singapore in the context of regularly moving people between Defence and 
Industry roles there (Karniol, 2006). This approach would potentially reduce the 
influence of the doxa embodied in the ideal type and thus adjust behaviours, 
whether through secondments or a more structured process. However, it is 
likely that a forcing function would be required, driven by senior stakeholders, to 
overcome the initial dominance of the doxa, such as by rewarding those who 
develop cross-border capital. Much as the development of a European identity 
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has been supported over time by student exchanges under the ERASMUS 
programme (Bennhold, 2005), a new doxa could not be generated in the short-
term. 
Secondly, the power of adversarial narratives could be reduced through 
increasing transparency on the part of both MOD and the Defence Industry, 
such as by sharing more of their future plans. Akin to recent policy intent in 
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015), this would provide the opportunity 
to set a combined demand signal for skills, reducing the incentive to compete 
for people through greater certainty of business and coherence in the 
associated resource requirements. However, the primary challenge to achieving 
this would be a willingness to commit to basing commercial decisions on the 
shared information. 
Finally, any drive to adopt a code of ethics for Defence acquisition should be 
resisted in favour of work to map power structures within the acquisition field. In 
particular, unethical behaviour is more likely to be countered by incentives to 
behave differently than by prohibitions on specific forms of conduct, which are 
invariably already contained in corporate codes of ethics. Therefore, the focus 
of Defence acquisition should be on what people are attempting to support or 
delegitimise when they narrate their experiences in terms of ethics, not on 
providing them with ethical frameworks to justify their decisions.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – Research survey 
 
Question Response Comments 
1 What sector do you work in?  Royal Navy  
 Army 
 Royal Air Force                                        
 Civil Service                                    
 UK Defence Industry 
o Company? 
 
2 What is your gender?  Male 
 Female 
 Transgender 
 
3 What is your rank/position?  OF6-10/SCS/Senior Manager 
 OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
 OR6-OF2/CS Bands E-C/Staff 
 OR1-5/Other 
 
4 What is your highest level of 
education obtained? 
 Secondary School 
 Trade Certificate 
 Degree 
 Masters  
 PhD 
 Other (Please comment) 
 
5 What is your age?  19 or under 
 20-29 
 30-39 
 40-49 
 50-59 
 60-69 
 70+ 
 
6 To what extent do you believe the 
MOD trusts the UK Defence 
Industry? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
7 To what extent do you believe the 
MOD should trust the UK 
Defence Industry? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
8 To what extent do you believe the 
UK Defence Industry trusts the 
MOD? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
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9 To what extent do you believe the 
UK Defence Industry should trust 
the MOD? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
10 To what extent do you believe 
that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry are dependent 
on one another? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
11 To what extent do you believe 
that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
12 What proportion of people do you 
believe can be expected to move 
employment from the MOD to the 
UK Defence Industry? 
 100-75% 
 74-50% 
 49-25% 
 24-0% 
 No opinion 
 
13 What proportion of people do you 
believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD 
to the UK Defence Industry? 
 100-75% 
 74-50% 
 49-25% 
 24-0% 
 No opinion 
 
14 What proportion of people do you 
believe can be expected to move 
employment from the UK 
Defence Industry to the MOD? 
 100-75% 
 74-50% 
 49-25% 
 24-0% 
 No opinion 
 
15 What proportion of people do you 
believe should be expected to 
move employment from the UK 
Defence Industry to the MOD? 
 100-75% 
 74-50% 
 49-25% 
 24-0% 
 No opinion 
 
16 To what extent do you believe 
that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common 
values? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
17 To what extent do you believe 
that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have 
common values? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
18 To what extent do you believe 
that the UK Defence system is 
managed as a single enterprise 
that includes both the MOD and 
the Defence Industry? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
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19 To what extent do you believe 
that the UK Defence system 
should be managed as a single 
enterprise that includes both the 
MOD and the Defence Industry? 
 Fully 
 Mainly 
 Partially 
 Not at all 
 No opinion 
 
20 Please add any other comments 
that you would like to make. 
  
Table A-1: Stage 1 data gathering - survey questions 
 242 
Appendix B – Research ethics confirmation 
B.1 Ministry of Defence JSP 536 Research Ethics approval 
 
From: People-TESRR-Trg Cap AHd (Woods, Tim Capt)  
Sent: 01 July 2015 08:22 
To: People-CDP PgM EA (Newall, Paul Lt Cdr) 
Subject: RE: Line Manager permission to conduct research 
  
Paul, 
  
I have reviewed your proposal and am content that this does not require 
MODREC scrutiny iaw JSP 536. 
  
as ever 
Tim W 
Capt Tim Woods RN | AHd Capability, TESRR | 06.N.04 MOD Main 
Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB | +44 (0)20 7218 6018 | military: 
9621 86018 
 
B.2 Cranfield University Research Ethics System approval 
 
Reference: CURES/361/2015 
 
Title: Social Contracting for the Defence Acquisition Ecosystem 
 
Your proposed research activity has been reviewed by CURES and you 
can now proceed with the research activities you have sought approval 
for. 
 
Please remember that CURES occasionally conducts audits of projects. 
We may therefore contact you during or following execution of your 
fieldwork. Guidance on good practice is available on the research ethics 
intranet pages. 
 
If you have any queries, please contact cures-support@cranfield.ac.uk 
We wish you every success with your project. 
 
Regards 
 
CURES Team 
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Appendix C – Interview consent form 
 
Researcher Paul Newall 
6M 
MOD Main Building 
London 
SW1A 2HB 
Email: paul.newall323@mod.uk 
Tel: 07766 577851 
Research aim To examine the relationship between the MOD and the Defence 
Industry in Defence acquisition. 
Interviewee 
contribution 
You will be invited to tell the story of how you perceive the 
relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry. You may be 
asked to expand on some of your answers. 
Information 
gathering 
Other interviews will be conducted and the results will be analysed by 
the researcher. 
Information 
recording 
If you consent, the interview will be recorded and transcribed for use 
in analysis. Notes will also be taken. You will be able to review these 
if you wish. 
Confidentiality of 
information 
Your responses in the interview will be made anonymous such that 
there will be no way for anyone to connect you with the content. Only 
the researcher will know your identity. 
Information storage 
and disposal 
The recording and transcript files will be stored in a password-
protected file. The anonymised transcript may be submitted to 
Cranfield University as part of the marking process. The recording, 
along with hard and soft copies of the transcript, will be destroyed 
after Cranfield University’s data requirements have been satisfied. 
 
Please complete the following details: 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the above information regarding my 
participation in this research.  I also I confirm that I consent to participate and 
that my organisation does not constrain or limit my participation in any way. 
 
Name (Block Capitals): 
Signature: 
Date 
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Appendix D – Survey results and analysis 
D.1 Overview of results 
As referred to in the results and findings, this appendix contains the data obtained from the research survey. To reiterate, the 
data were analysed to determine the relationships (if any) between variables using SPSS software, treating each of the 
questions in the survey as a variable and each of the identifying characteristics (Sector/Service, Rank/Position/Role, Education 
Level, Age and Gender) as supplementary variables. Given the survey responses obtained (n=124) and as a consequence of 
using snowballing rather than stratified sampling, some supplementary variables – age and gender – did not achieve sufficient 
diversity to make analysis meaningful (that is, the majority of respondents were male and aged 40-59, reflecting the trend in 
Defence as a whole); therefore, they were not subjected to the additional correspondence analysis. 
Accepting this caveat, for each variable and supplementary variable pair, the results display the crosstabulation followed by 
the correspondence analysis. Both follow the design of the survey, in which questions were based on the standard is/ought 
demarcation in ethics: each request of the respondents was for their opinions on how an aspect of the relationship between 
the Ministry of Defence and the UK Defence Industry currently is and how it should be (ought). The data thus show how the 
opinions ‘move’ from is to ought as people describe what should be straightforward assessments of how things are, followed 
by a normative opinion, thereby aiming to reduce social desirability bias. The subsequent correspondence analysis is 
displayed via symmetrical normalization to standardize and allow comparison between the variables. 
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D.2 Survey results 
D.2.1 MOD trust of the Defence Industry 
The first set of results assesses the extent to which the MOD trusts the UK Defence Industry against each supplementary variable. Assuming 
that ‘fully’ and ‘mainly’ are a proxy for trust in the responses, the data show a shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ (33% to 71% here, which is consistent 
across the other supplementary variables in the subsequent tables): 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK 
Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 2 6 17 3 0 28 (26%) 
Army 0 8 14 0 0 22 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 0 9 13 0 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 0 9 11 1 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 0 2 13 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 2 34 68 4 1 109 
Table D-1: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against MOD trust of Industry (is) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the 
UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 6 14 7 1 0 28 (26%) 
Army 1 12 7 1 0 21 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 1 15 6 0 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 2 14 5 0 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 4 8 3 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 14 63 28 2 1 108 
Table D-2: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
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Of note, the questions – in common with the others – asked about belief, so it was appropriate to ask Industry personnel about what the MOD 
should do (and vice versa in the converse questions that follow). Notwithstanding the limited data set (n=124) and the low proportion of 
Industry respondents (n=15), the movement from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is consistent across MOD and Industry here. 
As detailed in the methodology, in utilising Bourdieu’s theory of practice it is not enough merely to tabulate the data. Establishing the 
relationship, if any, between positions within the field and the dispositions (habitus) of the people occupying them is achieved through 
correspondence analysis (Bourdieu, 1996b). This then serves as a geometric representation of the interrelationships between variables, or the 
‘distances’ between row and column cells in the crosstabulations (Lebaron, 2009). Owing to the number of variables, it was not possible to 
display clearly a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). In particular, MCA is complicated by the research design and intent to map 
movement between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in ethics, so standard correspondence analysis was used. 
Figure 5-1 thus graphically displays the first pairing of ‘is’ and ought’ via SPSS outputs; specifically, how MOD trust of Industry is interrelated 
with Sector/Service through proximity two dimensions: 
 
Figure D-1: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and MOD trust of Industry (is/ought) 
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The correspondence analyses here are skewed by the single ‘no opinion’ response, but suggest the same shift or ‘movement’ displayed in the 
crosstabulations. However, the additional information is a closer ‘ought’ association of the Royal Navy and Defence Industry with ‘fully’. 
 
A similar shift (33% to 71%) is displayed in the association of trust with rank/position/role: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK 
Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 1 14 0 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
0 18 28 2 1 49 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
2 15 21 2 0 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 0 5 0 0 5 (4%) 
Total 2 34 68 4 1 109 
Table D-3: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against MOD trust of Industry (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the 
UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
2 10 3 0 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
6 27 14 1 1 49 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
5 23 10 1 0 39 (36%) 
OR1-5/Other 1 3 1 0 0 5 (5%) 
Total 14 63 28 2 1 108 
Table D-4: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
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Here the data are skewed towards more senior ranks, as could be anticipated given the level of personnel involved in acquisition. Indeed, 
given that snowballing was employed to obtain more results, this skewing helped to illuminate the structure of the acquisition field (as those 
involved in it perceive it). The correspondence analysis also displays a shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ and an equidistant clustering around 
‘fully’/’mainly’ for the latter: 
  
Figure D-2: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and MOD trust of Industry (is/ought) 
The shift (again 33% to 71%) is repeated for the same question with regard to education level: 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK 
Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 1 1 2 0 0 4 (3%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 5 7 0 0 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
1 5 15 0 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 0 21 38 3 1 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 1 4 0 0 5 (5%) 
Other 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 2 34 68 4 1 109 
Table D-5: Crosstabulation of Education Level against MOD trust of Industry (is) 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the 
UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 3 1 0 0 4 (3%) 
Trade certificate 0 2 0 0 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 2 7 2 0 0 11 (10%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
5 10 5 1 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 7 38 16 1 1 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 3 2 0 0 5 (5%) 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 14 63 28 2 1 108 
Table D-6: Crosstabulation of Education Level against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
In this instance, the survey population is heavily weighted to Undergraduate degree and Masters level (77% of respondents), which is 
suggestive of the professionalisation of the acquisition field. However, the correspondence analysis displays no clear relationships, which 
implies that education level is less important as a form of capital:  
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Figure D-3: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and MOD trust of Industry (is/ought) 
The shift (33% to 71%) is shown again with respect to gender and age, but the representation of these supplementary variables is that of an 
overwhelming male and middle-aged (40-59) group with too few data points outside this range for correspondence analysis to be able to 
reveal anything: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender 
identity?  
Man 2 30 63 4 0 99 (91%) 
Woman 0 4 5 0 1 10 (9%) 
Total 2 34 68 4 1 109 
Table D-7: Crosstabulation of Gender against MOD trust of Industry (is)  
  251 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the UK Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 14 59 24 2 0 99 (91%) 
Woman 0 4 4 0 1 9 (9%) 
Total 14 63 28 2 1 108 
Table D-8: Crosstabulation of Gender against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD trusts the UK 
Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your age? 20-29 0 1 2 0 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 1 4 8 0 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 1 16 29 3 0 49 (45%) 
50-59 0 13 27 1 1 42 (39%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 2 34 67 4 1 108 
Table D-9: Crosstabulation of Age against MOD trust of Industry (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD should trust the 
UK Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your age? 20-29 0 3 0 0 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 10 2 0 0 12 (11%) 
40-49 6 28 13 2 0 49 (46%) 
50-59 8 20 13 0 1 42 (39%) 
60-69 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 14 62 28 2 1 107 
Table D-10: Crosstabulation of Age against MOD trust of Industry (ought) 
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D.2.2 Defence Industry trust of the MOD 
This question is the inverse of the previous one; therefore, since (again) it sought to discover the perceptions of the respondents rather than a 
true representation, it was appropriate to ask it of both Industry and MOD personnel. When crosstabulated with Sector/Service, this time the 
shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ was 27% to 78%: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
trusts the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 1 6 18 2 1 28 (26%) 
Army 1 4 16 1 0 22 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 0 9 12 1 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 0 6 11 4 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 0 4 10 1 0 15 (14%) 
Total 2 29 67 9 2 109 
Table D-11: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Industry trust of MOD (is) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
should trust the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 7 13 5 2 1 28 (26%) 
Army 4 12 6 0 0 22 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 2 17 3 0 0 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 6 11 3 1 1 22 (20%) 
Defence Industry 3 10 2 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 22 63 19 3 2 109 
Table D-12: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Industry trust of MOD (ought) 
In the correspondence analysis, it is apparent that this shift is represented graphically in the movement from ‘partially’ to ‘fully’ by the Royal 
Navy and Civil Service, but it is also interesting that the Royal Air Force and Defence Industry remain closer to ‘mainly’ and the Army to 
‘partially’: 
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Figure D-4: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Industry trust of MOD (is/ought) 
This suggests that the is/ought shift is greater in the maritime context, while the Royal Air Force and Defence Industry are already familiar with 
some (but not full) interaction from existing availability contracts where enterprise approaches have been pursued more (Purchase et al., 
2011) and the Army is less connected because of an assumption that its functions are less amenable to outsourcing. (“You cannot surge 
trust.” – Army response to the potential implementation of the Whole Force Concept of Defence Reform; field diary, 22 September 2015.) 
An identical shift is present in the crosstabulation data for Rank/Position/Role: 
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To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
trusts the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 1 14 0 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
0 14 29 4 2 49 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
2 13 21 4 0 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 1 3 1 0 5 (4%) 
Total 2 29 67 9 2 109 
Table D-13: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Industry trust of MOD (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
should trust the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
4 9 2 0 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
9 26 10 2 2 49 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands E-
C/Staff 
7 25 7 1 0 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 2 3 0 0 0 5 (4%) 
Total 22 63 19 3 2 109 
Table D-14: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Industry trust of MOD (ought) 
The correspondence analysis data are less clear, although ‘fully’ is again closer to the centre and hence there is movement towards it (and 
towards ‘mainly’): 
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Figure D-5: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Industry trust of MOD (is/ought) 
The is/ought shift is repeated for Education Level: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
trusts the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 0 3 1 0 4 (3%) 
Trade certificate 0 1 0 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 1 4 6 1 0 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
1 8 11 1 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 0 14 42 5 2 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 1 4 0 0 5 (5%) 
Other 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 2 29 67 9 2 109 
Table D-15: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Industry trust of MOD (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
should trust the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 2 2 0 0 0 4 (3%) 
Trade certificate 0 2 0 0 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 3 6 2 1 0 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
5 13 2 1 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 12 37 11 1 2 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 3 2 0 0 5 (5%) 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 22 63 19 3 2 109 
Table D-16: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Industry trust of MOD (ought) 
The associated correspondence analysis again shows the movement of ‘fully’ and (to a lesser extent) ‘mainly’: 
  
Figure D-6: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Industry trust of MOD 
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As with the previous question, Education Level appears to be less influential than Rank/Position/Role and Sector/Service, with the latter most 
dominant. 
Finally, the data for Gender and Age continue the is/ought shift: 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
trusts the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 2 28 60 8 1 99 (91%) 
Woman 0 1 7 1 1 10 (9%) 
Total 2 29 67 9 2 109 
Table D-17: Crosstabulation of Gender against Industry trust of MOD (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
should trust the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 22 59 14 3 1 99 (91%) 
Woman 0 4 5 0 1 10 (9%) 
Total 22 63 19 3 2 109 
Table D-18: Crosstabulation of Gender against Industry trust of MOD (ought) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
trusts the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 1 2 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 1 2 9 1 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 1 15 31 1 1 49 (45%) 
50-59 0 12 24 5 1 42 (39%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 2 29 66 9 2 108 
Table D-19: Crosstabulation of Age against Industry trust of MOD (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the UK Defence Industry 
should trust the MOD? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 2 0 1 0 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 1 10 2 0 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 8 28 11 1 1 49 (45%) 
50-59 11 23 5 2 1 42 (39%) 
60-69 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 22 62 19 3 2 108 
Table D-20: Crosstabulation of Age against Industry trust of MOD (ought) 
D.2.3 MOD and Industry mutual dependence 
The next pair of questions concerned the interdependence of the MOD and Defence Industry, seeking to understand how close the 
relationship between them was perceived to be from a more practical or business perspective rather than in terms of mutual trust. Looking first 
at Sector/Service, the is/ought shift is reversed (82% to 59%) and moves from ‘fully’/’mainly’ to ‘mainly’/’partially’, with ‘not at all’ responses 
increasing (albeit only from zero to 3): 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the 
MOD and the UK Defence Industry are 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially 
Which sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 15 8 4 27 (24%) 
Army 5 13 4 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 5 11 6 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 7 10 4 21 (20%) 
Defence Industry 9 5 1 15 (14%) 
Total 41 47 19 107 
Table D-21: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Mutual Dependence (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
Which sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 8 11 9 0 28 (26%) 
Army 3 11 8 0 22 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 4 9 8 1 22 (20%) 
Civil Service 4 3 12 2 21 (20%) 
Defence Industry 7 4 4 0 15 (14%) 
Total 26 38 41 3 108 
Table D-22: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Mutual Dependence (ought) 
The correspondence analysis of this data reflects this, but only the closeness of the Defence Industry with ‘fully’ (for ‘is’ and ‘ought’) is made 
apparent: 
 
Figure D-7: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Mutual Dependence (is/ought) 
The same shift is seen in the crosstabulation data for Rank/Position/Role: 
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To what extent do you believe that the 
MOD and the UK Defence Industry 
are dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
3 8 4 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
22 19 7 48 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
14 18 7 39 (36%) 
OR1-5/Other 2 2 1 5 (5%) 
Total 41 47 19 107 
Table D-23: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Mutual Dependence (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
3 6 6 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
12 19 16 1 48 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
9 12 17 2 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 2 1 2 0 5 (4%) 
Total 26 38 41 3 108 
Table D-24: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Mutual Dependence (ought) 
The correspondence analysis also displays the shift: 
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Figure D-8: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Mutual Dependence (is/ought) 
There is limited movement to suggest any interpretation of the data, but the shift continues with respect to Education Level: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the 
MOD and the UK Defence Industry 
are dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially 
What is your highest 
level of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 1 2 1 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 5 5 2 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 13 7 1 21 (20%) 
Masters 19 28 15 62 (57%) 
Doctorate 1 3 0 4 (4%) 
Other 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Total 41 47 19 107 
Table D-25: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Mutual Dependence (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 1 1 2 0 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 1 0 1 2 (2%) 
Diploma 4 4 4 0 12 (10%) 
Undergraduate degree 6 8 7 0 21 (20%) 
Masters 14 22 26 1 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 1 2 1 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 0 1 1 2 (2%) 
Total 26 38 41 3 108 
Table D-26: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Mutual Dependence (ought) 
In this instance, the single case (Trade Certificate) can treated as an outlier that skews the picture, which otherwise displays the same shift:   
  
Figure D-9: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Mutual Dependence (is/ought) 
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Finally, the crosstabulation data for Gender and Age reproduce the result: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the 
MOD and the UK Defence Industry 
are dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially 
What is your gender 
identity?  
Man 37 43 17 97 (91%) 
Woman 4 4 2 10 (9%) 
Total 41 47 19 107 
Table D-27: Crosstabulation of Gender against Mutual Dependence (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 25 36 34 3 98 (91%) 
Woman 1 2 7 0 10 (9%) 
Total 26 38 41 3 108 
Table D-28: Crosstabulation of Gender and Mutual Dependence (ought) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the 
MOD and the UK Defence Industry are 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially 
What is your age? 20-29 0 1 2 3 (3%) 
30-39 5 7 1 13 (12%) 
40-49 17 23 8 48 (45%) 
50-59 18 15 8 41 (39%) 
60-69 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 41 46 19 106 
Table D-29: Crosstabulation of Age against Mutual Dependence (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD 
and the UK Defence Industry should be 
dependent on one another? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 1 2 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 7 6 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 14 15 20 0 49 (45%) 
50-59 11 14 13 3 41 (39%) 
60-69 1 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 26 37 41 3 107 
Table D-30: Crosstabulation of Age against Mutual Dependence (ought) 
D.2.4 Movement of people from MOD to Industry 
Having explored perceptions of trust and interdependence, the next question focused specifically on the movement of people between public 
and private sectors with respect to Defence, seeking to use this as an indirect proxy for understanding the extent to which respondents would 
countenance integration. The expectation was that this would reveal an acceptance of movement from the MOD to the Defence Industry, but 
that this would be sharply distinguished from a belief that little or no movement should occur in the opposite direction. The crosstabulation 
data for Sector/Service bear out the first part, with the only change between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ being one data point: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to move 
employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
Which 
sector/service 
do you work in? 
Royal Navy 0 8 13 5 2 27 (24%) 
Army 0 5 4 10 3 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 0 6 5 8 3 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 1 3 5 7 5 21 (20%) 
Defence 
Industry 
0 1 7 5 1 14 (14%) 
Total 1 23 34 35 14 107 
Table D-31: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Movement from MOD to Industry (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
Which 
sector/service 
do you work 
in? 
Royal Navy 1 8 10 7 2 27 (24%) 
Army 1 3 5 9 4 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 0 6 3 9 4 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 0 1 7 7 6 21 (20%) 
Defence 
Industry 
0 4 8 3 0 15 (14%) 
Total 2 22 33 35 16 108 
Table D-32: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Movement from MOD to Industry (ought) 
Note, however, that when combined with the correspondence analysis this reveals that the results are not identical and in fact there is 
movement across the Sectors/Services. In particular, the Civil Service data show a shift from ‘is’ (19% either ‘100%-75%’ or ‘74%-50%’) to 
‘ought’ (5%), although the number of data points is low (n=21). The correspondence analysis also shows the position change of ‘100%-75%’: 
 
Figure D-10: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Movement from MOD to Industry (is/ought) 
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The data are repeated for Rank/Position/Role: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 1 3 8 2 14 (13%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
1 12 14 15 6 48 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
0 10 14 11 5 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 0 3 1 1 5 (5%) 
Total 1 23 34 35 14 107 
Table D-33: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Movement from MOD to Industry (is) 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 3 4 6 2 15 (13%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
1 11 13 15 8 48 (45%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands E-
C/Staff 
1 8 13 12 6 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 0 3 2 0 5 (5%) 
Total 2 22 33 35 16 108 
Table D-34: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Movement from MOD to Industry (ought) 
The correspondence analysis also reveals little additional detail: 
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Figure D-11: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Movement from MOD to Industry (is/ought) 
The crosstabulation data for Education Level shows relative stability between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, especially at Masters level: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 0 1 2 1 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 2 3 5 2 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
0 5 9 4 2 20 (19%) 
Masters 1 15 17 21 9 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 0 2 2 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 1 23 34 35 14 107 
Table D-35: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Movement from MOD to Industry (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 1 1 1 1 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 1 0 6 4 1 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
0 6 7 6 2 21 (19%) 
Masters 1 14 17 20 11 63 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 0 1 3 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 1 0 0 1 2 (2%) 
Total 2 22 33 35 16 108 
Table D-36: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Movement from MOD to Industry (ought) 
The correspondence data is also consistent: 
  
Figure D-12: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Movement from MOD to Industry (is/ought) 
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Finally, both Gender and Age provide no exceptions: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 1 19 32 32 13 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 4 2 3 1 10 (9%) 
Total 1 23 34 35 14 107 
Table D-37: Crosstabulation of Gender against Movement from MOD to Industry (is) 
 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 1 21 29 33 14 98 (91%) 
Woman 1 1 4 2 2 10 (9%) 
Total 2 22 33 35 16 108 
Table D-38: Crosstabulation of Gender against Movement from MOD to Industry (ought) 
 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 1 2 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 3 7 1 2 13 (12%) 
40-49 0 13 12 17 6 48 (45%) 
50-59 1 7 13 14 6 41 (39%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 1 23 34 34 14 106 
Table D-39: Crosstabulation of Age against Movement from MOD to Industry (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe should be expected to 
move employment from the MOD to the UK Defence Industry? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 2 1 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 1 1 5 4 2 13 (12%) 
40-49 1 12 17 12 7 49 (45%) 
50-59 0 9 8 17 7 41 (39%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 2 22 33 34 16 107 
Table D-40: Crosstabulation of Age against Movement from MOD to Industry (ought) 
In summary, there is no shift from ‘is’ to ought’ and this is constant across all the supplementary variables. 
D.2.5 Movement of people from Industry to MOD 
Beginning with Sector/Service, the prediction that movement from the Defence Industry to the MOD would find less favour was disconfirmed. 
Instead of the constancy of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in transition from the MOD, transfer of people to the MOD elicited a positive shift (3% to 5% of 
respondents for 100-50% movement or 14% to 34% for 100-25% movement): 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 0 0 1 26 1 28 (26%) 
Army 0 0 2 18 2 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 0 2 4 12 4 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 1 0 3 13 3 20 (18%) 
Defence Industry 0 0 2 13 0 15 (14%) 
Total 1 2 12 82 10 107 
Table D-41: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Movement from Industry to MOD (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe should be 
expected to move employment from the UK 
Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 1 10 13 3 27 (26%) 
Army 0 6 13 2 21 (20%) 
Royal Air Force 3 4 7 8 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 1 4 9 6 20 (19%) 
Defence Industry 0 7 8 0 15 (14%) 
Total 5 31 50 19 105 
Table D-42: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Movement from Industry to MOD (ought) 
Although a majority of respondents believe that little or no movement should occur (24-0%), the correspondence analysis suggests that this 
shift is associated most with some movement (49-25%) for the Royal Navy and the Defence Industry: 
  
Figure D-13: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Movement from Industry to MOD (is/ought) 
The shift is displayed again for Rank/Position/Role and is concentrated on the 49-25% value: 
  272 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 0 0 14 1 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
1 2 6 34 4 47 (44%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands E-
C/Staff 
0 0 3 32 5 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 0 3 2 0 5 (5%) 
Total 1 2 12 82 10 107 
Table D-43: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Movement from Industry to MOD (is) 
 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe 
should be expected to move employment from 
the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 5 9 1 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
4 14 21 6 45 (43%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands E-
C/Staff 
1 11 16 12 40 (38%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 1 4 0 5 (5%) 
Total 5 31 50 19 105 
Table D-44: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Movement from Industry to MOD (ought) 
The correspondence analysis suggests that this shift is most closely associated with OF4-5/Bands B-A/Manager/Supervisor, or those people 
most involved in the practical business of Defence acquisition: 
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Figure D-14: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Movement from Industry to MOD (is/ought) 
The data are reproduced when crosstabulated with Education Level and the shift is most apparent at Masters: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
highest level 
of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 0 0 3 1 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 0 2 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 0 2 9 1 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 0 0 4 16 1 21 (19%) 
Masters 1 2 6 47 6 62 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 0 0 4 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 0 0 1 1 2 (2%) 
Total 1 2 12 82 10 107 
Table D-45: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Movement from Industry to MOD (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe 
should be expected to move employment from the 
UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
highest level 
of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 2 1 1 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 1 1 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 4 6 2 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 1 6 11 3 21 (20%) 
Masters 4 19 27 10 60 (57%) 
Doctorate 0 0 4 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 0 0 2 2 (2%) 
Total 5 31 50 19 105 
Table D-46: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Movement between Industry and MOD (ought) 
The correspondence analysis shows the closer association of Masters, Undergraduate degree and Diploma with 49-25%: 
  
Figure D-15: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Movement between Industry and MOD (is/ought) 
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Finally, the same shift in beliefs is displayed for Gender and Age: 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 1 2 10 74 10 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 0 2 8 0 10 (9%) 
Total 1 2 12 82 10 107 
Table D-47: Crosstabulation of Gender against Movement from Industry to MOD (is) 
 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe should be 
expected to move employment from the UK 
Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 4 28 46 17 95 (90%) 
Woman 1 3 4 2 10 (10%) 
Total 5 31 50 19 105 
Table D-48: Crosstabulation of Gender against Movement from Industry to MOD (ought) 
 
 
 
What proportion of people do you believe can be expected to 
move employment from the UK Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 100-75% 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 1 2 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 0 2 10 1 13 (12%) 
40-49 0 2 6 35 6 49 (46%) 
50-59 1 0 2 34 3 40 (38%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 1 2 12 81 10 106 
Table D-49: Crosstabulation of Age against Movement between Industry and MOD (is) 
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What proportion of people do you believe should be 
expected to move employment from the UK 
Defence Industry to the MOD? 
Total 74-50% 49-25% 24-0% No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 1 1 1 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 4 6 3 13 (13%) 
40-49 3 19 16 10 48 (45%) 
50-59 1 7 25 6 39 (38%) 
60-69 0 0 1 0 1 (1%) 
Total 5 31 49 19 104 
Table D-50: Crosstabulation of Age against Movement between Industry and MOD (ought) 
In summary, the data suggest that there is some movement from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ with respect to people moving from the Defence Industry to the 
MOD, which stands in opposition to movement in the other direction. Although this shift is common across the supplementary variables, it is 
not yet clear why there is a difference. 
D.2.6 Common values 
The penultimate question pair targeted commonality of values between the MOD and Defence Industry. The first crosstabulation against 
Sector/Service shows the now anticipated shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought” (22% to 64%): 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service 
do you work in? 
Royal Navy 0 10 17 1 0 28 (26%) 
Army 0 1 14 6 1 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 0 4 15 3 0 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 0 3 15 1 1 20 (18%) 
Defence Industry 1 5 7 2 0 15 (14%) 
Total 1 23 68 13 2 107 
Table D-51: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Common Values (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service 
do you work in? 
Royal Navy 4 13 10 1 0 28 (26%) 
Army 1 11 10 0 0 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 1 11 9 0 1 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 4 10 6 0 0 20 (18%) 
Defence Industry 5 8 2 0 0 15 (14%) 
Total 15 53 37 1 1 107 
Table D-52: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Common Values (ought) 
The movement of ‘fully’ is clearly displayed in the correspondence analysis, together with its close association of the Defence Industry and the 
placement of ‘mainly’ at the origin: 
  
Figure D-16: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Common Values (is/ought) 
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This is repeated for Rank/Position/Role: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
1 3 10 1 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
0 9 31 6 1 47 (44%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
0 9 25 5 1 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 2 2 1 0 5 (5%) 
Total 1 23 68 13 2 107 
Table D-53: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Common Values (is) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
1 8 6 0 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
5 22 18 1 1 47 (44%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
7 21 12 0 0 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 2 2 1 0 0 5 (5%) 
Total 15 53 37 1 1 107 
Table D-54: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Common Values (ought) 
The correspondence analysis also demonstrates this with the movement of ‘fully’ again apparent, although lower ranks/roles are most closely 
associated with the origin and ‘mainly’: 
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Figure D-17: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Common Values (is/ought) 
The crosstabulation with Education Level repeats the pattern: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level 
of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 0 1 3 0 0 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 2 9 1 0 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 1 6 10 3 1 21 (19%) 
Masters 0 14 39 8 1 62 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 0 3 1 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 1 23 68 13 2 107 
Table D-55: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Common Values (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level 
of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 2 1 1 0 0 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 4 7 1 0 0 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 5 9 7 0 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 4 33 23 1 1 62 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 2 2 0 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 15 53 37 1 1 107 
Table D-56: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Common Values (ought) 
Here again there is movement of ‘fully’ and a close association of ‘mainly’ with Masters level: 
  
Figure D-18: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Common Values (is/ought) 
Finally, the shift is also shown in the crosstabulations of Gender and Age: 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 1 22 62 11 1 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 1 6 2 1 10 (9%) 
Total 1 23 68 13 2 107 
Table D-57: Crosstabulation of Gender against Common Values (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 15 48 32 1 1 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 5 5 0 0 10 (9%) 
Total 15 53 37 1 1 107 
Table D-58: Crosstabulation of Gender against Common Values (ought) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 3 0 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 2 9 1 1 13 (12%) 
40-49 1 12 28 7 1 49 (46%) 
50-59 0 8 27 5 0 40 (38%) 
60-69 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 1 23 67 13 2 106 
Table D-59: Crosstabulation of Age against Common Values (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that the MOD and the UK 
Defence Industry should have common values? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 3 0 0 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 1 4 8 0 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 6 29 13 0 1 49 (46%) 
50-59 7 17 15 1 0 40 (38%) 
60-69 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 15 53 36 1 1 106 
Table D-60: Crosstabulation of Age against Common Values (ought) 
These results suggest that commonality of values is presupposed as a default (‘ought’) across all supplementary variables, but is opposed in 
practice (‘is’). 
D.2.7 Defence as a single enterprise 
The final question pair asked about the extent to which Defence should be managed across the MOD and Industry (the Enterprise Approach 
of the case study). The crosstabulation against Sector/Service shows another shift, but not as large as for common values (11% to 45%): 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence is managed as 
a single enterprise that includes both the MOD and the Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
Which 
sector/service 
do you work 
in? 
Royal Navy 1 4 16 7 0 28 (26%) 
Army 0 1 8 12 1 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 0 2 10 10 0 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 0 2 10 7 1 20 (18%) 
Defence 
Industry 
0 2 5 8 0 15 (14%) 
Total 1 11 49 44 2 107 
Table D-61: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Enterprise Management (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that UK Defence should 
be managed as a single enterprise that includes both 
the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
Which 
sector/service do 
you work in? 
Royal Navy 7 8 10 3 28 (26%) 
Army 1 4 15 2 22 (21%) 
Royal Air Force 2 9 11 0 22 (21%) 
Civil Service 0 7 9 4 20 (18%) 
Defence Industry 3 7 5 0 15 (14%) 
Total 13 35 50 9 107 
Table D-62: Crosstabulation of Sector/Service against Enterprise Management (ought) 
The correspondence analysis suggests that the shift is more closely associated with the Royal Navy and, to a lesser extent, the Defence 
Industry and Royal Air Force: 
  
Figure D-19: Correspondence analysis of Sector/Service and Enterprise Management 
These results are duplicated for Rank/Position/Role: 
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To what extent do you believe that UK Defence is managed as 
a single enterprise that includes both the MOD and the Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
0 1 7 7 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
0 4 22 21 0 47 (44%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
1 5 20 12 2 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 1 0 4 0 5 (5%) 
Total 1 11 49 44 2 107 
Table D-63: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Enterprise Management (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence should 
be managed as a single enterprise that includes both 
the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
rank/position/role? 
OF6-10/SCS/Senior 
Manager 
3 5 7 0 15 (14%) 
OF4-5/CS Bands B-
A/Manager/Supervisor 
6 14 25 2 47 (44%) 
OR6-OF3/CS Bands 
E-C/Staff 
4 13 16 7 40 (37%) 
OR1-5/Other 0 3 2 0 5 (5%) 
Total 13 35 50 9 107 
Table D-64: Crosstabulation of Rank/Position/Role against Enterprise Management (ought) 
The correspondence analysis again shows the limits of the shift relative to commonality of values and places ‘partially’ at the origin: 
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Figure D-20: Correspondence analysis of Rank/Position/Role and Enterprise Management (is/ought) 
The data are reproduced for Education Level, with a shift of 8% to 35% at Masters: 
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To what extent do you believe that UK Defence is managed as a 
single enterprise that includes both the MOD and the Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
highest level 
of education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 1 1 0 2 0 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 0 1 1 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 0 2 4 5 1 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 0 2 10 9 0 21 (19%) 
Masters 0 5 31 25 1 62 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 0 2 2 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2%) 
Total 1 11 49 44 2 107 
Table D-65: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Enterprise Management (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence should 
be managed as a single enterprise that includes both 
the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your 
highest level of 
education 
obtained? 
Secondary school 1 1 2 0 4 (4%) 
Trade certificate 0 2 0 0 2 (2%) 
Diploma 1 4 6 1 12 (11%) 
Undergraduate degree 3 11 5 2 21 (19%) 
Masters 8 14 35 5 62 (58%) 
Doctorate 0 2 2 0 4 (4%) 
Other 0 1 0 1 2 (2%) 
Total 13 35 50 9 107 
Table D-66: Crosstabulation of Education Level against Enterprise Management (ought) 
The correspondence analysis displays the movement of ‘fully’, but associates Masters level education more closely with ‘partially’ and 
Undergraduates with ‘mainly’: 
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Figure D-21: Correspondence analysis of Education Level and Enterprise Management (is/ought) 
Lastly, the data for Gender and Age demonstrate the shift to the same degree: 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence is managed as 
a single enterprise that includes both the MOD and the Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
gender identity?  
Man 1 10 43 41 2 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 1 6 3 0 10 (9%) 
Total 1 11 49 44 2 107 
Table D-67: Crosstabulation of Gender against Enterprise Management (is) 
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To what extent do you believe that UK Defence should 
be managed as a single enterprise that includes both 
the MOD and the Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your gender 
identity?  
Man 13 31 46 7 97 (91%) 
Woman 0 4 4 2 10 (9%) 
Total 13 35 50 9 107 
Table D-68: Crosstabulation of Gender against Enterprise Management (ought) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence is managed as 
a single enterprise that includes both the MOD and the Defence 
Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all No opinion 
What is your 
age? 
20-29 0 0 1 2 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 1 9 3 0 13 (12%) 
40-49 1 5 20 22 1 49 (46%) 
50-59 0 5 19 15 1 40 (38%) 
60-69 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1%) 
Total 1 11 49 43 2 106 
Table D-69: Crosstabulation of Age against Enterprise Management (is) 
 
 
To what extent do you believe that UK Defence should be 
managed as a single enterprise that includes both the MOD and 
the Defence Industry? 
Total Fully Mainly Partially Not at all 
What is your age? 20-29 0 2 1 0 3 (3%) 
30-39 0 4 7 2 13 (12%) 
40-49 8 15 22 4 49 (46%) 
50-59 5 13 19 3 40 (38%) 
60-69 0 1 0 0 1 (1%) 
Total 13 35 49 9 106 
Table D-70: Crosstabulation of Age against Enterprise Management (ought)  
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D.2.8 Summary 
As stated in the results and findings, taken together (with the sole exception of the movement of personnel from the MOD to 
Industry), the survey responses show a definite shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. This is a result that required an explanation because it 
demonstrates that the people surveyed regard the relationship between the MOD and the Defence Industry to be other than it 
might be. Furthermore, the correspondence analysis suggested that Sector/Service and Rank/Position/Role are more 
important in influencing the perceptions of the Defence acquisition field; therefore, these were given greater focus during the 
subsequent interviews and in exploring the survey comments because they were likely to be among the primary forms of 
capital that structure the field. In particular, the analysis suggested that the closest association with the case study’s Enterprise 
Approach involves the Royal Navy and the Defence Industry, so – in accordance with the methodology adopted – it was in the 
relationship between the two that the generation of a critical case was most likely. 
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Appendix E – Glossary of key terms 
 
Acquisition The activities of setting and managing requirements, 
negotiating and letting contracts, project and technology 
management, support and termination or disposal, all 
based on a through life approach to acquiring military 
capability. 
Akrasia Acting against one’s better judgment. 
Capital Accumulated labour that social actors struggle to define, 
gain and control, commonly described in economic, 
social or cultural terms. 
Consequentialism The ethical theory that an action is right or wrong insofar 
as it has positive or negative consequences respectively. 
Critical realism A social science research paradigm, according to which 
the social world consists in empirical experience, 
meanings and mechanisms, with the last necessary to 
explain social phenomena and serving to identify and 
challenge power relations. 
Deontology The ethical theory that what is right is determined by 
duties, instead of or even irrespective of consequences. 
Descriptive ethics The study and depiction of how people actually act, make 
ethical decisions and judge the ethical choices of others. 
Doxa The cognitive and evaluative presuppositions that people 
accede to in the social world. 
Ethics A systematic conception of right and wrong behaviour. 
Field Social structures in which social actors struggle over 
capital relative to their positions. 
Habitus Systems of durable, transposable dispositions that 
provide social actors with an unconscious calculation of 
what is possible, probable, improbable, or impossible for 
people in their specific locations in the stratified social 
order. 
Heuristic Rules-of-thumb that enabler quicker decisions by ignoring 
some information. 
Ideal type An analytical construct that serves to stress the logic of 
social relations and interactions, allowing this construct to 
then be applied to other contexts. 
Identity A sense of self-image that refers to the meanings that 
people attribute to themselves, whether as individuals or 
as members of groups. 
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Illusio An acceptance by social actors of what is or is not 
conceivable and acceptable within a field. 
Integrated Social 
Contracts Theory 
An ethical theory that achieves an accommodation 
between macro norms that everyone in society should 
endorse and context-dependent micro norms that are 
actually applied within communities in daily life. 
Narrative A method of recapitulating past social experience as the 
conjunction of stories and a controlling plot. 
Normative ethics The philosophical consideration of ethical problems 
through identifying norms to govern conduct, often by 
invoking principles that determine whether acts are 
ethical or not. 
Practice The interaction of field, capital and habitus, which creates 
what social actors do in a specific field in specific 
circumstances. 
Principal-Agent 
problem 
A problem in business ethics in which shareholders 
provide resources for and direction on what a business 
should do, but the agents who carry out this intent 
choose to deviate from it to suit their own needs. 
Shareholder theory A theory of business ethics, which argues that it is the 
responsibility of business managers to maximise 
shareholder profit because companies are the private 
property of their owners; therefore, businesses can have 
no social or ethical responsibilities beyond this fiduciary 
duty. 
Stakeholder theory A theory of business ethics, which asserts that anyone 
with a stake in a business’s activities is due ethical 
consideration, regardless of their legal position relative to 
the company. 
Symbolic capital Capital that has been legitimised through social actors 
recognising its possession as conferring authority. 
Symbolic power The power to establish exchange rates between forms of 
capital and, thereby, legitimate the way societies are 
structured and stratified into hierarchies. 
Symbolic violence Adjusting behaviour to social power as a practical 
adaptation rather than an act of consent, leaving power 
structures intact and resulting in the dominated 
misperceiving their positions as inevitable. 
 
